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This dissertation defends a positive answer to the question: “Can a videogame
be a work of art?” To achieve this goal I develop definitions of several concepts,
primarily ‘art’, ‘games’, and ‘videogames’, and analyze arguments about the com-
patibility between these notions.
In Part One, I defend a definition of art from amongst several contemporary
and historical accounts. This definition, the Intentional-Historical account, requires,
among other things, that an artwork have the right kind of creative intentions behind
it, in short that the work be intended to be regarded in a particular manner. This
is a leading account that has faced several recent objections that I address while
arguing that it is superior to other theories in its ability to answer the question of
videogames’ art status.
Part Two examines whether games can exhibit that kind of creative intention.
Recent literature has suggested that they can. I propose and defend an account
of games according to which games cannot be intended to be works of art because
games are goal-directed activities that require a voluntary selection of inefficient
means that is incompatible with the proper manner of regarding that is necessary
for artworks.
While the conclusions of Part One and Part Two appear to suggest that
videogames cannot be works of art, Part Three proposes and defends a new account
of videogames that, contrary to first appearances, implies that not all videogames are
games. This Intentional-Historical Formalist account allows for non-game videogames
to be created with an art-making intention, though not every non-game videogame
will have an art-making intention behind it. I also discuss examples of videogames
that are good candidates for being works of art. I conclude that a videogame can
be a work of art, but that not all videogames are works of art.
The thesis is of significance in several respects. It is a continuation of aca-
demic work that has focused on the ontology of videogames and the art status of
videogames. It clarifies the current debate and provides a positive account of the
central issues that has so far been lacking. It also defines videogames in a way that
corresponds better with the actual practice of videogame making and playing than
other definitions in the literature. It offers further evidence in defense of certain
theories of art over others, providing a close examination of videogames as a new
case study for potential art objects and for aesthetic and artistic theory in general.
This project also provides the groundwork for new evaluative, critical, and
appreciative tools for engagement with videogames as they develop as a medium. As
videogames mature, more people, both inside and outside academia, have increasing
interest in what they are and how to understand them. One place many have
looked is to the practice of art appreciation. My project helps make sense of which
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1.1 The Art Question for Videogames
To begin to answer the question of whether videogames are art one should first
check to see if the question has already been answered. Some answers have indeed
been offered, often of the general sort, either explicitly or not, whereby either all
videogames are art or none are. The question of the art status of videogames can
begin by addressing these claims, as well as taking into consideration the reasons
and methodologies used by those offering such answers. The question should be ap-
proached carefully by first dissecting the question itself and attending to each part.
This approach avoids careless haste in categorization, and provides a framework
in which disagreement can occur without demanding that one start from scratch.
Furthermore, checking to see if there are already satisfying answers to the art ques-
tion for videogames allows the borrowing of what good work has been done while
hopefully allowing for the quick discharging of the large amount of questionable
opinion-mongering that has also taken place. From the philosophical camp, such an
approach can also act as a response to what has perhaps been a hasty over-inclusion
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of videogames by extant art theories.1
The first place to start is with the question itself: “Are Videogames Art?” This
is not the most perspicuous formulation of the question as it entails an all or nothing
approach that we should be wary of. It may be the case that some videogames are
artworks while others are not. This does not make videogames unique, but rather is
true of other so-called artforms as well. It is not the case that all books are art, nor
all music and movies, not even all paintings and sculptures. Biographies may fail to
be artworks while novels succeed as such. Advertising jingles can succeed in being
music while failing to be art. Summer blockbusters are not only movies but may
even be a central paradigm case of the form while also failing to be art. And finally,
if a painting is simply paint on a flat surface and sculpture some non-utilitarian
created object in three-dimensions, then clearly there are paintings and sculptures
that are not artworks.
The idea that there could be both art and non-art works that are made from
the same materials meets an objection in medium materialism. This is the idea that
media are to be identified primarily by the physical stuff that they are made of. This
is a reasonable prima facie position, as it seems evident that paintings are indeed
made of paint on canvas or board or other flat support, sculptures made of marble
or metal, and music made of tones. This view arises from the belief that an artform
can be identified with its medium in the pursuit of making art that exploits that
medium for its artistic ends in a way that other media cannot. Clement Greenberg
1See [1] for an absolute positive, if not fully fleshed out, answer to the question of whether
videogames can be artworks.
2
believed that an art like painting should aim to develop the limits of the medium,
and thus painting should be kept pure with no admixture from the other arts. For
him, “discussion as to purity in art and, bound up with it, the attempts to establish
the differences between the various arts are not idle.”2 For Greenberg, an art goes
wrong when it becomes confused about its medium and tries to do what other arts
do.
The question, then, is whether medium specificity entails medium material-
ism. Noël Carroll notes that the thesis of medium specificity seems to lead to the
conclusion that “one need only examine the physical structure of the medium, and
the sort of effects the art form based in that medium should traffic in more or less
jumps out at one.”3 He immediately considers the problems with this view, as it
is not obvious for each art what the physical medium is, or for some arts whether
they even have a physical medium. For instance, is print, rather than language, the
medium of the novel?
Dominic Lopes continues in this skeptical vein, noting that the rise of digital
works created and instanced on computers demonstrates a further problem. For
these arts, and others, there is significant overlap, if not outright identity, among
the physical media of these arts.4 If medium materialism is correct, then these would
all be works within the same art, which is absurd. The solution is to expand the
notion of medium to include technical resources, which, “may be symbolic (e.g. a
language), and events like the sounding of a c-sharp and an actor’s movement.”5 Im-
2 [2]
3 [3, p. 7]
4 [4, p. 138]
5 [4, p. 138-139]
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portantly, we can also include techniques, separating out different ways of engaging
with a physical medium and employing technical resources. This expanded notion
of medium looks to the particulars of the individual arts to discover what goes into
making an object an object in that category. This can even include resources like
requirements or expectations of particular kinds of responses to the work.
Extending the idea of medium to include particular response, however, raises
the possibility of an odd kind of medium specificity, one too divorced from the physi-
cal medium. This is the idea that an art’s medium is just that, an art-medium. Thus
the medium of painting, with all its physical components and technical resources, is
not painting, but art-painting. This threatens to make medium specificity trivial, in
that it is no longer exploring the affordances and limitations of a physical medium,
or even that of technical resources, but says only that the appreciative practices of
a category of art are indeed the appreciative practices of that category of art. This
leaves whatever other objects are created in that physical medium, even those using
similar technical resources and techniques, as simply failing to be members of that
art-medium. More will be said on this below, but for now the objection is sufficient
that an overly inclusive conception of a medium that builds in art status would
have awkward consequences, not being able to make sense of (non-art-)paintings
and art-paintings as being members of the same medium. My brief argument here
thus suggests that while we must acknowledge technical resources in our notion of
medium, such acknowledgment should not extend to art status as well.
If we leave out the art status of the members of a medium from considera-
tion of membership in that medium, then we are left with the possibility that some
4
objects made in a particular medium are artworks and others are not. The art-
status-independence of media justifies a reformulation of the original question, “Are
videogames art?’ as “Can videogames be art?” or perhaps even more perspicuously
as “Can videogames be artworks?”6 Because the art status of an object is indepen-
dent of its being in a medium, it can turn out that when considering all the objects
in the medium “videogames”, some of them may turn out to be artworks while
others may not. This, I believe, is a preferable position to one according to which
within the seemingly unified medium of videogames there are actually at least two
media, videogames and art-videogames. More will be said on this later in defense
of a specific definition of art.
1.2 Definitions of Art
The task now, after reformulating the art question for videogames, is to make
clear what it would mean for any particular videogame to be an artwork. Then we
can check to see, not if all videogames as a medium meet those criteria, whatever
they may be, but if there are any videogames that do. Before there is a need to delve
into whatever particulars there may be about what videogames are, and whether
those particulars add up to making them artworks, we should consider whether there
is an adequate definition of art that has an answer to this question at the ready.
Several accounts and definitions have been given, of all manner of importance in the
literature, many of which may prove satisfactory to the art question of videogames.
6The second reformulation is meant to capture potentially different aims of investigation, where
the aim of analyzing the practice of art may be one thing and the aim of providing an extension,
or subset thereof, of artworks is a different one.
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If there are satisfactory definitions of art that do not also require a definition of
videogames, but only certain features that videogames have, then all the better.
If one is going to tackle this issue of whether videogames are art or not, or if
they sometimes can be, a natural place to start seems to be with first answering the
question of what art is. This is not an easy task, nor do I claim to accomplish it here.
But I will motivate a particular account, the Intentional-Historical account, in con-
trast to its alternatives, in particular two prominent competitors, the Institutional
Theory and the Cluster Account. I take this approach for several reasons.
First I find the Intentional-Historical account the most promising as a general
account of art, and of making sense of the art status of emerging forms of art,
and thus likely to be the best account under which to examine videogames’ art
potential, and, in Part 3, under which to provide a definition of videogames. Second,
I consider the Institutional Theory for two reasons. First, it is a popular theory
that has received a lot of attention and been given several important and subtle
treatments. It is also of a broad class of accounts of art that the Intentional-
Historical account is at least related to. Second, it gives a trivial answer about the
art status of videogames, revealing its weakness as a general theory and highlighting
the usefulness of videogames as a test case for art theory.
Third, one of the most sustained analytic philosophical treatments of videogames
is given by Grant Tavinor, where he employs the Cluster Account in giving a posi-
tive answer to the art question of videogames. This demands a response if I am to
defend a different theory in its place and so I consider the Cluster Account. I dis-
agree with the Cluster Account on independent grounds, but in particular because
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it fails to tell a convincing story, one way or the other, about videogames. Like the
institutional theory, the cluster account does not give us a satisfying answer to the
art question of videogames. But unlike the institutional theory, which fails by giving
too trivial an answer, the cluster account fails because it cannot give an answer at
all.
1.3 A Consideration of Historically Important Accounts
A benefit of starting with the art element of the question is that if there fails
to be an adequate definition of art at hand, then it will allow videogames, and
the question of their art status, to serve as a test case for the extant theories in
question. With that said, the natural place to begin is with older accounts and
definitions of art that have rightly been set aside, but may still be enlightening to
consider. Despite their obvious problems and shortcomings, there is insight to be
had in just which ways they fail to provide a satisfactory answer to the question
of videogames’ art status. In particular this is useful because, while philosophical
aesthetics has effectively refuted many a traditional art theory, the lay debate on the
art status of videogames continues to appeal to several of these theories or implicit
accounts of art status that are relevantly similar to them.
1.3.1 Kant’s Analytic of the Beautiful
Kant’s theories on beauty and art are difficult, bordering on arcane. Despite
this, several of Kant’s ideas, not all of them unique to him, have permeated much
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common thought about art and beauty. Chief among them, and one often encoun-
tered in discussions about the art status of videogames, is the connection between
art and beauty, or at least the aesthetic. It is a familiar argument that if an object
is beautiful, then it is art. First we’ll consider Kant’s actual theory, and then look
at more general formulations of it.
Kant’s analytic of the beautiful, found in the third critique, his Critique of
Judgment, is part of his overall project tying together his theories on metaphysics,
epistemology, ethics, and human cognition. Kant’s first concern here is to make
sense of our judgments of beauty. In particular, Kant argued that our judgments
of beauty are disinterested and that they find objects to appear to be purposive
without purpose.
Our judgments of beauty are disinterested. By this Kant means that it is
distinct from the pleasure we get from something because it is agreeable. We do
get pleasure from the contemplation of something beautiful, but the order of the
relationship between the contemplation and the pleasure matters. We take plea-
sure in finding something beautiful, rather than judging something to be beautiful
because we find it pleasurable. Much has been made about this disinterestedness
criterion, but a conservative interpretation says that it is only that we should find
things beautiful because they are so and not for some other reason. So while judg-
ments of beauty are based on pleasure, it is a distinct kind of pleasure, notably
one disconnected from our desire for the object. I ought not judge my couch to be
beautiful because it is pleasing to sit on, nor my friend’s drawings beautiful because
they were done my friend, or a garden beautiful because I was paid to judge it so.
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At the very least the disinterestedness criterion is a prohibition against a kind of
cognitive corruption of untoward influence. Beauty judgments are to be made freely
from, or indifferent to, other concerns.7
Our beauty judgments also find objects to appear to be made with a purpose
without having an actual purpose. We know what it means to recognize the purpose
of an object and to see how it was shaped or designed to accomplish that purpose.
Many objects that we judge to be beautiful, however, were not manufactured, like
sunsets and flowers.8 In judging something to be beautiful, we recognize that it
appears as if it had been created for some purpose without actually having any
such purpose.
Kant also gives an account of the pleasure that beauty generates. It is the
“free play” of the faculties of imagination and understanding. In ordinary cognition
imagination is constrained by the understanding, but this is not the case in the
contemplation of beauty. In these cases the imagination behaves as though it follows
or is constrained by a rule, but in fact it is free. This activity is pleasurable in a
way distinctive of beauty.
Kant’s account of beauty is necessary to his claims about art and art’s relation
to beauty. While Kant thinks that art is judged similarly to natural beauty, his
concern is over how art is created in a way that is consistent with his account of
beauty. He does this by highlighting the role of genius in relation to the artist.
While beauty must seem like it has a purpose without having one and the pleasure
7For more on the order of pleasure and sensation, see [5]. For a discussion on whether beauty
of this sort is best understood as disinterested, see [6].
8Unless we take a strong theistic understanding of Kant’s account. Even then, we can make a
distinction between the recognition of man-made purpose and God-created purpose.
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we take in it must be rule-like without actually being constrained by rules, so too
the creation of beautiful art must seem to follow rules without being constrained by
them. Here the notion of genius is invoked to set artistic activity apart from the
rule-governed tasks of the sciences, which can be learned. For Kant, genius cannot
be learned, but is innate. Thus while it behaves like it is rule-governed in having
standards, these rules cannot be learned and applied, as they can in other activities.
Genius is what allows the artist to create works that represent aesthetic ideas.
An aesthetic idea is related to the free play of the faculties, in that it is an idea
that generates a lot of thought, but for which no determinate thought is adequate.
This can occur when rational thought that cannot have sensible form is nonetheless
expressed. Kant’s examples are works that express the notions of death, envy, love,
and fame.9
So much for a very brief and rough overview of Kant’s account of beauty
and art. While few explicitly invoke Kant’s theory, and I imagine fewer still fully
understand it, something like the ideas he espoused are used to make claims about
the aesthetic quality of some things and the subsequent claim that they are thus
artworks. The first of Kant’s ideas that gets appealed to is that there is something
special about beauty, or at least high aesthetic value. It is difficult to say what
exactly this thing is, and rarely do people make claims about the free play of the
imagination and understanding, but the kernel of the idea is this: there is something
about aesthetic experience that makes it special, and experiencing it gives a kind of
pleasure distinct from other pleasures. This kind of experience has something that
9See also [7], [8], [9].
10
sets it apart from the pleasures of potato chips, or sex, or even a walk in the park.
All of these things have aesthetic qualities, to be sure,10 but there is something
distinct from the aesthetic in these other pleasures. Kant gets this separation right.
This is rather unexceptional as an understanding of the beautiful. Of course
there is something special about it. Where it becomes controversial, and where it
has become pernicious in the common understanding, is the tying of the aesthetic
to the artistic. In this understanding, for something to be art it must be beautiful,
or, extending the notion further, be an aesthetic object, meaning something with
sufficiently high aesthetic value. The aesthetic and the artistic can even be conflated,
which is to say that something being art just is it being notably aesthetic.
These kinds of thoughts on the nature of aesthetic and art lead to obvious
problems, only some of which can be attributed to Kant’s art theory. The conflation
of aesthetic and art is not a Kantian notion, though it is closely related. Kant bases
his aesthetic theory on natural, non-artifactual beauty, and his account makes a
distinction between beautiful artworks and beautiful non-artworks. To answer the
art question, however, we must indeed answer the art question, and not merely the
aesthetic question, unless the two are identical. It is false that something’s having
positive (or negative) aesthetic properties is identical to it being art, nor is the
(mere) possession of positive aesthetic value sufficient to make something art. But
there has been a long-standing connection, indeed a close one, between something’s
10There has been a recent surge of interest in everyday aesthetics. See [10], [11], and [12]. A great
deal of interesting work has been done, and some of it deals with distinctly Kantian ideas about
the relation between form and function, especially when looking at the aesthetics of functional
objects like coffee pots. See [13]. Also work on touch ( [14]), disgust ( [15]), and bodily itches
( [16]).
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either having aesthetic properties, or having high aesthetic quality, and it being art.
This is where Kant’s theory provides the basis for a misunderstanding about
the relation between beauty and art. While it may not be that anything that
possesses aesthetic qualities is art—consider sunsets, flowers, birds—when someone
makes something that exhibits such properties it must be a work of art. The pos-
session of beauty is understood to be not only sufficient for art status, but also
necessary; thus if something is not aesthetically pleasing, it cannot be art. And
the argument works in both directions. If videogames are aesthetically pleasing,
then they are art. If videogames are not aesthetically pleasing, then they cannot be
art. Milder versions of this thesis may posit being aesthetically pleasing as a merely
necessary condition of arthood, but then, of course, it must be said what else is
required.
Thus formulated, we can now check if any videogames meet these conditions.
At first blush, it is uncontroversial that videogames can be beautiful. The vistas
provided by recent videogames like Skyrim and Journey are breathtaking, majestic,
captivating. Crysis and The Vanishing of Ethan Carter have pushed the limits of
the visual fidelity that videogames can accomplish. Even older videogames that do
not benefit from recent advances in graphics technology, like Shadow of the Colossus
and Ōkami can be appreciated for their haunting beauty, scale, and otherwise high
aesthetic value. Similarly, such videogames, like Journey, are often appreciated for
the beauty of their score, or in other cases, like Amnesia: Dark Descent, for the
frenzied anxiety expressed, and caused, by their score.
Both the visual and musical elements of these videogames obviously have aes-
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thetic properties and arguably high aesthetic value. Furthermore, they seem to have
what Kant would call beauty. These features can provide a disinterested pleasure in
beholding the object, and perhaps seem purposive without having purpose. There
is no need, nor the space, to further hash out the particulars about Kant’s theory,
for there is a more pressing problem. Whatever formulation of Kant is arrived at,
it is clear that the visual or audio aspects of any given videogame are at least can-
didates for being beautiful. We could also add Kant’s notion of the sublime and
see that videogames could also provide this kind of experience. In fact, it may be
that videogames, at least ones of a certain type, more often provide sublime than
beautiful experiences. But again, all of this is futile if it turns out that in fact
we are appreciating the wrong thing. It may be that the visual or audio aspect
of videogames could be beautiful or sublime or whatever aesthetic property, but
this may not mean that the videogame possesses that aesthetic property, only some
aspect of it does. Before we address that concern, we can consider Kant among a
larger class of aesthetic theories.
Considering the aesthetic properties of some aspect of any work is also a fine
enough project, but one insufficient to answer the art question for any kind of
object. We might appreciate a violin as particularly beautiful to look at, but to base
any judgment on the music being made on such a judgment would be to make an
incorrect judgment. Less drastically, we might appreciate the beauty of a single still
of a film, but that also would be insufficient to judge the aesthetic quality of the film
as a whole. To answer the art question, we must be inquiring about videogames qua
videogames, not videogames merely as generators of images or producers of sounds,
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or whatever other aesthetic modalities they may include.11
We can generalize from Kant to any aesthetic theory of art. A definition of art
could be given with any specific aesthetic property or set of aesthetic properties as a
sufficient art condition. Or a definition could abstract over all aesthetic properties,
making sufficient for art status that an object possess positive aesthetic properties.
But even with such a general and abstracted theory of art as the possession of high
aesthetic value or good aesthetic properties, there are reasons to reject the theory.
This line of thinking extends to other more recent and contemporary definitions
of art that seek to ground the art status of artworks in the possession of an aesthetic
property. Perhaps the most well-known of these theories is the aesthetic theory
defended by Monroe Beardsley.12 He gives conditions of what the aesthetic is and
argues that artworks are things that exhibit this particular feature in sufficiently high
degree. As with any theory based on the possession of (certain) aesthetic properties,
however, it is both too narrow and broad. It is too narrow in that it excludes
artworks that do not possess these aesthetic features, and it is too broad in including
man-made artifacts that meet these aesthetic criteria, but are not artworks.13
It is clear that videogames, or at least several aspects of them, can have aes-
thetic properties, including positive aesthetic properties. Thus any kind of aesthet-
ically based account of art would categorize at least some videogames as artworks.
11There is an interesting haptic element to many videogames, one that also calls out for aesthetic
appreciation and analysis, perhaps along the tactile lines of what [15] suggests.
12 [17]
13For further criticism of an aesthetic theory of art, and others, see [18]. There are more subtle
contemporary versions of aesthetic theories, like Gary Iseminger’s (see [19]) which is combination of
aesthetic and institutional theories. Critique of views like this will be postponed to the discussion
of institutional theories below.
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What is not clear is that this is the right account of art; it is false that the posses-
sion of aesthetic properties is sufficient to make something art, nor is it necessary to
possess aesthetic properties for something to be art. In the former case, we do not
regard sunsets as art, yet they are paradigmatic cases of beauty. In the latter case,
we have works that are accepted as art by the art community, yet are ugly, perhaps
paintings by Willem de Kooning or Francis Bacon. Even more radically, there are
works that arguably have no aesthetic properties, like Robert Barry’s conceptual
piece All the things I know but of which I am not at the moment thinking – 1:36
PM; June 15, 1969, or works that involve objects that may be argued to possess
aesthetic properties, but whose aesthetic properties are irrelevant to the art status
of the object, like Marcel Duchamp’s The Fountain. One might respond by saying
that for something to be art it must not only possess positive aesthetic properties
(or whatever), but must also be an artifact. But this reply also fails, as there are
many artifacts that possess positive aesthetic properties, yet are not art.
Thus before the art question can be fully answered, as least with regard to
some accounts of art, the need for an account of videogames begins to show itself.
If we are curious about the aesthetic properties and quality of videogames, we must
first get a firmer grip on what videogames are, and make sure we are evaluating
them as a whole work, and not just some aesthetically salient component of them.
It may be that videogames themselves can be beautiful, and it may be that whether
they look or sound beautiful matters, but these are questions that must be set aside
until we can provide a more complete analysis of videogames. Suffice it to say here
that merely possessing aesthetic quality, whether of an aspect or the entire work, is
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insufficient to turn videogames into artworks, nor is a videogame’s lack of aesthetic
quality sufficient to disqualify it from art status. Kant’s theory, while instructive in
helping to get clear on the distinction between the aesthetic and the artistic, cannot
answer the art question of videogames.
1.3.2 Tolstoy’s Transmission Theory
Leo Tolstoy’s theory of art contrasts strongly with Kant’s theory, since Tol-
stoy’s theory is concerned with the effect of art and not its aesthetic form.
In its most basic gloss, Tolstoy’s theory is an expression theory. For Tolstoy, art
is about the expression and communication, or transmission, of emotions. Specifi-
cally, the more morally good and widely experienced the emotions being transmitted,
and the more widespread the transmission, the better the art. Tolstoy had a specific
type of emotion in mind as well, one informed by his late conversion to Christianity.
This best emotion is the Christian ideal of brotherly love for all. It is sufficient to
be art, however, that a work transmit any feeling its author had. In either case,
videogame works can be found that arguably meet Tolstoy’s conditions.14
Certainly it is possible for a videogame to communicate a feeling of broth-
erly love to a player. Many videogames allow for collaborative team effort, where
it is not merely the explicit representational content of the work that exemplifies
brotherly love (or whatever good emotions are to be communicated), but rather
that videogames allow players to participate in such acts. So where a novel about,
say, self-sacrificial love can be deeply moving, a videogame can let you actually per-
14See [20].
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form acts of self-sacrifice.15 In Brothers - A Tale of Two Sons the player engages
with a narrative of literal brotherly love, made manifest by the player having to
simultaneously control two brothers on a quest to save their father.
The acts allowable by videogames should be carefully analyzed here, as we
should not confuse what might be called meta-actions with the actions that actually
take place within the videogame. An example of meta-action as regards videogames
might be allowing someone else to take your turn. Clearly this is some kind of
self-sacrifice, if only to a very small degree, but it is not an action one takes within
the work of the videogame. An analogous action could be taken by letting someone
borrow the novel you were looking forward to finishing.
In videogames like DayZ and Rust, however, one can be self-sacrificial within
the work, and do this to others in a way that is not, or rather, cannot, be aimed
at advancing one’s selfish interests. These videogames are set in post-apocalyptic
worlds dotted with threats and scarce resources. The main danger, however, is
other people, who are often eager to exploit the weakness, solitude, or good-natured
quality of others. There are many in-work benefits to exploiting others, and very
little, if any, to be gained by helping others when you cannot secure their help in
return. This seems as good a candidate as any for the demonstration of Christian
brotherly love. So, according to the above gloss of Tolstoy’s account of art, we have
an instance of a work that meets the requirements to be not only art, but clearly
15The expression of self-sacrifice can be realized at differing levels of abstraction. In one
videogame you may cause a character to perform what is a representation of a self-sacrificing
act, like Joel’s protection of Ellie in The Last of Us. More interestingly, however, is in esport
competitive videogames like League of Legends and DotA 2 where one player can literally sacrifice
their avatar and standing within the game for another player or the good of the team.
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good art.
Is this then an answer to the art question? It depends in part on whether a
participant performing an action within a work that demonstrates an emotion could
be taken as showing that the work itself transmits this emotion. Do DayZ and Rust
promote and spread brotherly love, or do they merely provide an interactive space
within which such actions are possible? It is likely the latter with DayZ, as creator
Dean Hall has stated that he would rather let emergent game play dictate the course
of events than to enforce any kind of explicit structure himself. Of course, emergent
systems must emerge out of something, and the bedrock from which it does can have
a great effect. But the setting and mechanics of DayZ do not seem to either increase
or lessen one’s capacity for doing good: rather, they are a mirror for it. In Rust,
however, the developers have made decisions that suggest something like brotherly
love. It used to be the case that players could choose their sex and skin color, but
recently the developers instituted a change that randomly and permanently assigned
these to each player account. By making players more evenly spread as male and
female and white and black characters, and taking control of this decision out of the
hands of players, the stated idea is to take identity out of it, but enhance the role of
mutual trust. This decision has caused some strong reactions, many negative, but
the effect seems to be a reduced connection between the gender and racial identities
of players with their avatars and an increased perception of player characters as
equals, despite their appearance.
There are other, more cooperative videogames, that require consistent team-
work to accomplish goals. Videogames like Dota 2 require coordination, commu-
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nication, and teamwork to succeed. They do this in a way much like many team
sports, including even more specific roles where one participant can aid the team by
putting its goals above his or her individual success. Perhaps this counts as broth-
erly love; it certainly requires a particular lack of selfishness. That said, the aims of
such videogames are victory for the team, which one gets to participate in, even if
one sacrifices the success of their individual avatar for the sake of the team winning.
Thus such self-sacrifice may still be untowardly motivated, as one need not think of
a goalie making a great effort and possibly incurring injury as being selfless when
playing in the championship game, but rather, as driven by a desire to win.
Let us assume for the sake of argument that DayZ, Rust, or Dota 2, or some
videogame like it, or some other, perhaps very different videogame, does indeed
promote, communicate, or transmit the very kinds of good emotions that Tolstoy
had in mind. And this would mean that those videogames were indeed art, and
moreover good art, while avoiding any general conclusions about all videogames.
What is important is to answer the question, “Wherein lies the characteristic sign
of a work of art?”16 For Tolstoy, it is not in virtue of being a member of some
established art form, but rather in virtue of transmitting the right kind of emotion.
It is at least possible that a videogame does this, and thus for any that do, by this
account they would be artworks. It may be doubtful that any present videogame
“transmits the highest religious feeling”,17 but there need be only one, or rather
only one possible videogame, for Tolstoy’s definition to provide the means by which
16 [21, p. 506]
17 [21, p. 521]
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a videogame can be art.
But is this a correct definition of art? Tolstoy’s account categorizes many well-
known works as bad art, excluding others from art status at all. To see this we must
look more carefully at Tolstoy’s claims. The criterion that determines something’s
art status is its infectiousness. “There is one indubitable sign distinguishing real art
from its counterfeit—namely , the infectiousness of art.”18 He continues:
If a man is infected by the author’s condition of soul, if he feels this
emotion and this union with others, then the object which has effected
this is art; but if there be no such infection, if there be not this union
with the author and with others who are moved by the same work—then
it is not art. And not only is infection a sure sign of art, but the degree
of infectiousness is also the sole measure of excellence in art.19
Thus for something to be art on Tolstoy’s account it must infect the audience
with the emotion felt by the creator of the work. And the more infectious it is,
the better a work of art it is. Tolstoy gives three conditions for the quality of
infectiousness: (1) the individuality of the feeling transmitted, (2) the clarity of the
feeling transmitted, and (3) the sincerity of the artist. He also argues that all three
may be reduced to sincerity; the degree of individuality and clarity of the emotion
expressed result from the degree of sincerity with which the author feels the emotion.
We can abstract from Tolstoy’s specific theory to a general theory about trans-
mission. Something like a transmission theory has been used to both defend and
deny the art status of videogames. Roger Ebert, albeit in a rather confused argu-
ment, used a form of expression theory when he famously claimed that not only are
18 [21, p. 514]
19 [21, p. 514]
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videogames not art, but in principle they could never be art. To be clear, Ebert
makes a rather scattered post hoc argument in defense of an off-the-cuff remark he
made that he “did indeed consider video games inherently inferior to film and liter-
ature.”20 It is not helpful to rehearse here all of his various arguments given here;
what is relevant for the present argument is that in places Ebert gives a transmission
argument against the possibility that videogames can be art. He writes, “I don’t
know what they can learn about another human being that way, no matter how
much they learn about Human Nature.”21 Whatever difference there is to be had
between learning about human nature and a particular human is likely to come in
the form of what a particular artist can transmit to another person via their work.
Interestingly, several of those responding to him give an expression argument
in favor of the possibility of videogames as art. A recent example is the videogame
That Dragon, Cancer, in which the audience engages with a narrative about the
author’s confrontation with the cancer of his infant son and the loss that ensues. It
is difficult to imagine what could be a more personal thing to learn about someone
than their emotional state through such a trial, but in Ebert’s defense, he has
remained willfully ignorant of the medium of videogames, if willful ignorance can
indeed be a defense. In his actual defense, he died before this work was released;
however, for years he refused to experience The Shadow of the Colossus despite many
of his interlocutors recommending it to him, even going so far as to provide a copy
of the videogame and a console on which to play it. In this work the creators erect a
20 [22]. See also [23], [24], [25], [26], [27], [28] to see the hodgepodge arguments given.
21 [28]
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haunting dreamscape in which the protagonist searches for revenge and redemption,
but realizes in the process that perhaps he has become the kind of monster that he
has sought to vanquish. Oddly, Ebert seeks to distinguish film from videogame by
saying:
For example, I tend to think of art as usually the creation of one artist.
Yet a cathedral is the work of many, and is it not art? One could think
of it as countless individual works of art unified by a common purpose.
Is not a tribal dance an artwork, yet the collaboration of a community?
Yes, but it reflects the work of individual choreographers. Everybody
didn’t start dancing all at once.22
This is strange, because of any artwork, films, if they are indeed artworks, are
often created by a large community of people. Likely Ebert is relying heavily on the
auteur theory of directors, wherein the appropriate critical stance to take towards a
film is that it is largely the product of the director, one will imposing its vision on this
large, otherwise collaborative project. But of course, auteur theory accommodates
videogames equally well. One need only consider Shigeru Miyamoto’s Super Mario
Bros., Hideo Kojima’s Metal Gear Solid series, or David Cage’s Heavy Rain, or
Jonathan Blow’s Braid for works that clearly manifest throughout the director’s
touch in their style, production, and aesthetic.
The Ebert debate is not unique, but is a uniquely public example of the fevered
tone with which the art debate over videogames takes place, and a clearer example
of the need for philosophical insight in a public debate would be hard to come by.
In response to the Ebert debate, he is wrong that videogames cannot teach
22 [27]
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us about other humans, in at least whatever ways film can, and other artworks for
that matter. However, transmission theory in general is flawed. While it is true
that some artworks transmit feelings of all sorts to their viewers, it is also true
that non-artworks transmit feelings of all sorts to their viewers. What is lacking
is an account of why some kinds of transmissions are art transmissions and some
transmissions are not. To repeat, it seems that Tolstoy has provided an account
of a good-making feature of artworks, a feature that counts towards an artwork
being good, but not one that is sufficient to make something art, which is what
the art question demands. It is also questionable whether the transmission of a
good emotion or feeling is necessary for arthood. Much art, admittedly made after
Tolstoy developed his theory,23 is not concerned at all with the transmission of any
kind of emotional experience. Much post-modern art resists being described as
expressing a specific emotion, or any emotion at all. As art in the late 20th century
became more self-referential and art-historically self-conscious, as well as moving
further from the need to exhibit aesthetic properties, it became less plausible to
describe art as invariably expressing emotions or feelings. Jeff Koons’ Celebration
Series, made of works like Balloon Dog (Blue), a gigantic metallic recreation of a
balloon animal dog, has aesthetic properties, but is not properly evaluated as being
primarily an aesthetic object, nor because of emotions and feelings it transmits to
the viewers. The work’s importance, inter alia, is the commentary it makes about
the practice of sculpture, and the values of the then contemporary art world. Yet it
23Tolstoy and Ebert seem to share a certain grumpiness towards emerging artforms. Tolstoy’s
toward modern art that he calls “insanities” and predicts will be found out to be, “false, deformed,
and insensate art.” ( [21]); Ebert’s towards videogames.
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is still art, despite not transmitting emotions and feelings. Even if the transmission
of good expressions of feelings makes a videogame good, it is far from conclusive that
its ability to do so makes it art.
This theory can be even further abstracted to general theories of emotionalism.
These generally hold that art is whatever evokes (strong) emotions in us. It is a
common defense of the importance and art status of Final Fantasy VII that Aeris’
death at the mid-point of the narrative is an emotionally jarring one. I have heard
several anecdotes of a teary-eyed engagement with that part of the work; that after
investing dozens of hours into developing the character and familiarizing oneself
with her that the loss felt was a substantially emotional one. This should not be a
surprising reaction, for videogames like Final Fantasy VII have a strongly narrative
structure, and the emotional power of narratives is not in question. What remains
to be skeptical about, however, is whether the emotional power of any kind of thing
is either sufficient or necessary to its being an artwork.
Little can be said in defense of the idea. Surely not every thing that causes us
emotions can be reasonably accounted an artwork. Many things spawn emotional
responses that are not artworks, like arguments, loved ones, life insurance ads, sun-
sets, eviction notices. Surely these must be rejected from inclusion as artworks, but
how can the theory accommodate their exclusion? Perhaps one could stipulate that
only things that are works can be counted as artworks, and this seems an agreeable
enough condition. But then there is little left but stipulation to defend the idea that
it is the emotional evocativeness of the work, rather than some other feature, that
makes it an artwork. Emotionalism is suspicious even as a theory about the quality
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of works, let alone as a classificatory criterion. By emotionalism’s lights, there can
be no bad art that leaves us cold, but only non-art, and conversely no good art that
elicits no emotional response, and so much of modern and postmodern art must
then be rejected, on account of its emotional reticence.
Tolstoy leaves us with a choice. We can settle the art question for any partic-
ular videogame by asking if it meets the requirements set out by his account. If a
videogame provides the right kind of transmission of an emotion, then it is art, and
if it is a morally good emotion, then it is good art. But to accept Tolstoy’s account
is to ignore many of the ways art has evolved since the time of his writing. He was
not unaware even in his own time of the counter cultural implications of his account,
but by his own lights, if we are take his position we must see all non-emotionally-
transmissive works as non-art objects, and, more severely, that any society that
accepts these works as artworks is “perverted” in some sense.
The other option is to reject Tolstoy’s account. This spares us from having
to pay the high costs required by his account, but it leaves us still searching for an
adequate account of art.
1.3.3 Collingwood’s Expression Theory
A somewhat similar account can be found in R. G. Collingwood’s expression
theory. In brief, Collingwood’s theory differs from Tolstoy’s by not requiring the
successful transmission of an emotion, only the expression of it in the work by the
artist. The controversial element of Collingwood’s theory is what he takes the work
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to be, not the physical material wrought by the artist’s hands, but the mental and
imaginative expression of the artist’s articulation of their emotional experience. For
Collingwood this is not a particular psychological state existing only in the mind
of the artist, for then it would die when she does, but an abstract thing, that
particular kind of experience, that is, an articulation in a mental medium of the
emotional experience of the artist.24
Again, we face a similar dilemma as with Tolstoy’s theory. It is possible that
some videogame is the physical artifact resulting from the articulatory efforts of
the artist wrestling to express her inner emotional experience. Bientôt l’été and
Proteus are likely candidates for this kind of work. The first is an experience of
an atmospheric walk along the beach, the second is an exploration of an abstracted
landscape that responds to your travels with music. Quiet, contemplative, and
obvious emotional expressions that seek to communicate a very specific kind of
feeling through the interactive medium of the videogame. It might also be argued
that the participatory nature of videogames lends many of them their rhythmic
or hypnotic quality, which can give participants very specific sensations that are
difficult to articulate otherwise. If Collingwood’s account is right, not only is it likely
that some videogames have already met the criteria to be counted as art, but that
the interactive nature of videogames may make them particularly apt candidates.
There are several good elements to Collingwood’s theory. It does an excellent
job capturing something that is important in many works of art, which is the work
specific articulation of whatever the artist has sought to express. When pressed to
24See [29].
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explain what their work means, artists will often just gesture again, more emphati-
cally at their work; the only other way to express what the work already expresses
itself is by ostension. I once asked an artist at a show what his work meant. He
replied that if he could tell me in words, he wouldn’t have to make art. This phe-
nomenon is what Collingwood’s theory aims to capture.
Collingwood’s account, however, has strong counter-intuitive consequences. If
he is right, then all the museums in the world, all the galleries, all the private
collections, and all the art schools are not filled with artworks, but simply the
residue of them. The residue of attempts, however successful, are expressions of the
particular mental state the artist had in the creating of the object, and perhaps
served as the impetus to create the object. When artists think they sell or gift or
destroy their works, and respectively recipients buy or sell or appreciate them, they
are all mistaken. The work cannot be bought and sold, appreciated or destroyed
in that way, for it is not a physical object, not even partly. Rather it is fully the
abstract object that is the kind of experience the artist sought to express in the work.
This object preceded the physical object created in the project and will outlive it
as well.
Collingwood’s account also leaves the work out of reach for the viewer. It is
likely true that in a great number of cases when an artist makes a work the artist
is having a particular emotional experience, and likewise a viewer of that work also
has one. But Collingwood’s account provides no epistemic means for checking a
viewer’s experience against that of the artist, meaning that we have no way to know
if anyone has ever experienced a work. People have certainly had responses to the
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object that an artist creates in an attempt to express the work to the viewer, but
the work is always a private, and perhaps inaccessible, thing. Because the work is
created to express that which is otherwise inexpressible, we cannot ask the artist,
nor can they tell us, what the experience is that we should have, or check whether
the experiences we are having are the appropriate ones. Given the particularity of
the expression sought to be communicated, it is more likely that we are deviating,
even ever so slightly, from the correct expression, and thus we miss the work entirely.
So again, as with Tolstoy, this answer to the art question for videogames
presents a dilemma. To accept it is to put an end to the inquiry, by providing an
answer, but it comes with rather steep costs, ones that run counter to much of what
we take the actual practice of art appreciation to involve, and removes any kind of
epistemic access to knowledge about the works we are supposed to be appreciating
in search of the right kind of experience. Instead we should reject this account as it
stands, as with Tolstoy’s, since it can provide no better account for the art status of
videogames than it can for other forms of art, and the use of videogames as a test
case for the theory illustrates its shortcomings.
1.3.4 Bell’s Significant Form
Clive Bell’s theory of art as “significant form” is probably the most venerable
of the formalist definitions. Formalist definitions of art have it that something is art
in virtue of its manifest formal properties, ones that can be detected in the work
directly, and need no relation to outside facts about things like who the artist is,
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when it was made, or why it was made, or, even more radically, the content of the
work, what it represents, or its themes.
Bell’s theory is about a particular kind of form he calls “significant form”. Bell
does not define what significant form is, which has led many to suspect that there is
no stable notion behind it, but rather, that Bell was gesturing at a kind of aesthetic
gestalt, some kind of salient character about the perceptible features of the work
that made it art. “Lines and colours combined in a particular way, certain forms and
relations of forms, stir our aesthetic emotions. These relations and combinations of
lines and colours, these aesthetically moving forms, I call “Significant Form”; and
“Significant Form” is the one quality common to all works of visual art.”25 Perhaps
most radical about Bell’s version of a formalist theory is that it is a strong formalist
theory, meaning that it is only the form that matters for an object’s art status,
and the only thing of aesthetic relevance; not the subject matter, nor the things
represented in the work.26
Historically Bell’s motivations make sense. He was writing at a time when
increasingly abstract post-impressionist art was emerging, and it demanded a theory
to make sense of it. He developed a theory that attempted to make sense of the
importance being placed on formal innovations in painting, ones that seemed to
make accurate representation less important than abstract design. And it makes
sense, after a fashion; if we are to judge all art by the same criteria because it all
fits under the same tent, and the unifying element must be an intrinsic property
25 [30, p. 100]
26See [31] and [32].
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of the work, then we need some consistent way of doing it. And if we have art
that is not representational, yet we value it, we must find some way of appreciating
it that does not prioritize representational works over less representational ones,
particularly not the challenging new works being produced at the time. Thus an
appeal to the formalist notion of “significant form” as a manifest property that all
works possess and with respect to which all works all could be judged.
Bell, however, was never able to adequately explain what he meant by signif-
icant form. At best it can be categorized as a strong version of a broader set of
formalist theories that can be considered together. And formalist theories are fit
within an even broader set of functionalist theories that will be addressed below.
And each increasingly broad set has reasons why it fails as a theory of art and thus
as an answer to the art question of videogames.
Bell’s specific theory fails as a theory of art for several reasons. One, it is
absurd on its face. He rejects the artistic relevance of subject matter entirely. He
doesn’t merely subjugate representational content to form, but denies it any import
whatsoever. This would mean that no artistic merit arises from the content of a
work, or from the conditions of its creation, but only from the relations of perceivable
forms. This is, of course, deeply at odds with actual art practice, as much art is taken
to be about its representational content in a way that matters qua art. Furthermore,
many aesthetic properties, perceivable aesthetic properties, depend on the subject
matter. A classic example is the tension felt among the space between God’s finger
to Adam’s in Michelangelo’s The Creation of Adam. The energy felt in that space
depends not merely on the forms, but on several representational facts, not least
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that they are hands, but also whose hands they are and that they are pointing to
each other. A strong formalist theory like Bell’s cannot account for this.
Furthermore, as Kendall Walton has shown, the representational content of
an artwork can impact its aesthetic properties.27 If Walton is right, this spells even
further trouble for a theory like Bell’s. His theory is inadequate if it fails to take into
account the artistic importance of content. But if aesthetic properties can depend on
what is represented, then Bell’s theory is not merely incomplete by not recognizing
representational content, it fails to even explain the aesthetic properties that are
essential to it.
What does this mean for videogames? Bell’s theory cannot give an objective
account of art, or, as he puts it, an aesthetic theory. As Bell says, “all aesthetic the-
ories must be based on aesthetic judgments, and ultimately all aesthetic judgments
must be matters of personal taste.”28 Bell does not say this to reject aesthetic taste,
but to give an accurate account of its nature. And he is correct, but in doing so
he shows his theory to be one that leans more toward taste than to art. This is so
because personal taste extends to things far beyond the confines of art, to one’s taste
in things like feather pillows and weather, gardens and sports announcers, Scotch
whisky and wind chimes. There is no doubting that personal taste is involved in
our appreciation of art, but to conflate the two is the mistake.29
Likewise with videogames. It is obvious that personal taste matters both in
27 [33]
28 [30, p. 101]
29Certainly models of aesthetics that depend in some sense on taste can be made to work, see [34]
and [35]. It is the reduction of aesthetics to mere personal taste without an expanding theory of
universality that threatens to make it useless.
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what videogames one chooses to engage with and also of which elements and how one
appreciates. And surely whatever Bell was getting at with his idea of “Significant
Form” is as likely to be present in videogames as it is in other kinds of works.
This is so even in the most straightforward visual modality. Videogames like Super
Hexagon and Dyad create stunning visuals, hypnotic in their bold, dynamic visual
structure. Super Hexagon creates hexagonal, as well as pentagonal, rectangular,
and triangular, shapes laid against a background of outwardly pulsating stripes. All
of these are in matching color schemes, and most any still screen grab is likely to
capture a compelling image. And in motion they create a captivating vibe that
draws one’s visual attention to the center, while the player’s interaction spins the
elements around, adding to the center-focused visual attention.
In comparison to the stark images of Super Hexagon, Dyad trends towards
maximalist scenes, chaotically stuffing the screen with sharp, bright lights and lines
foregrounded against hazy neon explosions. Similarly, however, Dyad also features
a center-focused visual, with the player’s interaction controlling the spinning of the
image, in Dyad creating a cyclonic tunnel that the camera rushes headlong through,
adding an element of z-axis movement not as salient in Super Hexagon. I speak here
of the visual element of videogames, though of course videogames are not a purely
visual medium. But as Bell focused on the visual over the representational, in
applying his theory to videogames it seems most apt to discuss their visual element.
I mention all of this to say that both of these videogames, and many others as
well, reward the exercise of personal taste, and reward the sensitive aesthetic palate
Bell talks about. But none of this suggests that videogames are art, but rather
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that they can provide a certain kind of rewarding experience that could potentially
be experienced otherwise, even from obviously non-art objects. Bell defends this
aesthetic experience as a sufficient indicator of a work’s art status, but we can see
that this is a mistake. He gives no criteria by which to defend the theory against the
possibility of non-art objects having significant form, nor against the possibility that
some art objects may lack significant form. To stipulate either point without further
evidence is to beg the question in his own favor. Thus Bell’s formalism cannot give
us a satisfying answer to the art question. It either begs the question in giving an
answer, or it avoids doing so by weakening its claim to one of personal taste that
would apply equally to non-art objects, which is a true but trivial, and unhelpful,
conclusion.
Similar consequences hold for formalist theories that are weaker than Bell’s.
Any attempt to make the formal qualities necessary or sufficient for art status will
face counter-examples that can only be overcome by question-begging. Relaxing the
theory, however, to saying that the formal elements of a work can play a role in an
object’s art status is to make the claim possibly true, but at the cost of leaving the
art question unanswered.
1.4 Anti-Definitional Strategies
It might be wondered at this point if pursuing a definition of art, or a theory
of art, is the right approach. Perhaps art cannot be defined, and any project that
aims to find the correct theory of the arts must fail. This was the position argued
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for by Morris Weitz in his seminal “The Role of Theory in Aesthetics,”30 which set
the stage for the next half century of art-defining attempts in response. Weitz takes
his lead from an idea put forth by Wittgenstein in his Philosophical Investigations
just a few years earlier. Wittgenstein’s idea is that some, perhaps many, or even
all, concepts are not definable, and that our seeming success in picking out the
extensions of concepts is due not to our recognition of an object’s falling under a
formal definition, but a recognition that some objects bear a family resemblance to
one another.31
Wittgenstein’s paradigm example of the undefinable concept is games. This
has obvious relevance to our main project here, but it is one that can be partially
bracketed until Part 2. Weitz sees an analogy between the concepts of games and art
and the role family resemblance plays in our ability to correctly distinguish games
and art from non-games and non-art. Weitz argues that art, like games, is an open
concept, and thus cannot be defined because any “attempt to discover the necessary
and sufficient properties of art is logically misbegotten for the very simple reason
that such a set and, consequently, such a formula about it, is never forthcoming. Art,
as the logic of the concept shows, has no set of necessary and sufficient properties,
hence a theory of it is logically impossible and not merely factually difficult.”32
Weitz argues that art must be an open concept because art is creative, and
can only be creative if the application of the concept requires a decision on our part
that is consistent with the concept being open. This understanding of creativity,
30 [36]
31 [37, §65-77]
32 [36, p. 28]
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however, is false, as other things that are quite definable also allow for creativity,
like logical proofs. For example, though a logical proof exists within the parameters
of a definition, a proof may still be the result of great creativity. So Weitz’ claim
about the necessity of an open concept for creativity is untenable.
Noël Carroll highlights Weitz’ equivocation between artwork and the practice
of art. As Carroll points out, artworks might be created in myriad ways while
still possessing definable features, despite the practice of art always being open to
change. He correctly asks, “Why must an allegedly closed concept of art in the
first (artwork) sense be incompatible with the putatively open concept of art in the
second (practice) sense?”33
The difference between the two notions of “art” is that between objects and
practice. And this distinction shows that creativity in creating objects is not ham-
strung even if the practice in which they are created cannot be defined. Nor does the
practice of art being “open” mean that art cannot be defined. It very well may be
that all artworks have some property or set of properties, or necessary and sufficient
conditions, by which they can all be defined, while allowing that the practice of art
that explores and expands the possible ways of creating such objects allows for con-
tinual change. Carroll continues, “That artworks might possess defining properties
does not logically preclude the invention of new works that instantiate the relevant
conditions in innovative, unexpected, and unforeseeable research.”34
Carroll further notes that this is consistent with the theories of art that devel-
33 [38, p. 8]
34 [38, p. 9]
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oped after Weitz. In particular, the institutional theories of Dickie and Danto show
that any thing can be art, or made into art, if the proper procedures are followed
or are in place. And if a theory can allow for this kind of breadth over the possible
objects that can become artworks, while being framed in terms of a definition of
artworks, then this shows that Weitz’ arguments fails. For while the practice of art
can shift and change and adapt, it can do so while all the works produced within it
fall within certain parameters.
This does not mean that there are absolutely no limits on what can be an
artwork; moreover, there being such limits does not unduly restrict art practice.
Carroll continues this idea succinctly:
Still, it might be argued that necessary and sufficient conditions must
place certain limits on what can be an artwork even if no limits are
placed on the kind of thing that can be an artwork . . . Necessary and
sufficient conditions are not incompatible with an immense latitude for
expansion and innovation. Moreover, though the concept of art (in the
practice sense) may be open, it is not wide open — not everything can
be art at any time for just any reason. After all, even if we agree that
the practice of art is open to change and expansion, the relevant changes
and expansions must be related to what precedes them, or they would
not be changes and expansions of the practice. That is, the phenomena
in question cannot be utter non sequiturs.35
This is not to say that the institutional theories of Danto and Dickie are cor-
rect, but that their efforts, explored in more detail below, show that the definitional
project is not logically precluded by the openness of the practice of art.
35 [38, p. 10]
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Carroll says even more about problems with Weitz’ position, following Man-
delbaum, in that what it borrows from Wittgenstein seems to imply a feature that
neither of them would seem inclined to acknowledge. Wittgenstein speaks of family
resemblances, such as the kind we point out as obtaining between two members of
the same family. But we do not ascribe family resemblances to people who merely
look alike when we know they are not related. The notion of family resemblance
upon which Wittgenstein rests his anti-definitional stance requires a genetic aware-
ness, a recognition of the non-perceptual relation that objects can have to each
other. A proper application of family resemblance requires knowledge of the origins
of a work. And this suggests the very line of reasoning that leads to the kind of
procedural or institutional theories that Danto and Dickie themselves espouse. As
Mandelbaum puts it:
Had the existence of such a twofold criterion been made explicit by him,
he would have noted that there is in fact an attribute common to all
who bear a family resemblance to each other: they are related through
a common ancestry.36
A shared ancestral heritage was not the kind of intrinsic perceptual property
that Weitz had in mind when arguing against the indefinability of art. This is not
prima facie unreasonable, as perceptual or aesthetic or emotional response features
are as good a property to look for in artworks as anything else. Difficulties reveal
themselves for all the reasons listed above. Not all works exhibit the same kind of
aesthetic properties or any at all nor do all works evoke emotions in the same way
or at all.
36 [39, p. 221]
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It might be argued that this shows that Weitz is only pointing out the obvious.
That the arts are disparate things and unable to be encompassed under a single
rubric. But this is problematic for two reasons. First, it’s so obvious that different
arts are not going to share an intrinsic similarity like those theories that have been
rejected that Weitz should have been more wary of attacking the wrong target.
Weitz does briefly consider Dewitt Parker’s more complex Voluntarist account, but
rejects it as “rest[ing] on dubious principles.”37 He does not consider the possibility
that there could be a different complex account that could satisfy the demands of
providing necessary and sufficient conditions. Once he realized that these theories
are too simple in relying on a single property, or on dubious complex ones, that
should have prompted him to a search for more adequate, less simplistic solutions,
and not a wholesale rejection of the project.
Secondly, because Weitz rejects definitions of art as too simplistic, not finding
any single property that unites all artworks, it is then odd that he wants to supplant
a theory like that with one equally simple. Family resemblance is not a complex rela-
tion, at least not as Weitz and Wittgenstein present it. Sometimes family members
look like each other, sometimes in one way, sometimes in another. It still remains a
resemblance theory. “Some games resemble others in some respects—that is all.”38
This does not mean that games, and thus art, must always look like each other in
some respect, only that they resemble each other somehow. But resemblance itself,
however disparate in its instances, might still hold promise as a unifying property
37 [36, p. 30]. See [40].
38 [36, p. 31]
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on which a definition could be built.
More strangely, Wittgenstein’s target is games, not a class of things that moves
one immediately to thoughts of resemblances, as works of art might. Games are not
merely their physical paraphernalia, not the boards and cards and dice, but abstract
sets of rules. Some games do not even require physical apparatus for them to be
played. To say of these abstract things that a unifying property cannot be seen, but
that they can share in a resemblance is to walk a tight-rope that I am not convinced
Wittgenstein, and thus Weitz, successfully do. That they fail to recognize the genetic
element in family resemblance demonstrates the incompleteness of the view.
A more recent entry in defense of the undefinable nature of art comes from
Aaron Meskin, and I mention it not for its argumentative strength, but because it
relates to a theory of art that has been popularly invoked in defense of the art status
of videogames. He offers some considerations in favor of art’s resistance to definition,
“for example, induction on the long history of failed proposals, the implications of
our best theories of concepts, scepticism about the value of a definition.”39 Thus,
some may say, since art cannot be defined, there is no clear reason not to include
videogames as art, since they obviously share similarities with artworks.
Surely any history of failing to provide an adequate definition, no matter how
long, cannot settle the matter against the possibility of such a definition. Fur-
thermore, it might be questioned how long that history has really been. Analytic
philosophy of art, it is true, has been largely concerned with providing a definition
of art, but it has not been a salient discipline for very long, arguably starting as
39 [41, p. 388]
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recently as Sibley’s work on aesthetics in the 1950’s. If that is the history to which
Meskin is referring, then it must be countered that a scant six decades spent search-
ing for an as yet unsettled definition of art is enough to put the matter to rest.
Surely more inquiry into the matter is reasonable.40
As to the other claims, perhaps Meskin is right that our best theories of
concepts suggest that many things, art included, are unlikely to yield a satisfying
definition. And also that even if we were to come up with a satisfactory defini-
tion, it would be without much value. But even if this is so, and I believe that it
remains to be shown, then the art-defining project that has so occupied much ana-
lytic philosophy of art is in no worse state than many other disciplines. Maybe we
are all wrong-headed, but it seems like excellent company to keep in the meantime,
and an otherwise fruitful project, despite the success of various negative arguments
concluding in the indefinability of art. That is being overly pessimistic about the
future prospects of the project, while taking an unfairly dim view of the value of
the collective efforts so far.
The greatest problem still faces anti-definitionalism. Namely that it is based
on Wittgenstein’s account of games and his claim that they cannot be defined. For
if games can be successfully defined, the basis for Weitz’ anti-definitionalism about
art, and anti-definitionalism in general, evaporates. Bernard Suit’s definition of
games41 as well as Stone’s may count as offering such success.42
So I think the anti-definitional move can be resisted. Much progress has been
40This is in part the argument made in [42].
41See [43].
42See [44] for an account similar to, though not as successful as, and apparently unaware of,
Suits’.
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made over the last several decades. Insights have been gained, and bad theories put
aside. At worst, this has cleared a lot of ground for even better work to be done in
the future. Thus trying to find something with which to answer the art question for
videogames still seems like a viable approach.
With the anti-definitional project resisted, the next theories to be considered
are those that have received more sustained defense in recent years, and are in fact
theories that have been used by laypersons and philosophers alike to attempt to
settle the art question for videogames.
1.5 Institutional Theory
We now come to the first contemporary argument for a thoroughgoing theory
of art that can make sense of videogames. Also important is that it is invoked,
sometimes tacitly, by non-philosophers in defense of videogames’ art status.
Many of the reasons given in favor of videogames being art are along the lines
that being selected to be in art museums makes them art, and thus take some form
of Institutional Theory. There are several variations of institutional theories, each
with different degrees of the broadness of the artworld institution(s). Roughly, the
relevant form of institutionalism in this debate says that something is an artwork
if it is selected for presentation in an art institution in the right way, usually by a
relevant member of the artworld.
George Dickie’s formulations are the usual target, and for better or worse, it
is his earlier formulation that is being invoked once again.
41
A work of art in the classificatory sense is (1) an artifact (2) a set of
aspects of which has had conferred upon it the status of candidate for
appreciation by some person or persons acting on behalf of a certain
social institution (the artworld).43
This is not Dickie’s only formulation,44 nor his most sophisticated, but it is the one
that some endorsing the Smithsonian and MoMa collections as art-making seem to
be using. It is sometimes made even simpler: if something is in an art museum’s
collection, then it is art.
If something like this account of what makes something art is correct, then it
is straightforward that videogames are now artworks, and why, as they have indeed
been included in what are uncontroversially art institutions and were selected to
be presented there by what seem to be relevant artworld members. But, of course,
we must back up and pose more carefully the relevant questions: “What is the
artworld?”, “What are artworld institutions?”, “Who are the relevant members of
the artworld?” and “What kind of selection did they make?” before asking whether
this is the right account of art. The answers to the former group of questions will
show themselves to be relevant to the latter.
Donald Judd famously said, “if someone calls it art, it’s art.” For some,
this maximally broad notion of what the artworld is, who the relevant members
are, and what selection consists of is sufficient. Some people have started calling
videogames an artform, or at least some videogames artworks, and this is enough




Derek Matravers categorizes as strong proceduralism.45 As he puts it, this version
of institutionalism states that “all there is to being a work of art is to be an artifact
of a kind created to be presented to an artworld public.”46 Elsewhere he states it
differently, saying “Strong proceduralism claims that there is no reason, other than
being appropriately presented to the artworld, such that for any work of art, that
is the reason why that object is a work of art.”47
These two formulations of a strong proceduralist version of institutionalism
are not equivalent, as the first entails that it is the intentions of the creator that
matter, while the second only requires that the work be presented to the artworld
appropriately, presumably allowing the presentation to be done by someone who is
not the creator. My argument is not over which of these formulations is correct,
but which of these seems to be in use by those arguing that videogames are now
art. Clearly it seems to be the latter, that mere selection for presentation in the
artworld is sufficient to grant something art-status, regardless of whatever artworld
presentation the creator of the videogame had in mind, or more likely, did not.
This, of course, is problematic, as art status does not reside solely in someone
calling something art. If this were the case there would be no room for mistakenly
calling something art or someone doing so as a hoax, as it would be a conceptual
impossibility, for once one called it so, so it would be. Clearly then, taken literally
it is false that just anyone can transform anything at all into art simply by calling
it so.
45 [47]
46 [47, p. 243]
47 [47, p. 244]
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Judd, however, is speaking with characteristic flair, highlighting the impor-
tance of an element of so-called Idea Art at the time, in response to a Formalist
tradition that was concerned with craft and the way an art object looked. Thus we
can take his comment in context with a grain of salt. A more reasonable interpre-
tation of his statement understands him as defending the view that an artwork is
not so because of its morphology, not because of its formal properties, but because
an artist intended it to be art, directing the right kind of intention at it. What is
this appropriate intention? Well, it would be something like intending the object to
be considered alongside other artworks, or as other artworks have been considered,
which generally includes an intention for them to be included, at least as potential
members, in art institutions like museums and galleries.48
1.5.1 Selection Problems
In the present cases, however, it is not simply that someone has called videogames
art. They have been put into the right kind of buildings, recognized by the right
kind of institutions for inclusion as art objects. Or at least this is tacit in the
claims of some in defense of videogames’ status as art objects. But if we look more
carefully at the way videogames have actually been exhibited, their inclusion is not
as unequivocal as it may first appear. The Smithsonian exhibit, now touring the
country, is not a permanent collection, at least not yet. Perhaps this is a small
point, and we should note that the faddish attention of the artworld does not de-
48Discussion on the limitations, or lack thereof, of the kinds of things that can be coherently put
forward for consideration as a work of art can be found in [48] in response to [49].
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termine something’s art status, and this point says even less about other temporary
museum exhibitions.49 What is of more interest, however, is how the exhibition was
presented.
The Smithsonian exhibition was, by many accounts, including my own personal
experience, disappointingly tame and conservative. Importantly, almost none of the
videogames included were playable.50 Most of the exhibition was taken up by a
dry, historical presentation of the development of videogame systems and a small,
unplayable, selection of videogames from each. These were accompanied by still
images and videos taken from the videogames. The reasoning behind making the
exhibition like this is understandable, though it ends up being at odds with the
aim of inclusion of videogames as art. The Smithsonian is an august institution,
and large segments of videogame culture are not. To treat videogames like the
other art objects in the museum might be seen as too inclusive to those who hold
a dim view of videogames, as well as any reasonable method of inclusion being
inappropriate given what videogames are and the way we engage with them. After
all, it is relatively easy to hang a painting on a wall compared to the curatorial efforts
required to maintain an operating videogame system.51 However, some might think,
to simply set up some videogame consoles and let the public have at them would be
at odds with the kind of engagement that we think appropriate for artworks in art
49An even smaller point, it seems, now that the Smithsonian has added two games to its per-
manent collection: Flower and Halo 2600.
50I use ‘playable’ to mean whatever engagement is appropriate to the work, and not to bias
acceptance of videogames as artworks on the basis of them being playthings.
51Not that the Smithsonian has shied away from such involved curatorial tasks. One need only
consider how difficult it is to keep Nam June Paik’s Information Superhighway up and running, so
to speak.
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institutions. So a staid and compromised exhibition was the result, and what was
offered was an institutional inclusion on the level of a presentation of an interesting
cultural phenomenon. Thus while the Smithsonian exhibition is inclusion in an
artworld institution, the Smithsonian created and couched the exhibition in a way
that meant to sanitize that inclusion to some degree. This raises questions about
whether the inclusion in the Smithsonian was of an appropriate sort, in other words
inclusion as art, as opposed to another kind of inclusion, one that is insufficient to
make something art by institutional theory standards.
The MoMa collection is different from the Smithsonian exhibition in that it
is permanent. It is also different in that, when reasonably possible, the videogames
are playable in their entirety. MoMa has taken seriously both the technical and
experiential aspects of videogames in a way that the Smithsonian exhibition does
not; when the games are not feasibly playable in the museum, due to their duration
or complexity or the necessity of engaging with a massive number of other players,
the MoMa curators have prepared narrated video guides to present the works.52 All
of this is less dryly historical and more clearly focused on the experiential quality of
engaging with these videogames.
MoMa has not, however, added videogames to its permanent art collection.
Rather it has added them to the Applied Design collection of the museum, to share
space with vacuum cleaners and the cardboard coffee sleeve. It should be of no
surprise that videogames can be objects of aesthetic interest and design sensibility;
52The videogames that receive such treatment are Dwarf Fortress, which uses an incredibly un-
intuitive ASCII interface and GUI and EVE Online, a massively multiplayer online game. Neither
is particularly intuitive, and both require great amounts of time. The latter also requires, if one is
serious about ontology, roughly half a million other players to be properly played.
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these are precisely some of the reasons why some have defended them as art candi-
dates. It is less clear that inclusion in a collection of applied design in an institution
that also houses art is sufficient to make them art. This leaves the MoMa collection
facing similar complications as the Smithsonian exhibition: even if institutional in-
clusion is sufficient for art status, it is unclear that videogames have been included
in whatever manner is appropriate to do so.
We can see that in these real world cases, even if institutional theory is correct,
there is a strong case to be made that these videogames are still not art, as they
have not been put forward in the right way for presentation to the artworld.
1.5.2 Selector Problems
So maybe the particular way that these particular games have been put forward
is not sufficient to make them art. But let’s imagine, for the sake of argument, that
they were fully included in the appropriate institutions, unequivocally embraced by
these lauded art institutions as art objects. Are those who included them justified in
including them as art, as opposed to, say, objects of cultural significance or curiosity?
Another way of asking this is, “Are the criteria for inclusion for presentation as art
objects relevant to their inclusion qua art?”
The selection process used in the Smithsonian exhibition was caught between
the categories of art and videogames, and seems not to have represented either
category well. The exhibition drew on material from 85 videogames which were
voted for by the public from a curated list of 240. The list was put together by
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a group of videogame industry professionals led by Chris Melissinos, founder of
PastPixels and former Chief Gaming Officer at Sun Microsystems, who also served
as curator of the show.
This selection method should give us pause, as the worry here is about who
are the relevant members of the artworld that are supposedly capable of bestowing
the art status on these videogames. The videogames included were selected by a
public online poll, so unless we are willing to grant the whole public the status of
artworld member, and this seems like a move we should resist,53 then they were not
selected by members of the artworld. Thus their selection is not appropriate for the
kind of artworld inclusion that IT prescribes.
Perhaps, however, the relevant selection happened in the selection of the initial
240 choices. This raises other questions. Are the guest curator and videogame
industry professionals who were chosen to make this selection adequate artworld
members? It appears that they were not chosen as selectors for their artworld
expertise, but rather their videogame expertise. Melissinos’ current work is on the
preservation of videogame media, and this is obviously relevant to the curatorial
practices of art museums. However, it is also relevant to broader preservation and
curatorial practices for many media other than videogames, and thus is not a reliable
marker for art expertise.
53It could be objected that perhaps the members of the public who actually voted are indeed
appropriate representatives of the artworld. That would of course be quite the happy accident, but
it only further stresses the need to say what exactly the qualifications are for being a member of the
artworld and furthermore what the criteria for selection for artworld members and their choices is.
If, however, the response is that in virtue of voting for what objects to include in an art institution
makes the voters members of the artworld institution then that status is both question-begging
and problematically unfalsifiable.
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Maybe it is the artworld member(s) at the Smithsonian who chose the selection
committee that is able to confer art-status-granting powers, but this seems like an
unreasonable stretch of transitive powers, by all but the most permissive forms
of institutional theories. Such a stretch would threaten to give anyone who ever
selected an object for inclusion in an institution art-granting powers, and further,
to anyone who selected anyone for such a task. If this were the case, would then the
United States government, in dispensing National Endowment for the Arts grants,
or boards of trustees at private institutions, then be able to turn an object from
non-art to art? Such a conclusion seems absurd.
The above considerations about selection highlight a related set of problems
for an institutional theory of art, all stemming from problems of circularity defining
the artworld. If art is what is selected by artworld members, and artworld members
are just those who do the selecting of art, then there does not seem to be a way
to enter the circle, definitionally speaking. Are the members of the artworld made
so by fiat, and do their selections make objects into artworks by fiat also? If the
institutional theory is saying that this is all there really is to art, that seems a very
unsatisfying answer, one that misses something about the nature of art or why we
care about it or what kind of properties we expect it to have. This concern about
arbitrariness motivates the search for some set of reasons why an artworld member
selects one work over another for artwork status.
A search for artworld selection reasons is also motivated by concerns about
what kind of selection is taking place and when a selection by an art institution
is an art selection. Art institutions make selections about informational placards,
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lightbulbs, hand rails, and advertising posters. What differentiates these selections
from art selections, if the only criteria for being art is that something has been se-
lected by an art institution. Perhaps some of these objects, like lightbulbs and hand
rails, can be excluded because they are not being selected for an artworld public.
But certainly informational placards and advertising posters are, and the problem
persists in finding reasons to distinguish art selections. But any move to give prop-
erties or conditions for selection of artworks beyond mere fiat would undermine the
point of institutional theories, which is to situate artworks and art-making practices
within institutional ones, leaving aside problematic, because inadequate, accounts of
some univocal property shared by all artworks. The problem, in other words, is that
as stated the institutional theory is not a proper account of artworks, and moves to
remedy it in the direction of requiring certain properties of artworks transforms it
into a different, non-institutional, kind of theory.
There is a way to limit the relevant kind of selector. Dickie’s later formulation
of institutional theory could be helpful here. “A work of art is an artifact of a kind
created to be presented to an artworld public”54 If this is the preferred formulation,
then we can set aside questions about the selection process and who the selectors
are from the perspective of artworld institutions and instead focus on the creators
of the works. Were any of these videogames created “to be presented to an artworld
public”? This is not an easy question to answer, but it does suggest some possible
answers. As Matravers points out, to give this formulation a “strong procedural-
ism” reading makes the created-for-artworld-presentation condition sufficient for art
54 [46, p. 80]
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status, as nothing more is needed. But if the resistance we might feel towards the
bare sufficiency is because we would like to believe that people have a reason for
doing the things they do, then Matravers’ weak proceduralism formulation is more
appropriate. This states that artworks “attained their status for whatever reasons
were operative in the artworld at the time.”55
This move from unreasoned selection to reasoned selection puts weak proce-
duralism into a place Matravers claims of “remarkable consensus among current
analytic philosophers of art that something like this must be right.’56 This move,
however, undermines the motivation of an institutional theory that claims that
videogames are now art because of their inclusion in artworld institutions. To say
that there must be reasons is to say that there must be other reasons for art status
beyond mere art institution selection. This may be correct, but it prompts one to
leave behind institutional theory’s strong proceduralism and take up some other kind
of account of art. Once this move is made, there is no more room to appeal to mere
inclusion, but to inclusion of a certain kind, one that appeals to the reasons of the
selectors or creators; an explanatory burden that theories other than institutional
ones are capable of bearing, while institutional theories themselves cannot.
Is there an appropriate party who possesses the relevant artworld and videogame
expertise to be an adequate selector or presenter of works as artworks? Perhaps it
is a creator who creates with the right intentions, or maybe it is a sufficiently expert
member who selects in the right way. But if defining and finding such a party is nec-
55 [47, p. 244]
56 [47, p. 245]
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essary it stresses the importance of what would qualify them as appropriate creators
or selectors, and attempting to answer this question further shows the insufficiency
of institutional theory to settle the matter of videogames as art. In fact, doing so
would just enact a concrete scenario for Richard Wollheim’s dilemma for Dickie’s
position. He puts the dilemma as such: either there are good reasons for something
to be art or not, for any objects included in an art institution. If not, it puts the
importance of institutional theory into question. If yes, then those reasons would
seem to make the beginnings of a good definition, and obviate the need to appeal
to institutional theory in the first place.57
1.5.3 The Also-Rans
Perhaps even more problematically, what do we make of the remaining 155
videogames that were on the ballot, but did not receive enough votes in the poll?
Are they art? Not art? Stuck in an art-like limbo? None of the answers are
satisfying. Does institutional theory entail that the 85 games that were selected
were not art all this time, only becoming art now that they have been selected?
This would certainly expose the pure fiat by which something is made art according
to institutional theory. It does, however, leave those unselected games maddeningly
counterfactually close to art-status, perhaps too frustratingly so even for an advocate
of institutional theory to be comfortable with.
A further difficulty, even if the right kind of person included them in the right
way, is whether this says anything about the rest of videogames, those not (yet)
57 [50, p. 160]
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included in the right institutions. Institutional theory is not meant to grant art
status to whole categories of things or media, but rather to selected individuals.
Thus taken strictly, even if a videogame is appropriately selected by an appropriate
member of an appropriate artworld institution, this does nothing to expand the
banner of art to include all videogames, unless by some convoluted transmission of
artworld-institution-status the Smithsonian and MoMa are somehow able to turn
the videogame distribution markets XBox Live, PlayStation Network, and Steam
into artworld institutions themselves. This lack of general support for the art status
of videogames by institutional theory is likely to leave those who tacitly invoked it
a bit cold, thus weakening any claims to intuitive support it might have hoped to
gain.58
It does not appear that institutional theory would count the videogames in
the Smithsonian and MoMa exhibits as art. Even if it did, however, it would only
serve to highlight the problems of justifying institutional theory in light of whether
its selections are reasoned or by fiat. None of this is to suggest that videogames are
not artworks, or could not be. What this shows is that for any videogame, if it is
art, it is not because of the recent selections made by the Smithsonian and MoMa,
even were they were to have happened under more ideal circumstances.
58One could propose a form of institutional theory whereby once a member of a medium is
selected as art it turns all the members of that medium into art. This would be an institutional
theory about media and not particular works. While this would give a theory the power to extend
art status to non-selected works, inclusion by virtue of medium similarity, it raises all the same
questions about how one medium is selected and another is not, while demanding an answer to the
difficult problem of defining media. Furthermore, this leaves artworld selection as only relevant
for the first selection of any member of any particular medium, that initial selection doing all the
art-making work for all other members of that medium. This kind of institutional theory would
be even more attenuated from actual practice, serving only a kind of initial media baptism role,
and leaving the account no explanatory power over all the subsequent, and apparently irrelevant,
work selections the artworld continues to make.
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It appears that the public appeal to something like an Institutional Theory
fails to provide a satisfying answer to the art question. This is not merely because
of the contingent facts about the actual exhibits of videogames. It is because of
how institutional theory fails to give a satisfying answer even about paradigm cases
of art. If something is presented to or accepted by the artworld, we want to know
what makes that object a candidate for such a procedure. It is no good to simply
say that the procedure occurred. For even if we can find an uncontroversial case
of an artworld institution accepting a videogame as art, we will want to know why
it was accepted, what it was about the videogame that allowed its acceptance, and
what separates it from the myriad videogames that are not christened as art by a
representative of the artworld, not least so that we can apply or withhold that same
status to other videogames not yet selected by the artworld.
Still there is a lot to be gained from careful attention to institutional theory.
The most important lesson, presented so eloquently by Arthur Danto,59 is that
something’s art status cannot depend on its manifest properties, but must instead
depend on some kind of relational property. Institutional theory provides one way of
understanding the necessary and sufficient relational property, namely presentation
to and acceptance by an artworld institution. It has been carefully argued by many
that this argument fails. But that does not mean that all theories of art that
centrally feature relational properties must fail. There are other candidates, and we




The cluster account of art is the second substantial defense of videogames as
art in the philosophical literature. Berys Gaut defends the account as a skeptical
response to the difficulty of providing a definition, and as a reconfiguration of the
definitional project given what he takes to be a wrong-headed approach to defining
art. A cluster account of art has been appealed to by a handful of philosophers
keen on defending the art status of videogames, including Gaut.60 Like the other
definitions considered so far, the cluster account faces strong criticisms as a general
account of art; we shall see that unlike most other definitions it fails to answer the
art question of videogames by being unable to supply an answer. Instead of giving
a poor answer, it can give no answer at all.
In developing the theory Gaut is sympathetic to the resistance to definitions
espoused by Wittgenstein and Weitz, but believes that the resemblance notion is
not sufficient to establish the anti-essentialism he finds compelling. To reject the
definitional project and support his anti-essentialism, Gaut develops and defends
his cluster account of art.
In Gaut’s words, “art is a cluster concept and for that reason cannot be de-
fined.”61 By ‘cluster concept’ he means that “there are multiple criteria for the
application of the concept, none of which is a necessary condition for something’s
being art.”62 The possession of any individual criterion counts towards something’s
60 [52] and [53]
61 [54, p. 273]
62 [54, p. 273]
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being art, but is not necessary. For Gaut, this means that if there is a list of criteria
which form the cluster of a concept, then the possession of all of them is sufficient for
that thing to fall under the concept. Not all the criteria, however, need be satisfied
for something to fall under the concept. As he explains the notion counting towards :
First, if all of the properties that are criteria are instantiated, this suf-
fices for an object to fall under the concept; and more strongly, if fewer
than all of these properties are instantiated, this also suffices for the
application of the concept. So there are jointly sufficient conditions for
the application of the concept. Second, there are no properties that are
individually necessary conditions for the object to fall under the concept
(that is, there is no property that all objects falling under the concept
must possess). Third, there are disjunctively necessary conditions for
application of the concept: some of the properties must be instantiated
if the object is to fall under the concept. By the second point, it follows
that if a concept’s meaning is given by a cluster account, one cannot de-
fine that concept, in the sense of fixing individually necessary and jointly
sufficient conditions for it.63
Gaut defends a particular cluster account of art, which posits ten criteria:
(i) possessing positive aesthetic qualities (I employ the notion of positive aesthetic
qualities here in an narrow sense, comprising beauty and its subspecies)
(ii) being expressive of emotion
(iii) being intellectually challenging
(iv) being formally complex and coherent
(v) having a capacity to convey complex meanings
63 [54, p. 274] author’s emphasis.
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(vi) exhibiting an individual point of view
(vii) being an exercise of creative imagination
(viii) being an artefact or performance that is the product of a high degree of skill
(ix) belonging to an established art form
(x) being the product of an intention to make a work of art64
There are several considerations in light of this list and what Gaut takes a
cluster concept to be. Importantly, he aims to defend the form of a cluster concept
of art, and not the specific cluster that he puts forth. Also, this specific list provides
a clear example of several features of the cluster account that we can now look at
specifically. Primarily, if we assume that this is a correct list of the criteria that
make up the cluster concept that is art, we now know that if any object possesses
all ten of these criteria, then it is art. Also, as defined, none of the criteria listed are
individually necessary; there is no one property that every work of art must have.
That Gaut proffers any specific set of criteria is interesting because he claims
to be only defending the form of a cluster concept, not the specific cluster that he
presents. This tempers his claim about evidence against the definitional project.
What is interesting is that this list may be incomplete or problematic. If something
was missing from the list, or incorrect about it, this would not count against the
form of the cluster account, but only that specific set of criteria.
Gaut is right that any incorrect list would not count against the form of the
cluster account, but this diminishes his claim about the problems that a defini-
tional account faces. Thomas Adajian points out that the same strategy can be
64 [54, p. 274] items put into list form for clarity’s sake.
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used to defend definitional approaches. As he writes of Gaut’s defense of the form
over the content: “This in turn entails the failure of one way of arguing that art is
indefinable—by induction from premises about the defectiveness of attempted def-
initions.”65 Just because one, many, or all our ways of trying to define art have
failed, it does not follow that the form of a definition of art must be a failure, but
only the content of those particular definitions.
Gaut’s response to Adajian is that he does not hold that the inference is valid
against definitions but not against the cluster account, but rather that the inference
is supportive of pursuing the cluster account. He uses the example of losing your
keys, and looking for them in the house awhile, and then considering looking for
them elsewhere. This is a fine enough analogy, but one that can offer only limited
support for the truth of the cluster account. We could even push the analogy further.
Perhaps it is the search for a definition of art that is like looking for your keys at
all. When they cannot be found, either within the house or without, it is not that
you should look elsewhere, but perhaps begin to wonder if there were ever keys to
begin with.
1.6.1 Is the Cluster Account a Definition?
The cluster account, as Gaut has outlined it, is supposed to be a corrective to
the traditional, and supposedly failed, attempt to provide a definition of art, replete
with necessary and sufficient conditions. Stephen Davies has argued that it fails in
this aim because it is itself a definition, albeit a highly disjunctive one. Though
65 [55, p. 381-382]
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an incredible number of disjuncts may seem to lend support to anti-essentialism,
the actual number of disjuncts may not actually be all that incredible. And if
the disjuncts together can form a definition, then Gaut has not provided an anti-
essentialist counter to the definitional project.
Davies traces Gaut’s prima facie reasoning:
He reason[sic] as follows: the cluster theory allows for many different
ways in which something might qualify as an artwork. Where the chain
of alternatives is very long—indeed, where there might be nearly as many
disjuncts as there are putative artworks—what is uncovered is not an
underlying essence but merely an enumeration of the concept’s possible
extension. Because he believes the number of disjuncts is bound to be
very high for the case of art, Gaut concludes that the cluster account
is anti-essentialist at heart. It reveals that art cannot be defined while
demonstrating how artworks come to be grouped together under the
concept.66
Thus, if there are millions of possible disjuncts of criteria that are sufficient for
making something art, this would be suggestive of there not being anything essential
shared among all the art objects and that a definition of art cannot be provided.
However, it does not seem as though there are so many disjuncts, and a fortiori
there are not nearly as many disjuncts as there are works of art.
Out of the ten criteria given, Gaut endorses only one of the possible disjuncts as
being certainly sufficient for art status: possessing all ten criteria (or all of whatever
number of criteria the final considered list would have). He considers other possibly
sufficient combinations, like criteria (1), (2), (4), (5), (8), and (9), but does not
66 [56, p. 299]
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offer much beyond that. He also notes that the art-making disjuncts will not all
be the same in number, so we cannot conclude something like, “Any group of eight
criteria will be sufficient for art,” or some otherwise similarly ordered claim. This in
itself greatly limits the number of disjuncts that the cluster account will generate,
but even without this reduction, the theory does not generate impossibly too many
disjuncts, or even larger numbers that approach the number of art works.67
For instance, and simplified for example by not excluding certain disjuncts,
Davies calculates that even if every possible combination of eight or more criteria
was a sufficient disjunct, that would only add up to fifty-six ways of being art. As
he concludes, “I see nothing in his account entailing that the disjuncts must be too
numerous to qualify the result as a complex, disjunctive, but otherwise orthodox,
definition, so long as those disjuncts are specified at an appropriate level of abstrac-
tion. In other words, there will be a list of complex alternatives, but not one that
is absurdly extended.”68
If Davies is right, then his concluding words are apt: “I conclude that the
cluster account lacks what Gaut identifies as its primary virtue. It does not support
anti-essentialism in aesthetics. The reverse.”69
What to make, then, of the support the cluster theory receives from those who
consider the art status of videogames? Gaut offers four methodological considera-
tions that any account of art should meet. In his words, an adequate account of art
67This is different from ( [57]), in which a cluster account is defended in which the possession of
a threshold of criteria is sufficient for art status. Gaut argues against this kind of formulation that
in different criteria may count towards art status with different weight in different combinations.
68 [56, p. 299]
69 [56, p. 299]
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must be adequate to intuition, normatively adequate, include a theory of error, and
have heuristic utility. We can address these in order.
The constraint Gaut finds most important is the adequacy to intuition, that
the account should agree with our intuitions about what things are art and what
things are not, including both actual and counterfactual cases. This is, as far as I
can see, an unobjectionable constraint, but one that shows in particular the failing
of the cluster account as it applies to videogames. If, as Gaut claims, adequacy
to intuition is the most important constraint of an account of art, then it does no
good to appeal to the theory when trying to classify videogames as art or non-art.
The whole point of bringing a theory to bear on the question is precisely because
we don’t want to lean too much on our intuitions about whether videogames are
art. Furthermore, if we are actually ambivalent or agnostic about the art question
of videogames, and thus unsure of what our intuitions tell us about a case, then a
theory whose best credential is that it lines up with our intuitions will not help us.
Gaut could respond by saying that if the account lines up with all our other
intuitions about art, and perhaps does so better than any other theory or account,
then whatever it tells us about videogames, intuitions aside, will be informative
and likely correct. This is, in fact, the tack he takes in arguing that the cluster
account matches our intuitions better than functional, institutional, or historical
accounts do. He dispatches functionalist and institutional theories rather quickly,
and for similar reasons as I have given above. What is of interest is his response to
historical definitions. He thinks that historical definitions face a problem because
aliens might make art, and we might discover it, but depending on how we formulate
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the definition, we will have to say that either the objects we found are not art, or
that the aliens did not know they were making art.
This is not a convincing refutation of the intuitive adequacy of historical defini-
tions. First, certainly aliens could make artifacts that were superficially or formally
similar to our own artworks, but this does not show that they were indeed art. In
fact, to claim that they are would be to beg the question. Second, there are plenty
of instances of artworks made on earth by humans that are best explained by not
ascribing a self-aware art-making intention to the creator. This meets his error the-
ory constraint, and allows for the reflective equilibrium of the normative adequacy
constraint. So by those lights, historical definitions seem to meet his constraints
as well as the cluster account. Furthermore, it is not clear to me that we really
do have the strong intuitions about alien art that Gaut claims we do. Finally, he
argues that the cluster account avoids Kripke’s argument about cluster accounts of
names because “art” is not a proper name nor a natural kind. “Indeed art may be
the preeminent example of something that is not a natural kind”.70
I think Gaut is exactly right about this. However, what it shows is his covert
affinity for the historically contingent nature of art. This affinity reveals his alien
art objection to be quite toothless, as there is no natural kind out there that aliens
can be making instances of, but only our own historically contingent human practice
of art making. Rather there is only our actual art making practice that aliens could
be participating in, not with complete epistemic awareness but only by other, more
intrinsic criteria. The sufficiency of certain intrinsic, rather than explicitly art-
70 [58, p. 38]
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historically relational properties is a subtle point of which a full defense will have
to wait until the following section. But it should be sufficient for now to say that it
is that very nature of art that Gaut is appealing to in defending the cluster account
against Kripke’s otherwise aimed criticisms.
Most devastatingly, I take it is the very flexibility of the account that Gaut
repeatedly claims is its virtue. He defends the form of the cluster account over
the particular criteria that he gives by noting that even if the criteria he gives are
incorrect, we can just modify the list to reflect the reasons why we include some
new piece of art that eluded inclusion on the going list of criteria. But surely this is
telling of a deep inadequacy of the cluster account to explain why something is art,
and is even less adequate at classifying new forms, media, or uncategorized objects.
If the account is modifiable by first checking something’s art status and then making
sure the cluster includes the relevant criteria, then there is something else doing the
classificatory work, not the cluster account itself. What is this unspecified, and
presumably unspecifiable, intuition that guides our art classifications that we then
fit with a post-hoc set of criteria? Because no set of criteria, save the totality of
them, can be sufficient for something’s art status, the account cannot dispel our
ignorance, it can only match the judgments we have already made. This is precisely
the problem the cluster account faces when it is put into service to answer the art
question of videogames.
Interestingly, though the above considerations show the cluster theory of art
to fail in its own aims, namely that of anti-essentialism, and thus fail to be a good
art theory by which to examine videogames, it fails in another way too. The cluster
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theory of art simply cannot provide an answer, positive or negative, to the art
question of videogames.
1.6.2 Cluster Account Failure
How, exactly, does the cluster account of art fail to provide an answer to
the art question of videogames? Videogames are, by some lights, what are often
called borderline cases of art. They exist at the edges of what can be acceptably
recognized as art, and it is possible that they should be included, and it is possible
that they should be excluded. Our intuitions about their status are said to be on the
borderline of art and non-art and thus not determinative or wholly reliable. This is
not a case where a theory ought to match our intuitions, since there are none, or
they are too weak, so we must turn to our theory. This is importantly different from
so-called hard cases of art. These are cases that are, less controversially, art, yet
prove difficult to account for by extant theories of art, and thus require a revision of
the theories. Thus borderline cases test theories of art in a different way than hard
cases do. While hard cases test theories by forcing revisions upon theories that do
not include them, borderline cases instead impose precisification on theories that
cannot settle borderline cases of art one way or the other.
Recall that Gaut employs the notion of counting towards in his cluster account.
The strong consequence of this is that, as in his case of ten criteria, while possessing
all the criteria is sufficient for something to be art, possessing less than ten of the
criteria can also be sufficient for something to be art. What Gaut does not claim
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of the cluster account is that it offers a list of criteria which are, in any number,
sufficient for arthood. In other words, it is not always the case that the possession
of a subset of the ten criteria is sufficient to make something art.
We can see that this is so by examining the individual criteria, assuming that
the list of criteria is correct. Consider the first criteria, possessing positive aesthetic
qualities. Many things that are not art possess positive aesthetic qualities, like
some people, sunsets, flowers, mountains, trees, wall paper, faucets, motorcycles,
and shoes. Similarly with the second criteria, being expressive of emotion. Many
things that are not art are expressive of emotion, like someone crying, or yelling, or
a heartfelt card, or a touching eulogy. None of these things are art, yet they satisfy
a criterion that counts towards them being art. As we can see, the satisfaction of
a single criterion that count towards being art is not sufficient for that thing to be
art.
Nor is the possession of just any set of multiple criteria sufficient for art status.
For there are things that possess criteria (i) and (ii) and yet are not art. These would
be things like a beautiful smile, or a lonely vista, or a handsome happy dog. So the
set of criteria that is sufficient for something to be art must be of some certain sort
such that it picks out only art objects and not also non-art objects.
Gaut considers a condition on such sets that says that the object in question
must satisfy most(or some specific number) of the criteria. And that “cluster ac-
counts which hold that most of the criteria must be satisfied in order for something
to be art can indeed provide a method for determining whether something is a bor-
derline case of art: they can stipulate what proportion of criteria must be satisfied
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in borderline cases, and what proportions in the cases of works that are clearly art
and works that are clearly not.”71 But Gaut strongly criticizes this condition. “Such
accounts are implausible: why should we suppose that our concepts are structured
so that each criterion is of equal importance no matter what the other criteria are
with which we consider it?”72 For instance, he criticizes Dennis Dutton’s use of a
numerical threshold for a cluster account because, in Dutton’s example, meeting
six of his criteria is not always sufficient for something to be art. “For instance,
professional football games satisfy (i)–(iv), (vi), and (vii), yet professional football
games are not works of art.”73
Clearly the same holds for Gaut’s theory and any attempt to give a numerical
threshold of his criteria for art sufficiency. Adajian recognizes this, and criticizes
Gaut’s view as being unable to provide a satisfying account of when something is
a borderline case of art, or even of art and non-art. While Gaut’s list of criteria
certainly captures something about art, it provides no means for discerning the art
status of objects whose status is in question, yet satisfy some set of the criteria.
This is because there are objects that satisfy sets of the criteria and are art, and
objects that satisfy sets of criteria and are not art.
What would be devastating to the theory is if there are two objects that
satisfy the same set of criteria, one of which is art and one of which is not art.
But even without considering this possibility, there is a further problem. For any
given object whose art status is in question, is the set of criteria that it satisfies
71 [54, p. 279]
72 [54, p. 279]
73 [54, p. 280]
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(assuming it satisfies any) sufficient for it to be art? The cluster theory does not
seem to be in possession of the resources needed to make decisions on borderline
cases. Adajian points this out, noting that, “the cluster view has no resources for
saying, of any given thing with some but not all of the criterial properties, whether
that thing is an artwork, not an artwork, or a borderline case. That is, the same
‘explanation’ of why one thing is a borderline case—it has some but not all of the
criterial properties—is also the ‘explanation’ of why a second thing is an artwork,
as well as the ‘explanation’ of why a third thing is not a artwork. But if the cluster
view cannot say, of a given case which has fewer than all the properties, what makes
it a borderline case, rather than either an artwork or a clear non-artwork, it seems
to lack explanatory power.”74
Gaut responds to this criticism by acknowledging that a numerical threshold
is indeed unworkable, but that there are other ways of making the criteria work.
He notes the extreme limits of the implications of cluster theory, that “objects
satisfying all or none of the criteria will not be borderline cases of art; but that is
all.”75 He concedes that, “it is certainly the case that merely saying that an object
satisfies some but not all of the criteria does not differentiate between art, non-art,
and borderline cases.”76 This is right, and thus Gaut’s theory requires a further
explanation of what differentiates the sets of criteria-meeting categories of art, non-
art, and borderline cases. It is here that Gaut’s resources run dry. He offers this
suggestion: “The method is the familiar method of inspection: that is, consider the
74 [55, p. 382]
75 [54, p. 280]
76 [54, p. 280]
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particular subset, and consider whether something satisfying it is a borderline case
or not.”77
This is particularly vexing when the cluster theory is used to defend the art
status of videogames. What is done is to claim that videogames meet some set of
the criteria in the art cluster, and that this cluster is sufficient. What is problem-
atic, however, is that the cluster theory cannot be used this way. On one hand, if
videogames meet a set of criteria that are not met by other art objects, it is unclear
whether the set they do meet is a set that is sufficient for art status. The only way to
check, however, requires an independent verification of the art status of videogames.
Once we know that, say, videogames are art, then we know that the set of criteria
they meet is a sufficiently art-making one.
The greater problem, however, is that the cluster theory presumes that dif-
ferent objects meeting the same set of criteria must therefore have the same art or
non-art status. But this is only a presumption of the theory and, I believe, one
undermined by other elements of the theory. Recall that Gaut is not defending the
particular set of criteria that he proposes, only the general form of the cluster theory.
To determine the proper set of criteria, we consider artworks and the criteria they
possess and make a list. If, however, the list is inadequate in some way and either
includes non-art objects as artworks (perhaps by them meeting all the criteria), or
fails to properly include artworks, then the list must be modified. But this faces
the above problem of requiring independent verification of the art status of these
objects. First we must come to know by some other method what the art status of
77 [54, p. 280]
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an object is, and only then can we either recognize the criteria or judge a proposed
set as correct. But this leaves open the possibility that some set of objects meet
some set of criteria, some of them being art and some of them not. Because this is
always a possibility, no cluster of criteria can ever be known to be sufficient for art
status for an object of unknown art status. It might always turn out that the object
in question was an aberrant member of the set of objects that met those criteria,
and while they appeared sufficient for status, they either are not in general or not
in particular as regards this object.
This means that a cluster theory cannot be appealed to in answering the art
question for videogames. Not because it fails as a general account of art, though
it might do that as well. But because it cannot, in principle, be used to settle the
art status of objects whose status is unknown. And given that the art status of
videogames is the very thing in question, this is precisely the kind of work that a
cluster theory needs to do, but cannot.
Gaut’s approach is good general advice for thinking about art; when dealing
with art theories we should reflect on sets of criteria and consider whether the objects
that satisfy them are art objects or not. In fact, this might just be a restatement of
the best methodology going. However, this betrays the reliance one can put on the
cluster account of art. Gaut’s response shows that the cluster account cannot settle
borderline questions, or even determine whether something is a borderline case.
Instead we have to look to something else to make this determination. Whatever else
that thing may be (e.g. intuition, institutional stipulation, other theories) it will be
more than the cluster account gives us. This conclusion may initially seem satisfying
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to the proponent of the cluster account, given its anti-essentialist motivations, but
it does not recognize that the dependence on some other determining factor in
something’s art status may be definitional. What are we to consider when thinking
about sets of criteria in the cluster account if they themselves are not sufficient to
settle the matter? Definitional approaches to art can offer an answer to this question,
whereas cluster accounts must pass the buck onto some unspecified criterion that it
must hope will not threaten the anti-definitional nature of its main account.
1.7 A Definition of Art
No definition yet examined can satisfactorily answer the art question of videogames.
This is for one of two reasons: either the definition fails as a general definition of
art, and thus also fails in the particular case of videogames, or, as seen with Cluster
Theory, is not equipped to give an answer about videogames at all, regardless of
its explanatory power about other artforms. Not every possible account of art has
been examined, nor every variation and form of the kinds of definitions offered, but
there are reasons to doubt that any definition of the kinds offered above can be suc-
cessful. As Stephen Davies observes, definitions of art tend to come in a functional
or procedural form.78
Functional definitions hold that for something to be art it must fulfill a certain
function or functions, the usual function being an aesthetic one. But regardless of
the function chosen, be it aesthetic, expressive, communicative, creative, or anything
else, there will always be counterexamples that show such a definition to be too
78 [59]
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narrow. This has become especially salient in the twentieth century, which has seen
the concept of art evolve into an ever more stripped down set of criteria, shedding
not only its aesthetic function, but even its objectual physicality, as evidenced in
Minimal and, subsequently, Conceptual art. Given what art has become and the
vast diversity of objects (and non-objects) that can be artworks, it is unlikely that
any definition could be given that will adequately outline a function that all and
only artworks possess.
Functional definitions are also problematic in being too broad. As with aes-
thetic functions, there are obviously many objects that are not artworks that also
serve aesthetic functions. The same is true of any candidate function for definitions
of art. No matter the function singled out for arthood, there are a plethora of other
things that also serve those functions. The only way out, it seems, is to try to specify
a kind of “art” function, to add a condition that specifies not only what property
an object must possess, like aesthetic excellence, but also that it must be art, stip-
ulating a distinction from non-art objects. But this approach simply recreates the
problem of defining art while simultaneously showing that the function in question
is insufficient to the task. If there were a way of picking out art objects and then
recognizing their aesthetic function, it would make the latter unnecessary.
The other sort of definitions are procedural, which face a dilemma that seems
to force them into relying on a function. If all that art really is is the outcome of a
particular kind of procedure, as is proposed by Institutional Theory, then the value
and distinctness of art seems threatened. For art to be a purely procedural matter
is to make it a purely arbitrary matter. To avoid the charge of arbitrariness the
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proceduralist could offer reasons for why the procedure of deeming something art
is appropriate in one case but not another, but that is to make the procedure itself
secondary to whatever reasons guide the implementation of the procedure. Leaning
on such reasons threatens to turn the definition into a functional one, which would
avoid the threat of arbitrariness but at the cost of the problems that functional
definitions face.
We have dispatched many of the accounts and definitions of art that have held a
place of prominence during the past few centuries. These accounts have failed either
because they are incapable of satisfactorily answering the art question of videogames,
or, and in some cases also, because they fail as an account of art independently of
the art question of videogames. A definition of art is still needed to make good on
the first part of the project, which is to provide an analysis of art that is not trivial
and that allows us to make progress on answering the art question of videogames.
Functional and procedural definitions both seem inadequate, so something else must
be suggested. In the following section, I expound the Intentional-Historical definition
of art, put forth by Jerrold Levinson, and then defend the definition against several
recent objections.
1.8 Intentional-Historical Definition of Art
The practice of art is expansive and includes many seemingly disparate things.
The challenge of successfully defining art is to discover the feature common to all
artworks that is also unique to them. As we have seen, attempting to specify a
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function that all and only artworks possess does not look promising, nor does giving
a non-arbitrary proceduralist answer. Jerrold Levinson attempts to remedy this
dearth by proposing an Intentional-Historical definition of art. He finds something
appealing in the approach of an Institutional Theory, that there is something about
the intention of the artist to put forward a work for a certain kind of reception.
The disagreement comes about on the point of what kind of intention or action is
the sufficient one for art-making. Institutional Theory has it that the art-making
happens in the acceptance of the artworld representative or the intention of the
artist that the artworld accept the work as art. Levinson’s account differs in the
nature of the intention required and the kind of reception, if any, that is needed for
art status.
Levinson begins by pointing out that the concept of art has changed over
time and that today there are vastly different kinds of objects that fall under the
concept of art. What is common to Austen’s Pride and Prejudice, Michelangelo’s
David, Manet’s Olympia, Beethoven’s 5th Symphony, Duchamp’s Fountain, and
Robert Barry’s Inert Gas Helium Mojave Desert? While it might be the case that
in the past art was concerned primarily about the mimesis of nature, or displaying
aesthetic form, or expressing an emotion, or communicating the ideas of the artist,
none of these are sufficient to capture all the works that have been created in the
total history of art.
In short, Levinson proposes, something is an artwork iff it is or was intended or
projected for overall regard as some prior art is or was correctly regarded.79 With-
79For the original formulation see [60]. Subsequent revisions can be found in [61], [62], [60],
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holding an explicit account of each of the features of this definition for treatment
below, the immediate take-away is that the definition is an essentially historical one,
building into the definition of what makes something art now the actual contingent
history of what was art in the past. This irreducible historicality is part of what
must be intentioned by would-be art-makers in order for their art-making intentions
to be sufficient. It will have to be explained how different ways of making this
intention come about work, but first, let me highlight what makes this definition
different from and superior to other definitions.
What is similar across all works of art is that there is an art-making intention
present in all of their creations. By making the art-making intention sufficient, the
Intentional-Historical definition can be distinguished from the problematic notions
of art as cultural performance and requiring any specific kind of appreciation.
Divorcing art-making from a kind of cultural performance separates the intentional-
historical account from proceduralist accounts like institutional definitions. Where
those accounts require a kind of public or artworld ceremony to transform or baptize
an object as an artwork, the intentional-historical account does not. The art-making
intention is sufficient; this allows for private art that is never seen by or presented to
an artworld representative, and can even, to a certain extent, be made unawares of
the artworld. This distinguishes the definition from the institutional theory’s con-
flation of art and self-conscious art, allowing art to be made in a more naive form
even by those who do not wear the professional or cultural mantle of “artist”.
That the intentional-historical definition puts such weight on an art-making
and [63].
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intention allows it to avoid the problems that other definitions face, either in under-
or over-specifying the kind of appreciation that is appropriate to art. Most defi-
nitions offer an account of appreciation that is appropriate to some, perhaps even
many artworks, of a certain period. The difficulty they face is in giving an account
that holds for all artworks, across all periods of art, and is plausibly extended to
future art and the ways in which new artworks might be made.
The intentional-historical account is in effect a template-like definition, refer-
ring to, though not explicitly naming, all appropriate ways of regarding artworks.
This includes ways of appreciating them. By referencing the actual history of art,
the definition necessarily contains all the ways artworks have properly been appre-
ciated in the past and includes them as ways art can be properly be appreciated in
the future. This has an obvious advantage over definitions which attempt to pick
out one particular way of appreciating artworks and applying it as a necessary and
sufficient condition for all artworks. This, of course, is both too narrow and too
broad, as any one way of appreciating artworks will fail to capture artworks that
require different kinds of appreciation as well as potentially including non-artworks
that welcome the same kind of appreciation without also being artworks.
It might be countered that an adequate functional definition could be given
that simply lists all the ways art has been appreciated in the past. This might be
successful for the present, but faces two difficulties. The first is that it may not
be that all correct or proper art regards or regardings are appreciative in nature.
There may be other proper ways of regarding or engaging with a work beyond
appreciative ones. This depends heavily on how we distinguish these notions, but in
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broad strokes, appreciative practices are ones focused on the experience the viewer
has when engaging a work. This already does not cover creative functions, like
Collingwood’s, and there may be others. More difficult, however, is that even if
all ways of regarding are appreciative and giving a correct list of all appreciative
practices is sufficient to capture all that ways that art has been intended in the past,
it might always be the case that new ways of appreciating works come to be proper,
as with revolutionary art. The intentional-historical theory can handle revolutionary
art, as will be shown below, while a proposed maximal list of appreciative ways
cannot.
The historicity of the definition also fleshes out the kinds of appreciation ap-
propriate to art left unsatisfyingly underspecified in the case of the institutional
theory. Institutional theory must avoid the undermining effect of weak procedu-
ralism which would introduce other sufficient reasons for something be an artwork.
This seems to leave it only the option of being a strong proceduralism, which carries
with it an uncomfortable arbitrariness about the art-making procedure.
The intentional-historical definition avoids all these problems, by specifying
but not over-specifying the kinds of appreciation appropriate for artworks and then
tying those to the necessary and sufficient art-making intention rather than a kind
of cultural performance or ceremony.
This is a quick overview of how the intentional-historical definition is different
from competing accounts. Now we can look carefully at exactly what the definition
says and how it is supposed to cover all and only artworks.
The definition first takes as a requirement both extensional and intensional
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adequacy. This means that it must both correctly categorize artworks as such,
neither leaving any out nor including too much, as well as telling us something
about the nature of the concept art and not leaving it as an empty title. The
definition’s adequacy on both counts should reveal itself as it is explicated, but I
shall return to this in the conclusion.
The first charge is to find something common to all works of art. As noted
above, at minimum there seems to be an art-making intention present for all works
of art. It must be said what it is to have this kind of intention. The intention need
not be explicitly “I intend this thing to be an artwork,” though that kind of intention
can at times be sufficient. The idea is that the intention governing the work is intent
for regard-as-a-work-of-art. What this means is the way any work or works of art
have been properly regarded in the past. This involves both the intentional and
historical elements of the definition. While for something to be an artwork requires
this kind of intention, thus the intentional part, that intention necessary involves
the history of our art-making practice, thus the historical part.
To intend a work for regard as works of art have been properly regarded in
the past is to necessarily invoke the actual history of art. This gives the theory
content, whatever ways of regarding are actual in art history, but does not restrict
the definition to identifying some particular way of regarding works that may not
include everything. In a sense this lets the definition off the hook of having to
specify what the actual ways of proper art regarding have been, and thus currently
are, but it does so in a way that meets our intuitions about the importance of
an understanding of art history to an understanding of art. Given how human-
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dependent and culture-dependent, and indeed historical, art is, it would be strange
if a definition of it could ignore the contingencies of art. The intentional-historical
definition not only recognizes the importance of such contingencies, it builds them
into the concept itself, making them part of the defining concept.
Levinson stresses that this is not a roundabout way of getting at what the
content of our concept of art is, something that we get to through understanding
the ways art has been properly regarded in the past. Rather, the collection of ways
that art has been regarded in the past just is the content of a proper art-making
intention. The notion of art, unlike for perhaps all other things, is a purely historical
notion. What art is depends essentially on what it has been. This radical historicity
gives us the tools to determine what art is now, assuming we have identified a past
set of uncontroversial artworks.
It is assumed that we do have such a set, that art museums and galleries, and
certainly textbooks on art history, are largely filled with objects over which there is
no great controversy as to their art status. That we have these objects at hand then
allows us to examine the ways in which it is proper to regard them as art objects, a
notion to which I will return briefly. Once we have an understanding of the proper
ways of regarding these past artworks, we can then simply hold new objects to this
standard and check if they are also intended to be regarded in these ways; if they
are, then they are artworks, if they are not, then they are not.
Now we must say more about the individual parts of the definition, including
what kind of objects it applies to, what it is to intend something to be regarded as
past works of art have properly been regarded. This intending involves two notions,
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one being the ways of intending, both relationally and intrinsically, and the second
being the relative repleteness of the regard that is required. To be clear on just
what the definition requires, Levinson offers a more precise version:
X is an artwork = df X is an object that a person or persons, having the
appropriate proprietary right over X, nonpassingly intends for regard-
as-a-work-of-art, i.e. regard in any way (or ways) in which prior artworks
are or were correctly (or standardly) regarded.80
This definition covers all manner of things that can plausibly be artworks.
To intend an object for regard is not only to have created or manufactured the
object, as happens with paintings and sculptures, symphonies and novels. There are
other kinds of objects that can be artworks and other ways of making those objects
artworks, including selecting or picking out. This will include found art objects, like
Duchamp’s works Fountain, made from a discarded toilet and Bottle Rack, examples
of his Readymades that he purchases, sometimes commercially and then displayed
as artworks. Clearly all that seems to distinguish these works from their ordinary
counterparts is some kind of art-making intention. Other kinds of artworks fail
to have even a physical objectual existence, being a directing of attention towards
objects or events, as we find with conceptual works and performance events. All
of these fall under the broad notion of object, it not being restricted to the sort of
medium-sized concreta we might normally associated with the term. Any kind of
entity might serve as a candidate for art status.81
The proprietary right requirement signals the ownership nature of artworks,
80 [64, p. 8-9]
81Though not every intended function is one that is consistent or compatible with being art, as
shall be argued with games in Part 2.
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in both legal and moral senses. While most anything can be turned into art, the
author must have the right kind of control over it. It is not enough that they simply
walk into your living room and declare your TV a work of found art, and thus off
it goes to the artworld. No, it must be something that they have proprietary rights
over, either through ownership or the permission of the owner. Levinson gives the
example of the Grand Canyon, pointing out that no amount of robust intending
is sufficient to turn it into a work of art, barring some great shift in who actually
controls what, though there might be a seemingly similar case where an artist’s act
of pointing out the Grand Canyon and imploring us to regard it as if it were a work
of art would be an ontologically distinct object of sufficient degree so as to count as
an artwork.
There are also moral limits, and that while any kind of object might con-
ceivably be made into an artwork, there are limits on the kinds of things we can
rightfully intend for regard in this way. Intending other humans for art status, even
perhaps with their permission, may just be beyond the pale. Humans, as indepen-
dent agents, just aren’t the kinds of things over which another person, in this case
the artist, can ever have sufficiently proprietary control over to prescribe how others
ought to regard it.
The non-passing requirement for the intentions is to secure the status of art
as a stable thing, not merely subject to passing whims. This is also useful in
distinguishing the different intentions of intending that we regard something as art
and intending that we regard something as if it were art. It can be rewarding to
consider objects as though they were works of art, meant to communicate some
80
idea, or for aesthetic delectation, but this is different from the kind of wholesale
non-passing treatment required to treat them as artworks, as opposed to merely as
if they were.
The non-passing requirement also leads us to the repleteness or completeness
of the kind of regard intended for artworks. This avoids any objection of pointing
out merely one way in which an artwork is properly regarded and noting that non-art
objects are sometimes properly regarded in this way too. Of course many things are
attended to for their aesthetic quality or their expressiveness or their craftsmanship.
But when we add in all the ways of considering the work that are relevant to its
status as art and that are part of what was intended, like the creative history of
the author, their oeuvre, the works in which they intend the work to be closely
interacting with, these considerations become unique to art.
Finally, and most substantially, we must consider the various ways in which
this intention for regard-as-a-work-of-art can come about. This intention can be un-
derstood both relationally and intrinsically, this being a key to the way the template
nature of the definition succeeds where other definitions have failed.
The intention may be given relationally, intending only that the object in
question be intended for regard as art. Regard in this way can be related to either
a specific work of art or a particular set of artworks, or to the entire ensemble of
artworks, whatever may happen to fall into that category. This kind of intention
relates the regard intended for the object in question to the ways prior artworks
have been intended to be regarded, whatever those ways of regarding happened to
be. In this sense the relationally way of intending is like a de dicto intention, the
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referent being whatever falls under that description “How artworks have properly
been intended in the past.” This can apply to a single work, the artist knowing
that some object is an artwork and intending their work for similar regard, or for a
class of artworks, be it a style, like impressionist paintings, or a whole artform, like
all sculptures. Most broadly, the intention can simply be for regard as artworks are
regarded, however that might be.
This kind of regard is non-naive and self-conscious to varying degrees. It
captures what is likely the most common form of (contemporary) art making, that
of someone aware of art history, to whatever degree, and intending for their work
the same regard as is given those other objects.
The other way of intending an object for a proper art regard is to intend it for
a specific kind of replete regard that just so happens to be a way that art is or was
properly regarded in the past. In this way someone can make an artwork in a naive
way, even if they are completely unaware of the artworld or any art history. In this
mode of intention one merely need to have a sufficiently fleshed out notion of regard
that they seriously intend their object for that is shared by other accepted artworks
in the past. This allows for artworks to be created in private, even in cases where
no one other than the artist ever experiences the work, and without even requiring
that the creator know that it is an artwork that has been created. This is a limiting
case to be sure, but it captures the intuition that art can be made far away from
the artworld and in ways the institutional theory cannot make sense of.
Though this definition makes explicit the historical component of the concept
of art, the way in which new works can be intended for art regards allows for revolu-
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tionary art, and revolutionary art regarding, to take place. Revolutionary art is art
that expands that boundaries of what kinds of things can be art as well as introduc-
ing new ways of regarding an object as an artwork. On the face of it this seems like
something that an essentially historical theory cannot accommodate. This, however,
is an essential element to a successful definition of art because, of course, the art-
making practice develops and explores new areas, and, as we have seen particularly
in the 20th century, sometimes seemingly radically different objects can be offered
up as artworks and, eventually, accepted into the mainstream artworld as relatively
uncontroversial artworks. Accommodating revolutionary art is also important be-
cause it is on exactly these kinds of cases that have proved problematic for functional
theories and expose the unacceptable fiat nature of institutional theory.
Levinson suggests two strategies for making sense revolutionary art. The first
strategy is that when creating a revolutionary artwork the artist ultimately intends
their work for some kind of unprecedented regard, but it gets there by initially
offering itself up for a familiar kind of regard. Once it has been accepted in the
standard way, the other ways of it being intended to be regarded are then also made
ways of proper art regarding, becoming a new way that future artworks can be
properly regarded.
The second method of incorporating revolutionary art is to broaden the notion
of what counts as regard-as-a-work-of-art to include conscious rejection of the past
ways. One might intend that a work not be appreciated for its, say, particular
aesthetic complexion, but because it blatantly rejects such a reading. This approach
works because the new way of appreciating the work is intended in direct relation
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to the way prior works have been regarded, even though the current regard is new
and not an already proper way of regarding art.
I suspect that both of these strategies get at the real mechanism that makes
these work, and that is, that much weight can be put on the relational notion of rev-
olutionary art. Clearly a candidate work can only be so revolutionary before we fail
to see it as art at all. The connection to past art must happen at some level and an
intrinsic similarity to past regards that is too strong is likely to frustrate the artist’s
ambition of making revolutionary art. So the artist does something more radical,
but always pushing on the relational nature of the candidate work, that despite its
revolutionary nature and unprecedented way of regarding the object, it is, among
other things, to be regarded as a work of art, despite the strain that this might
require. This not only fits within Levinson’s definition, but captures the tension
that exists with revolutionary art, that we are being asked to appreciate something
in ways that are perhaps not felicitous, but we attempt to do so nonetheless. Fur-
thermore, when this kind of stretching of the repertoire of correct art regards is
successful, it opens up new venues for art, sometimes in such a way that subsequent
works intended for a similar, heretofore, revolutionary way of regarding seem imme-
diately derivative. One need only think of how tired the prospect would be of more
Readymade urinals presented as artworks.
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1.9 Objections
Thus it seems that we have a definition of art that avoids the main problems
that face functional and institutional definitions. Before considering how it fares in
answering the art question of videogames, the definition is in need of defense from
several recent objections. Otherwise, while the theory might give an interesting
answer to whether videogames can be art, it would fail as a general theory of art
and thus be of little use. There are four objections that I will consider here: (1) the
challenge presented by the buck-passing theory, (2) the claim that the intentional-
historical account doesn’t accommodate the possibility of failed artworks, (3) a
recent new objection that the definition cannot accommodate revolutionary art,
and (4) the problem of ur-art.
1.9.1 The Buck-Passing Theory
Dom Lopes has recently proposed a buck-passing theory of art that aims to
correct the misguided approach of so-called buck-stopping theories, including Levin-
son’s intentional-historical account.82 Lopes, with characteristic rigor, gives a nice
analysis of the differences between theories of art and theories of the arts. The
importance of making this distinction, as Lopes sees it, is to keep appropriately
separate the question “What is art?” from the question “What is a work of art?”
He sees buck-stopping theories of art as unduly conflating them, and that a buck-
passing theory of the arts response gives a better answer. A theory of art, he says,
82 [4], also, [65], [66].
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“state[s] what it is for an item to be a work of art.”83 This is often given in the
form, as found in Levinson’s above:
x is a work of art = x is . . .
This is to be contrasted with a theory of the arts, which aim not to give an
account for any stand alone object whether it is art, but rather pushes the art
question back to inclusion of art forms or art kinds, and gives an analysis of what
it is for a kind K to be an art kind. This is of the form:
K is an art = K is . . .
It continues by giving the theories of the arts which gives an analysis of what
it is to be a member of each kind K that is an art kind. This has the form:
X is a work of K, where K is an art = X is...
The theories of the arts then go on to explicate the individual arts, like, paint-
ing, sculpture, dance, music, etc., and perhaps more specific forms as well, and give
membership conditions for objects to be members of those kinds. Because for each
kind K that is given a theory like this is already taken to be an artform or art kind,
the question of the art status of the members of the various Ks is unnecessary. To
be an artwork, according to Lopes, is to be a member of an art kind; the interesting
question is what makes something a member of any individual art kind. Thus we get
Lopes’ buck-passing theory that makes reference to art kinds and the inclusion of
83 [4, p. 11]
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objects within those kind as the necessary and sufficient conditions for those objects
to be artworks:
x is a work of art if and only if x is a work of K, where K is an art.
Thus the theory is a buck-passing one, rather than a buck-stopping one.
Whereas a theory of art attempts to stop the buck at the question “What is art?”
and give an analysis that can be applied at the object level, the buck-passing theory
passes on this question, leaving it to the domain of art kinds and replacing an answer
to that question with an answer about what makes different things members of the
various art kinds. There is nothing else to be analyzed here, no further reduction in
art status. Art membership is simply art-kind membership. The interesting work
to be done in aesthetics is the difficult and contingent art practice focused work of
saying what it is to be a member of each art kind. Thus we need experts in poetry
analyzing poetry, experts in dance analyzing dance, and so on. We leave behind
the project of identifying some set of conditions for art status that are univocal
across all artworks, and look only for what is crucial to making something a work
of conceptual art, or performance art, or literature.
As criteria for what makes a theory of art successful, Lopes gives two, viability
(or correctness) and informativeness. He also argues that on the metric of success
by these criteria, the buck-passing theory is superior to buck-stopping theories.
Viability is the ability of a theory to withstand counterexamples; this tracks its
correctness in being extensionally adequate. A viable theory correctly categorizes
artworks as such and does not incorrectly include non-artworks.
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Lopes suggests that it is often supposed that a buck-stopping theory of art
is systematically informative, that knowing what makes x an artwork can also tell
us what kinds are art kinds and what it is to be a member of those kinds. He
readily admits that his buck-passing theory is not systematically informative in
this way. This is clearly right, as the work is being passed off onto the individual
theories and the theory of art presented is merely one of membership of art kinds.
It appears, however, that Lopes’ argument for the non-informativeness of buck-
stopping is question-begging. He is right to point out that merely showing what it
is for an x to be an artwork is not sufficient to show anything about the kind K that
x belongs to, nor what it is about being a K that contributes to its art status. But
this begs the question in favor of there being art kind Ks as he supposes there are.
For this to be the case, it must be that things like painting, sculpture, and music
are artforms. Said like this is sounds practically like a truism. What else could they
be, and if not these, then what?
For the charge of non-systematic informativeness with which Lopes charges
buck-stopping theories of art to stick, he must provide a strong notion of artforms
or art kinds. It must be that simply being a member of those kinds is sufficient
for being an artwork. And while that may seem obvious on the face of it, such a
view does not withstand sustained examination. There are paintings that are not
artworks, like billboards and advertising posters. There are sculptures that are not
artworks, as rows of tchotchkes for sentimental tourists the world over clearly show,
and elevators are stereotypically known for being, perhaps unfairly, for being full on
non-art music. The charge of uninformativeness only sticks if it is true that a theory
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of art should entail a theory of the arts, and of how being a member of those arts
contributes to the art status of its members. But it’s unclear that this is the case,
insofar as such a requirement depends on articulating a strong notion of art kinds.
Putting this issue with informativeness aside, we can look to Lopes’ other
formulation of informativeness: the ability to deal with hard cases. As examples
of hard cases, Lopes suggests Marcel Duchamp’s Fountain, Andy Warhol’s Brillo
Boxes, and John Cage’s 4’33”. Of these, he says, “a theory of art is informative to
the extent that it enables us to cope with the hard cases in an adequate fashion.”84
It’s unclear that the intentional-historical definition of art is less informative
than Lopes’ buck-passing theory, either in failing to be systematically informative
or in dealing with the hard cases. It also seems to be extensionally correct. So on
these cases there seems to be a draw. What we must do is take the tack that Lopes
does, and see if, on other counts, his theory turns out to be superior or inferior in
either viability or informativeness.
To consider the success of the buck-passing theory of art, I echo criticisms
raised by Stephen Davies and Robert Stecker.85. The first objection is one that
Lopes anticipates: the Coffee Mug objection. This is the idea that if something is
an artwork in virtue of being a member of an art kind, then what about objects, like
coffee mugs, that seem to be members of art kinds, in this case ceramics, yet are not
artworks? As hinted at above, the reliance on art kinds proves problematic for Lopes’
account, and it muddies what was otherwise meant to be a clear analysis of the arts.
84 [4, p. 22]
85Respectively, [67] and [68]
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Lopes’ solution is to make a distinction between art and non-art versions of each
kind. This gives us not the simple kind ceramics that happens to be an art kind, but
rather two kinds: art-ceramics and non-art-ceramics. He avoids question-begging
by not merely asserting that the ceramic mug belongs to the kind non-art-ceramics,
but gives an account of what would separate these two different kinds.
The difference between art kinds and non-art kinds of ostensibly the same
medium lies in their participating in different appreciative practices. Whereas art-
ceramics is a practice that has certain evaluative elements of an aesthetic or artistic
sort, non-art-ceramics does not. This saves the distinction, but it reintroduces the
question of generality of art that the buck-passing theory was supposed to have left
behind with the buck-stopping theories. We are forced to ask, what then distin-
guishes art-kinds from non-art kinds in otherwise similar media? The answer lies
in the kind of appreciative practices each has. This sounds satisfying, but now we
are in need of an account of what makes an appreciative practice an art one or a
non-art one. Any answer to this question seems like it must reintroduce consider-
ations of a general art kind that spans different art kinds, lest it fall into the kind
of unacceptable fiat that faces strong proceduralism. As Davies puts it, if we’re
eventually going to divide art kinds from non-art kinds, “it looks as if we need an
account of the buck stopping kind that tells us what is art before any buck passing
can begin.”86
The other main objection to Lopes’ account, which he also anticipates, is the
Free Agent objection. This is the problem of how to accommodate within the arts a
86 [67, p. 331]
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work of sufficient uniqueness that it does not obviously fit into any existing art kind.
Lopes offers two suggestions: either the work actually does fit into a preexisting art
kind, or it generates a new art kind. The first seems implausible, since while this
may be the case for some works, clearly there are works that have unmistakably
introduced new art kinds. So we must go with the second suggestion, but it is
problematic as well. Davies notes, “if the art status of a work from which a new art
kind derives is not conferred retrospectively–that is, if it was art at the outset–then
its initial status as art does not depend on its membership in the kind that, later,
it is recognized as founding.”87
Stecker adds another facet to these objections, one that shows both objections
to be related: it “comes from the world of artefacts in which special instances
of such things as carpets, furniture, tools or ships rise to the level of art. Lopes
only discusses [a different type of case], and that automatically makes his response
incomplete.”88
While Lopes does provide a convincing analysis of appreciative practices and
the way they distinguish kinds, it is not convincing that doing so makes a distinction
between art kinds and non-art kinds. This suggests that the buck-passing theory is
not as successful at addressing the free agent and coffee mug objections as his text
claims. These problems are compounded by a point Stecker makes on the general
claim of the superiority of the buck-passing theory. He notes that, while Lopes is
right that for a theory of art to be as informative as possible it must make room
87 [67, p. 330]
88 [68, p. 261]
91
for the lessons gained from close attention to actual and individual art practices,
it’s less clear that, as Lopes has set things up, the buck-passing theory is clearly
superior. Lopes concedes that he is not presenting theories of the arts, and that
those must be developed individually; he is only defending the theoretical structure
that would encompass such theories. But the difficult work of whether a theory can
accommodate hard cases of artworks or not cannot be accomplished solely on the
general theoretical level, as Lopes argues. “By parity of reasoning, there is no way
that Lopes can show that BPTs [buck-passing theories] handle hard cases better
than BSTs [buck-stopping theories], because how well this is done is a property of
individual theories, not types of theories.”89 Thus, Stecker argues that Lopes has
failed to show that buck-stopping theories are actually at a methodological impasse
that prevents them from attending to the particularities of the individual arts as
well as the buck-passing theory can.
Most problematically for the guiding question of this project is what can a
buck-passing theory of the arts say about videogames? It seems that it is caught
between two unacceptable positions. It must say for the whole class of videogames
whether it is an art kind or a non-art kind. Or, more precisely, it must characterize
non-art-videogames and then decide if there is another class of art-videogames that
contrasts with that. But the buck-passing theory, by its own lights, cannot perform
this task. It seems as though it may have passed the buck too far, leaving it wholly
unanalyzed how we are to determine if there is a kind of object that is an art
kind. We do know that it would have to be a kind that has a sufficiently art-
89 [68, p. 261]
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like appreciative practice. But in answering this question, the theory threatens to
turn into a buck-stopping theory, giving a way of tying all the art kinds together
via similar appreciative practice criteria. Or, it avoids this possibility but leaves
the criteria of the appreciative practice of art-videogames undetermined. Thus it
seems that when faced with the challenge of answering whether videogames can
be artworks, the buck-passing theory either cannot answer,90 or gives an answer
consonant with the intentional-historical definition.
In sum it does not seem that the buck-passing theory proves an alluring al-
ternative to the buck-stopping intentional-historical definition of art, nor that, if it
did, it would be able to answer whether videogames can be artworks.
1.9.2 Failed Art
An interesting challenge to the intentional-historical definition of art has been
put forth by Christy Mag Uidhir.91 Mag Uidhir claims that for all things based on
intentions, there is a relevant class of objects that is sometimes overlooked. It is not
simply the case that there are Xs and non-Xs, but also a special subset of non-Xs
which are failed-Xs. Given that there is a near consensus that artworks, whatever
they are, are intention-dependent, they must also accommodate this phenomena.
Thus, while there are artworks and non-artworks, there is a special subset of non-
artworks which are failed-artworks.
90This is problematic in the same way that the cluster account is. The theories only seem
equipped to give an analysis of what makes objects artworks once it has already been established
that they are artworks, or in Lopes’ case, members of a kind that has already been established as
an art kind.
91 [69] and [70]
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There is an important difference between non-Xs in general and the subset
of them that are failed-Xs. Mag Uidhir identifies this distinguishing factors as
attempts. As he points out, a cheese sandwich is (in ordinary cases) a non-artwork,
but not, as Mag Uidhir claims, interestingly so. It is similarly (presumably equally
uninterestingly) a non-car, a non-mountain, and a non-electron.92 In no way is the
cheese sandwich a failed artwork, any more than it is a failed car, mountain, or
electron. This is because there was no attempt to make the cheese sandwich into
an artwork, or anything else. To be a failed-X requires something more than being
a mere non-X; there must have been a relevant attempt to make an X and that
attempt must have failed. It is this that separates failed-Xs into their special subset
of non-Xs.
He gives the following example in demonstration of the general principle:
Suppose we carve the world into lawyers and non-lawyers. For simplic-
ity’s sake, let’s assume that passing the bar exam is both necessary and
sufficient for being a lawyer.
Lawyer: a thing that has passed the bar exam (e.g. Hillary Clinton,
Clarence Darrow, Johnnie Cochran).93
Non-lawyer: a thing incapable of taking the bar exam, or a thing
capable of taking the bar exam that either has not taken the bar exam
or has taken the bar exam but did not pass the bar exam (e.g. myself,
William Shatner, Pigeon the cat, ferns, the number five).94
For any object falling into the class of non-lawyers, however, Mag Uidhir argues
92 [70, p. 9]
93The names have been corrected from the original: “Hilary” and “Johnny Cochrane”. I have
assumed in my corrections what the author meant. Max Bialek suggested to me that, given the
context, we might reflect on this as a potential case of failed reference.
94 [70, p. 13]
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that it is only informatively non-lawyers if it is a non-lawyer in the right way, namely
as a failed-lawyer. He continues:
Being a failed-lawyer must be about attempting to be a lawyer in the
right sort of way—call these attempts lawyer-attempts—but have that
attempt fail . . . Since we are supposing that passing the bar exam is both
a necessary and sufficient condition for being a lawyer, lawyer-attempts
then must be attempts that, if successful, also satisfy that condition;
namely, passing the bar. Presumably then, there is but one kind of
lawyer-attempt: taking the bar exam. Failed-lawyers and lawyers share
the same lawyer-attempt—taking the bar—but diverge with respect to
the failure and success of that lawyer-attempt.95
Thus we have Mag Uidhir’s central example of failed-Xs as a subset of Xs
which will serve as an analog for all cases of X-attempts and cases of failed-Xs, in
particular artworks and failed-artworks. Mag Uidhir’s account meets a stumbling
block in Levinson’s theory, however, because the intentional-historical definition’s
success condition is an intentional one. This eliminates the possibility of a failed-
attempt in the sense that Mag Uidhir presents it. For his account to work, there
must be some intermediate threshold for the achievement of X.
Mag Uidhir’s account breaks down when this supposedly intermediate thresh-
old of achievement is the same as the achievement itself. We see how his account
works so well with lawyers, there is a definite threshold to be crossed: passing the
bar. But the intentional-historical definition identifies the sufficient condition for
something to be art with what Mag Uidhir’s account recognizes as only a sufficient
condition for attempting. By simply having to intend an object for the right kind
95 [70, p. 15] emphasis his.
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of regard to make it an artwork, there is no way in which failure could occur. It
seems, then, that by the intentional-historical definition of art, there can be no
failed-artworks, only artworks (objects which have been correctly intentioned) and
non-artworks (objects which have not been correctly intentioned).
Mag Uidhir resists this conclusion however, finding fault not with a theory of
failed-art but with the intentional-historical definition. He denies that intentions
are the kinds of things that on their own can make something into an artwork, and
thus concludes that any definition which states that they can must be mistaken.
Mag Uidhir’s analysis has it that artworks are the results of artwork-attempts, as
all created Xs must be the result of X-attempts. Attempts, he takes it, conceptually
presuppose the possibility of failure. Thus if artworks come from artwork-attempts,
it must be that there can be failed-artworks. Mag Uidhir recognizes that Levin-
son’s theory does not make room for failed-art-attempts and responds: “Given this,
Levinson’s theory entails either that all art-attempts are ipso facto successful or that
the success or failure of art-attempts is irrelevant to something’s being art. Both
assumptions are quite clearly false if not also absurd.”96
I must confess, I struggle to see how Levinson’s view is false at all, let alone
quite clearly so, and it is even further away from being absurd. Mag Uidhir gives us
no argument for this claim, other than his conviction that successful-Xs must be the
result of successful X-attempts, and that to attempt must entail the possibility of
failure. For artworks to not obey this schema would make them special, distinct from
other kinds of artifacts. This is in fact what Levinson claims. The closest Mag Uidhir
96 [70, p. 30]
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comes to giving an argument against Levinson’s claim is to argue against the analog
cases that Levinson presents as fellow candidates for special intentional status, that
being that they are not subject to the same kind of success and failure conditions
as more paradigm attempt cases, like lawyers. These are the cases of “observed
thing”, “beloved object”, and “prize-winner.” I take Mag Uidhir’s argument against
the analog cases to be convincing enough, but this does not show that art itself is
not a special case. Of course it may highlight that art is a particularly special case,
perhaps even unique. That artworks might be uniquely sensitive to intentions is part
of Levinson’s point; artworks are uniquely purely historical. This makes them wholly
relational, and what relates current art creations to past ones is intentions. What
art is depends on what art has been in the past in a way perhaps unlike any other
artifact. If this is so, then it should not surprise us if artworks relate to constituting
intentions differently than do other objects, in that they are so intimately tied to
them, precisely because of their particularly historical relational nature.
Mag Uidhir considers the possibility that the propriety condition accommo-
dates failed-art on the intentional-historical view but ultimately rejects it. “It is
but merely a prerequisite for any such regard-attempt to be in principle capable of
succeeding.”97 There are other ways the intentional-historical definition can handle
failed attempts. There is the possibility that an intention for art regarding goes
wrong in a different way. Imagine a case where someone intends something for a
kind of regard that they incorrectly believe is the way some artwork or set of art-
works has been correctly regarded in the past. It is not the case that their intention
97 [70, p. 29]
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is sufficient in the relational sense, because that is not the kind of intending they
have attempted. While such an intending perhaps would be sufficient, they have
not intended the work in this way, and the account works on actual intentions, not
promising available but unactualized intentions. It seems in this case that someone
has made a legitimate attempt at making something artwork by intending it for a
kind of regard that they have a right to intend—this avoids the proprietary compli-
cation raised above—but the attempt fails because while they believed that kind of
regarding was sufficient for art-making, it was not.
Mag Uidhir might object to this move, arguing that the definition incorporates
art-regarding intentions in such a way that to fail to have one is to fail even to have
an art-attempt. Even if this reply is right and the intentional-historical definition
cannot conceptually accommodate failed-attempts, Sherri Irvin has offered a helpful
analog that neatly parries Mag Uidhir’s objection.98 She gives the example of her son
making a drawing, and then being asked who the drawing is for. Her son answers,
which indeed lets us know whom it is for, but the verbal expression is not required
for that to be the case. In fact, it seems, nothing is required for the drawing to
be for someone other than her son intending it. This action of dedication seems
to be without the possibility of failure, just as Levinson’s definition of art; either it
happens and succeeds or it does not happen, there is no room for a failed attempt.
It also happens that Mag Uidhir misrepresents Levinson’s case as being about
the uptake of the work, where a work is regarded as it was intended, rather than
merely intended to be regarded in some correct way. While the original state-
98 [71]
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ment and analysis of Levinson’s definition is accurate, criticism of it quickly slides
into considerations of whether the attempted artwork in question is ever actually
regarded in the way intended. Surely on a definition like this, where uptake is con-
stitutive, there can be failed-attempts. I can intend for you to look at a picture
in just some such way, and if you don’t, then my attempts have failed. But the
intentional-historical definition is explicitly not a definition like this, being careful
to make its sufficient condition one of intentions about regard, not the success with
which the regarding takes place. This makes room for private art, undiscovered art,
and the lot, and is much of what makes the definition extensionally superior to its
competitors like the institutional theory. That Mag Uidhir addresses this modified
form and shows that it makes room for failed-art does not carry any weight against
the intentional-historical definition as offered.
1.9.3 Revolutionary Art
Levinson himself sees making his definition compatible with revolutionary art
as an important part of his account. Recently, Daniel Wilson has challenged the
adequacy of the solutions Levinson proposes. There are two:
One is to maintain that although consciously revolutionary artists desire
that eventually their objects will be dealt with in unprecedented ways,
to make them art they must initially direct their audiences to take them
(or try taking them) in some way that art has been taken—otherwise,
what can we make of the claim that they have given us art, as opposed
to something else? . . .
A second strategy for dealing with this issue perhaps does less violence to
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the outward stance of the consciously revolutionary artist. This requires
a liberalization of what regard-as-a-work-of-art amounts to: . . . regard
in any way (or ways) in which prior artworks are or were correctly (or
standardly) regarded, or in some other way in contrast to and against
the background of those ways.”99
Wilson finds an inconsistency here when these strategies are attempted on the
kinds of works that Levinson defines as revolutionary. He describes a revolutionary
artwork as, “one for which any past ways of approaching art seems inadequate, inap-
propriate, pointless, or impossible; a revolutionary artwork appears to be ultimately
calling for a kind of regard which totally unprecedented.”100 If this is all as it seems,
then it seems that Levinson’s theory cannot actually accommodate revolutionary
art. It requires some overlap with preexisting ways of regarding, yet it denies any
of those ways to the work of revolutionary art. Surely we are at an impasse.
Wilson offers a solution that rescues Levinson’s account. It requires an ad-
justment of what is meant by revolutionary art. Instead of seeing revolutionary art
to have ways of regarding that are totally unprecedented, he argues that, contra to
Levinson’s definition, “a revolutionary artwork will have a regard profile that sub-
stantially consists of existing types of individual art regards {R1, R2, R3, . . . Rm}
but that also has at least one individual art regard, Ry, that is contra-standard with
respect to the regards that are dominant in contemporaneous art history.”101
I agree with Wilson that if things are as they superficially appear to be, then he
is right, there is a problem for the intentional-historical definition. And further, that
99 [64, p. 16-17] emphasis his.
100 [64, p. 15-16] emphasis his.
101 [72, p. 412]
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his solution seems a promising fix. However, to get Wilson’s reading, one requires an
uncharitable misreading of Levinson’s description, though, admittedly, Levinson’s
account could have made the correct reading more salient. Wilson correctly notes
the two ways of proper art-regarding, relational and intrinsic. It is arguably the
case, however, that when Levinson is talking about the specific ways in which art
can be regarded, he is restricted to talking only about intrinsic ways of regarding.
Restricting his claim in this way avoids the inconsistency that Wilson presents and
obviates the need for a redefinition of revolutionary works.
The problem with Wilson’s solution is that while it may make sense of some
revolutionary artworks, or artworks that are revolutionary to a certain degree, it
cannot make sense of artworks that are revolutionary to the degree that Levinson
envisioned. But, properly restricted, this more totalizing notion of revolutionary art
bears only on the intrinsic ways in which the work is meant to be regarded. To make
the account work for revolutionary work of this kind requires not a liberalization of
the intrinsic ways of regarding, as proposed by Levinson, but simply an emphasis on
the importance of the relational way of regarding. Levinson himself remarks that by
the lights of the intentional-historical definition it is, “obviously the dominant mode
today.”. Even in cases where an artist intends both relationally and intrinsically,
“the relational element (the thought of prior art) itself assures the art status of what
is made.”102
Given the dominance of the relational mode, and that it can make intentions
for intrinsic regarding overdetermined, it should be the case that a relational inten-
102 [61, p. 47] emphasis his.
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tion is sufficient for art-making. If this is the case, then it seems Levinson’s account
can be saved without needing to water down the degree of revolutionary art that
it can accommodate. For a work such as he describes, which is in no way intended
for intrinsic regard as prior artworks have been, being relationally intended for art
regard will be sufficient to make it an artwork. This requires no specific intrinsic
way of regarding, other than that it be considered as part of the history of art
alongside other artworks. Then, by its inclusion as art by means of a relational
regard, if such work is successful or receives uptake, then it introduces new ways of
intrinsic regarding that are appropriate to the revolutionary work and adds them to
the corpus of proper intrinsic art-regarding ways.
If this itself is too much of a similarity to prior artworks, then I know of no way
to make sense of Levinson’s description of revolutionary art, although I believe it is
obvious that he does not think that something that revolutionary could ever count
as art. It should also be noted that this way of bringing in and adopting elements
of heretofore revolutionary art sits better with an account of ur-art than one that
would require all intrinsic modes of art regarding to exist prior to the relational
intending, not to mention that such a view would take quite the bark out of how
the theory makes sense of how new art regards are introduced. It would allow for
artworks to be somewhat revolutionary, but not as revolutionary as it seems we’ve
experienced in the past.
It might also be suggested that Levinson could evade this problem given that
he has only claimed that revolutionary art appears to require unprecedented ways
of regarding when in fact such ways might require actually pre-existing ways of
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regarding. In some sense this is the move that Wilson makes in resuscitating the
intentional-historical definition. But this won’t do, because Levinson is clear a
few lines later that these works not only seem to require unprecedented ways of
regarding, but that they, “are intended as revolutionary by their artists, that is to
say, intended for treatment in a manner completely distinct from what has gone
before.”103 I think this makes the case even clearer that a defense of Levinson’s
account should reject a de-revolutionizing move like the one suggested by Wilson
and lean more heavily on the art-making power of the, now dominant, relational
way of intending regard.
1.9.4 Ur-art
Perhaps the most popular complaint about the intentional-historical definition
is that because it is a historically-dependent account it essentially references the art
that came before it. This works to a point, but eventually an account most be given
of the first art objects. The problem can be stated as follows: There must have been
a first artwork. The intentional-historical definition defines art as, roughly, being
intended for regard in a way that prior artworks have been properly regarded. But
since there are no artworks prior to the first artwork, there can be no such ways.
Thus, the kind of regarding required to be intended by the first object does not
exist, thus the first object cannot reference it. Thus there can be no first artwork
and the history of art could never have gotten started. Clearly the history of art
has happened, thus we have a contradiction and something must go. Since we are,
103 [64, p. 16] emphasis his.
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and should be, unwilling to jettison the entire history of art, it is the definition that
we should come to see as problematic and discard.
Levinson addresses this problem with the inclusion of ur-art. These are the
works that are either the first artworks, and do not have prior artworks to refer
back to, or are not artworks, but somehow stand in the right relation to the first
artworks such that they can properly become artworks.104 There is, somewhere,
a kind of bootstrapping process needed, where the backwards-looking conceptual
reference gets a foot hold and can begin.
There are several ways to respond to this. One is to pursue the possibility
that Levinson already has a solution, if we allow for uncontroversial artworks at
some period. Take some period of art in which there is a set of uncontroversial
artworks, say, the late 18th century. From these works, and the intentional-historical
definition, we can work forward to our time, able to discriminate between art and
non-art based on whether such objects were properly intended for regard as prior
works had been. Similarly, we can work backwards from the late 18th century,
being able to pick out what works supplied the prior regards that made this set of
uncontroversial works art. We can continue working backwards until we reach some
work or set of works that were referenced by the artworks that followed them but
have no prior artworks to reference themselves. Thus we have arrived at the ur-arts.
Levinson’s suggestion is that we add a recursive step at this point. The most
promising option by my lights is that it allows for the first artworks, identified as
such by this backward-looking method from uncontroversial artworks, to be art in
104Levinson gives both versions of ur-art in, respectively, [64] and [60].
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virtue of the relation that they have to artworks after them, rather than prior to
them. Levinson admits that, in light of such a move, “the theory’s claim to have
unearthed a sense of “art” applying univocally to everything in the extension of
“art” must be slightly tempered. However, since the tempering required is confined
to the very earliest stages of the story of art, the universality of the analysis of
arthood offered is not, I think, seriously compromised, nor are its prospects vis-à-
vis future art in any way dimmed.”105 I’m inclined to agree, and for further reasons
other than what Levinson offers.
It appears correct in light of the radical changes the artworld has undergone in
the 20th century that something more robustly specific than the kind of historically
relational account given by Levinson is unlikely to succeed. But it is equally clear
that such a self-conscious relation could not have been in place at art’s inception.
That we must alter our account of art to make sense of its beginnings seems no
great violence. It appears to me that the complaints of non-univocality press too
firmly with Occam’s Razor, or forget too quickly that we have a rather large set of
uncontroversial artworks with which to begin. The task was never to identify art ex
nihilo at its outset, without any prior notion of what it might be.
It might also be argued that if the problem of art’s beginnings is the biggest
problem that a definition faces, then that is quite an accomplishment. Most theories
cannot even accommodate what we uncontroversially take as artwork, let alone get
to the point of having to make sense of how art began. Unless the problem of being
unable to explain early art somehow undermines the ability of the definition to make
105 [62, p. 169]
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sense of contemporary art, this is at most a minor strike against it. In any case, as
has already been conceded, a plausible adjustment to make sense of art’s beginnings
could be made. Furthermore, given that we already have a set of uncontroversial
artworks, the boot-strapping is more or less unnecessary. Regardless of whence it
came, we have an immensity of prior artworks to which candidate objects can now
be related in such a way as to make them artworks as well.106
1.10 An Intentional-Historical Answer For Videogames
If the intentional-historical definition can be adequately defended against the
objections above, then it seems like a plausible candidate for a general definition of
art. There of course is not universal agreement on this definition, but it is promising
as both a definition of art and as a way of answering whether videogames can be
artworks. This means that unlike some definitions and accounts that might give us
interesting answers about the art status of videogames but ultimately fail as defini-
tions of art, the intentional-historical definition provides a compelling definition of
art. The question then is whether it can provide an answer as to whether videogames
can be artworks. Recall that other theories of art that were not obviously unsuc-
cessful as accounts of art, like the cluster account and the buck-passing theory, were
nevertheless unable to provide answers about the art status of emerging candidate
artforms. Is the intentional-historical definition equally incapable?
106A similar suggestion is made by Alessandro Pignocchi, who argues that the best definition of
art is an intentional one that is very similar to Levinson’s, but without the strict priority condition,
see [73]. That we can apply the concept “art” to something depends only on our application of
the same intentions we see behind other artworks to the artwork in question. This allows for
backward-looking application, as moving from uncontroversial artworks to earlier ones.
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Unlike functional theories, the intentional-historical theory does not give an
answer based only on some intrinsic properties of videogames that would be rela-
tively easy to check. If all that were required were that videogames be aesthetically
valuable, or emotionally expressive, or demonstrated creativity, or have notable
form, or whatever, then we could simply point to examples that met those criteria
and be done with it. Nor can the intentional-historical definition give an answer
about the whole category of videogames, as it does not justify the application of the
concept of art to all objects within a medium or artform, but rather to individual
objects on a case-by-case basis. For instance, the definition tells us what it is for an
individual painting to be art, not what it is for the category of all paintings to be
art. Now it is often the case that we are able to heuristically get at something’s art
status by noticing that it is a painting, as paintings overwhelmingly tend to be made
with the intention that they be regarded in established and widely recognized ways
of properly regarding artworks. But it is not succeeding on this heuristic approach
that makes a painting an artwork, that is to say, it is not being a member of the class
of paintings per se that makes a painting an artwork, but that it was intended for
the right kind of regard. It merely happens to be the historical case that paintings
have gone this way.
We now can see the ways in which the intentional-historical definition cannot
answer whether videogames can be artworks, that is, neither because of some artistic
function that they may possess nor categorically as a medium. But there seems like
a clear way in which the definition can answer positively, though it is by no means
an easy or obvious one. All that is required is for there to be an X that is intended
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for regard-as-a-work-of-art, i.e. regard in any of the ways works of art existing prior
to it have been correctly regarded and for that X to also be a videogame. To do this,
we must get clear on what videogames are and whether they are the kinds of things
that can be properly intended for art regards. If we can answer that positively then
we can say that they can be artworks. It would then clearly be satisfying to explore
promising candidate videogames to see if some actually are artworks. These are the
questions that will be taken up in the remaining parts of this dissertation.
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Chapter 2: Games
2.1 Philosophy and Ontology of Games and Play
Part 1 began the investigation into the question of whether videogames can be
artworks. As it broke down the question into smaller pieces more amenable to analy-
sis, it first addressed providing a definition of art. I examined various definitions and
accounts of art and defended a particular account, the Intentional-Historical defi-
nition, from among them. The intentional-historical definition of art was defended
against several objections, and seems a promising account for understanding when
and why something is an artwork. This recommends it over other definitions and
accounts that face general criticisms or are ill-equipped to address the art status of
videogames. The intentional-historical definition’s reliance on the intentions of the
artist does not immediately rule out the art status of videogames, which is another
mark in its favor, allaying any concern that it may be overly conservative in what it
can count as artworks. Videogames are a rich and varied medium and any account
or definition of art that would rule them out categorically should give us pause as
to its ultimate adequacy.
An interesting wrinkle, however, is that while the intentional-historical defi-
nition does not rule out the possibility of videogames being artworks, it also does
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not obviously include them as artworks, at least not as a medium. The definition
only makes provisions for individual works that have been properly intended for the
right kind of art-regard. Thus to answer whether videogames can be artworks we
need to consider them on a work-by-work basis, and not only through consideration
of their essential features as members of that genre. This also means that to answer
whether videogames can be artworks we need only consider if it is conceptually pos-
sible that a thing can be a videogame while also being intended for the right kind
of art-regard. If such a possibility exists, then videogames, at least some of them,
in principle, can indeed be artworks. A fortiori if a videogame can be discovered
that has been properly intended by its creator for regard as a work of art, that will
demonstrate that there is a videogame that is an artwork, and since what is actual
is possible, that will settle the matter.
It may seem obvious that such a thing could be the case, that a videogame
could be intended for regard as a work of art, but this may not be so obvious as it
first appears. While according to the intentional-historical definition it may be that
any thing can be an artwork, there may be certain intentional functions, or ways of
being intended, that interfere with being properly intended as an artwork. Levinson
gives some examples of the limits of the power of an artist’s intention. It does not
seem that artists can transform things into art that they do not have proprietary
control over, whether this be for legal or moral reasons. This is why an artist cannot
turn your home into an artwork, though they might be able to do so, in the mode of
conceptual art, with the act of looking at your home, or drawing attention to it, or
contemplating it. But because they don’t have proprietary control over your house,
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unless you give it to them or they purchase it, they cannot otherwise turn it into an
artwork. Similarly because no one can morally have this kind of ontological control
over another person, even perhaps if the subject were to consent to it,1 no artist can
turn a person into a work of art. It would violate the dignity and autonomy of the
person in a way that is unacceptable, and indeed, it is not accepted.
While neither of these scenarios seems to be the case for videogames, as in
many cases artists can have proprietary control over them and videogames are not
persons, it may yet be that videogames call for a kind of regard that is incompatible
with proper art regarding. Exploring this possibility requires that we be clear about
what videogames are and what functions, if any, they have that may or may not be
compatible with being intended as artworks.
This leads us to consider the nature of videogames, and examine them in the
way we have done with art. To begin, it is prima facie reasonable to think that,
whatever else they may be, videogames are games. And perhaps they are also video,
having a visual component of a certain type that is meant to be generated in certain
ways on certain kinds of displays. I will address each concern in turn, showing
what I think to be the second hurdle of answering whether videogames can be
artworks, the first having been the task of providing a sufficiently workable account
of art. We then must face an additional, and quite large, hurdle in answering the
art question of videogames. We have already settled on a definition of art, no small
accomplishment, but now we must deal with an even more intractable hobgoblin: a
1By some accounts of consent, one cannot give oneself away to another, as this would fail to be
reasonable, and only reasonable persons can give consent. See ( [74]) for several arguments in this
vein.
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definition of games. Games are Wittgenstein’s famous example of that which cannot
be defined, and this served as the basis for his position on the undefinability of words
and the fuzziness of concepts. As a result, games have been the paradigm case of
that which cannot be defined for over half a century.
2.2 Games
To understand whether videogames can be artworks, we must understand what
videogames are. And to do that, it seems that we must, due to videogames appearing
to be a subset of games, understand what games are. There are many things that we
call games. Certainly some videogames are also prime examples. The Madden NFL
series of videogames is a clear case. It is rather easy to classify as a game if only
because it is modeled after something else we already understand to be a game:
American football. Other examples of games that a definition or account should
make sense of include much outside of videogames as well. Chess, Monopoly, poker,
charades, Dungeons & Dragons, (actual) football, footraces, racquetball—these are
all games and any adequate definition must cover them.
The most obvious and immediate hurdle to this investigation is that if Wittgen-
stein is right about games then it is a non-starter. He used the example of games as
a paradigm case of the kind of thing that cannot be defined and used that example
as a bedrock on which to build his theory of language as use. In addition to this,
philosophy of art soon followed suit, borrowing his general anti-definitional strategy
and arguing that artworks are as resistant to definition as are games.
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To accomplish the task at hand, saying what games are in service of saying
what videogames are, would be to undo not just the anti-definitional stance within
philosophy of art, but to argue against Wittgenstein’s general strategy—and thus
Wittgenstein himself—which is no mean feat. Fortunately, there has been much
excellent work on the topic in this vein, and I need merely defend what I think is a
promising account and adapt it to our present purpose, not create one out of whole
cloth.
2.2.1 Wittgenstein
First we look to Wittgenstein’s negative account, where he argues that one
cannot give a definition of games, and by analogy, of language—or as he puts it:
“language-games”. He famously writes:
66. Consider, for example, the activities that we call “games”. I mean
board-games, card-games, ball-games, athletic games, and so on. What
is common to them all? – Don’t say: “Theymust have something in com-
mon, or they would not be called ‘games’ ” – but look and see whether
there is anything common to all. – For if you look at them, you won’t
see something that is common to all, but similarities, affinities, and a
whole series of them at that. To repeat: don’t think, but look! – Look,
for example, at board-games, with their various affinities. Now pass to
card-games; here you find many correspondences with the first group,
but many common features drop out, and others appear. When we pass
next to ball-games, much that is common is retained, but much is lost.
– Are they all ‘entertaining ’? Compare chess with noughts and crosses.
Or is there always winning and losing, or competition between players?
Think of patience. In ball-games, there is winning and losing; but when
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a child throws his ball at the wall and catches it again, this feature has
disappeared. Look at the parts played by skill and luck, and at the dif-
ference between skill in chess and skill in tennis. Think now of singing
and dancing games; here we have the element of entertainment, but how
many other characteristic features have disappeared! And we can go
through the many, many other groups of games in the same way, can see
how similarities crop up and disappear.
And the upshot of these considerations is: we see a complicated network
of similarities overlapping and cross-crossing: similarities in the large
and in the small.
67. I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities
than “family resemblances”; for the various resemblances between mem-
bers of a family – build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, and
so on and so forth – overlap and cross-cross in the same way. – And I
shall say: ‘games’ form a family.2
Wittgenstein certainly makes an impassioned case for the indefinability of
games. As we saw in Part 1, however, he seems preoccupied with the intrinsic
essential features of things. He may claim to not have been able to think of a
better expression to characterize the similarity of intrinsic features than to call
them family resemblances, but Mandelbaum was.3 Recall that Mandelbaum takes
the notion of family resemblance seriously, noting that one does not draw such a
connection between things merely because of intrinsic similarities, but in light of
relational connections as well. In the case of artworks this was suggestive of a need
for theories to consider the genetic history of a work, to incorporate its creation,
and perhaps the intentions behind it, in determining its art status. It is likely that
2 [37] emphasis his.
3 [39]
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a similar move away from mere intrinsic features can be equally illuminating in the
case of games.
Wittgenstein also gives two admonitions: to “look and see” as well as “don’t
think, but look!” The former is almost certainly good advice, though the latter
is questionable. If anything, it seems that Wittgenstein did not heed his own
advice. Thomas Hurka remarks on “the superficiality of Wittgenstein’s discus-
sion. “. . .Wittgenstein notes only surface differences between games—that some
are amusing and some not, that some use playing cards and some not—without
even wondering whether they might mask a deeper commonality.”4
We need not take Wittgenstein, despite his eminent stature, as gospel. What
we should do is take his advice to look and see what games are, but ignore his
advice not to think, or, more charitably, to only think, and consider some of the
attempts at defining games and see what is promising about them. There are far
too many accounts of games to review them all, but a brief review of the historically
prominent and videogame-centric attempts to define games will surely be helpful.
As will become apparent, one vexing distinction that will assert itself is between
games and play, and thus the relationship between them will have to be carefully
elaborated. I do not address this distinction and that relationship immediately, but
first focus on games, addressing play later.
4 [75, . xv]
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2.2.2 Johann Huizinga
No examination of games and play could properly begin without at least a
nod to Johann Huizinga’s work on the subject. An anthropologist, his 1938 seminal
work Homo Ludens5 is an exploration of humans as creatures that play. He takes
play to be the broader category of which games are a subset. In light of this, he
thinks there is a continuity between the kind of play that happens in games and
the kind that occurs during play in general. Importantly, he draws the connection
between play and games as one holding between games and contests as well. As he
notes, contests have long been an important activity in human life, even dominant in
some cultures—e.g. the ancient Greeks—and that making the connection between
contests and games, and thus also to play, shows how fundamental a notion of play
is to life.
As for play itself, Huizinga provides this summary:
Summing up the formal characteristics of play we might call it a free
activity standing quite consciously outside “ordinary” life as being “not
serious”, but at the same time absorbing the player intensely and utterly.
It is an activity connected with no material interest, and no profit can be
gained by it. It proceeds within its own proper boundaries of time and
space according to fixed rules and in an orderly manner. It promotes the
formation of social groupings which tend to surround themselves with
secrecy and to stress their difference from the common world by disguise
or other means.6
Later, he defines it somewhat differently:
5 [76]
6 [76, p. 13]
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play is a voluntary activity or occupation executed within certain fixed
limits of time and place, according to rules freely accepted but absolutely
binding, having its aim in itself and accompanied by a feeling of tension,
joy and the consciousness that it is “different” from “ordinary life”. 7
This early account captures much of what we recognize about play, and par-
ticularly games, though it seems to conflate the two in places. Of obvious trouble
is that Huizinga discusses the features of play inconsistently, and often elides the
difference between play and games, sometimes talking about games as a subset of
play and other times ascribing features of games to play as a whole.
He captures the sense that play is often understood less on its own and more
often contrasted with what it is not, namely work. What he misses is that it is
unlikely that play need always be utterly absorbing, as we can be distracted in play
as we can be in most spheres of life. It is also unlikely that play can have have
no material interest. We should hesitate to say that poker players are not playing
and that only a pure love for the game itself can result in play, every other form of
engagement being something else. Or, if we are to insist that play can garner no
profit, then we must mark a sharp distinction between profitless play and the case
of games in which profit can play a role. This claim could also be understood as
affirming that games do not have a productive aim as part of their constitutional
nature, and this is certainly an interpretation that future definitions of games have
taken, but it needs to be made more explicit than Huizinga makes it.
Most problematically for his account of play, I believe, is his insistence on
play following not only rules, but fixed rules. While this is arguably a feature of
7 [76, p. 28]
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games, sometimes play involves merely running around outside spinning in circles,
rules be damned. Moreover, some forms of play involves rules, but the rules, and
the following of them, is fluid, prone to capricious change.
Huizinga also delves into cultural criticism with the result that takes away
from the plausibility of his account, when he opines on the social functions of play,
emphasizing the pro-social aspects of play but missing the anti-social possibilities
of play. While play can sometimes be a catalyst for social activity, it can also be a
solitary endeavor, sometimes even a selfish, anti-social one. Perhaps this is captured
by his definition, if he aims to include groups of single individuals within his social
taxonomy. But this leaves a different problem untouched, that of secrecy. It simply
is not the case that groups of players tend to surround themselves with secrecy; we
need look no further than televised sports to see this. As his definition is of play, it
is too broad for a definition of games. It may also be too narrow, in that there are
almost certainly games, or instances of game playing, that do not promote social
behavior or shroud themselves in secrecy.
2.2.3 Roger Caillois
Roger Caillois notices these flaws, and others, in Huizinga’s account, and in his
1961 Man, Play and Games, directly engages with and criticizes Huizinga’s account.
“His work is not a study of games” and contains “strange gaps in a study which is
in every other way remarkable.”8 Caillois’ account is decidedly focused on giving
an analysis of games. He lists the following as defining features of games:
8 [77, p. 4]
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1. Free: in which playing is not obligatory, if it were, it would at once lose its
attractive and joyous quality as diversion;
2. Separate: circumscribed within limits of space and time, defined and fixed in
advance;
3. Uncertain: the course of which cannot be determined, nor the result attained
beforehand, and some latitude for innovations being left to the player’s initia-
tive;
4. Unproductive: creating neither goods, nor wealth, nor new elements of any
kind; and, except for the exchange of property among the players, ending in a
situation identical to that prevailing at the beginning of the game;
5. Governed by rules: under conventions that suspend ordinary laws, and for the
moment establish new legislation, which alone counts;
6. Make-believe: accompanied by a special awareness of a second reality or of a
free unreality, as against real life.9
Caillois’ account goes quite a bit further to making out the logical space of
games to be separate from the larger category of play, though it too does not accu-
rately capture games, in part because of its connection to play, in part because it
mixes the evaluative in with the classificatory.
One way, however, in which Caillois’ theory shows sensitivity to the variety of
play is that he distinguishes between rule-governed play and make-believe. He gives
a disjunctive account of these two criteria: “games are not ruled and make-believe.
Rather, they are ruled or make-believe.”10 He is right that it captures a difference
that is present in play, but it is less clear that it captures a difference in games as
9 [77, p. 9-10]
10 [77, p. 9] emphasis his.
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much as a difference among things that we happen to call games. I address this
distinction further in §2.3.6
Caillois’ criteria seem more or less appropriate to most games, but there are
exceptions. As for separateness, Caillois is certainly right that some games are
temporally fixed in advance; most obvious, perhaps, are sporting events with a set
clock. But of course there is baseball, a game known for lasting long periods of
time. And there is cricket, which is notoriously even longer, sometimes going on
for days. But even more mundane examples exist. Chess, while it exists only on
the board, and only for as long as it takes to reach checkmate or a draw, does not
have a preordained set of time or number of moves within which to do so. Perhaps
Caillois is making the claim that games are played in the space they are played in
and take however long they take, but this would be tautological. It is unclear what
insight such a claim would provide in distinguishing games from non-game events
that are equally bound in space and time.
The uncertain nature of games is more evaluative than descriptive of games.
Good games, of course, might have uncertain outcomes, but bad games might not.
Tic-tac-toe is an example. It is a relatively easily solved game, which is why many
adults stop playing it. And when such an adult plays a child, there does not seem to
be an uncertain outcome, but rather a certain one, and yet they are still playing the
game of tic-tac-toe. Or as Katie Salen and Eric Zimmerman point out, “If a chess
master plays against a beginner, is the outcome of the game uncertain for the chess
master?”11 On either account, because of simplistic game mechanics or mismatched
11 [78, p. 76]
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player skill, sometimes the outcome of games is not uncertain.
The second part of this criterion is helpful in shedding light on the notion of
the difficulty or advanced nature of some games. He claims that “some latitude for
innovations [is] left to the player’s initiative.” Perhaps this is key to understanding
the whole claim, not that game mechanics might be too simple or player’s skill
mismatched to an almost deterministic degree, but that in principle there are choices
for the player to make that can impact the outcome of the game. What is interesting
is what this would say of games like Candy Land and Chutes and Ladders. There are
no choices in these board games, merely the mechanical trappings of what seems like
a board game. In Candy Land, for instance, a player can have no impact on what
occurs, no choices are available; their only option is to go through the motions of
playing the game. One turns over a card and moves one’s piece to the next square
with a matching color. The exclusion of choice perhaps shows things like Candy
Land that we call games are either quasi-games (at least by Caillois’ account) or
something like training wheels for playing games. This would explain why these are
considered children’s games: it is not merely the child-like representations in the
game, but the minimal game mechanic that helps young players participate in a
game, or game-like, activity without being too demanding of them.
Much critical attention has been directed at Caillois’ criteria of unproduc-
tiveness. He believes that no production of value can come from playing games,
particularly no monetary value. Poker is easily enough made sense of: when one
player makes money another player or players must have lost that amount, so it is
always a zero sum. But this raises the problem of professionals, about whom he
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firmly claims that, “As for the professionals—the boxers, cyclists, jockeys, or actors
who earn their living in the ring, track, or hippodrome or on the stage, and who
must think in terms of prize, salary, or title—it is clear that they are not players
but workers. When they play, it is at some other game.”12
Caillois is getting at the notion of amateur play here, a kind of pure play
untainted by any other concerns. And he might be right about their being in a state
of play or not, or at least a particular kind of play. But it seems incorrect, or at least
not as obvious as he wants to make it, that professional athletes are not engaged in
a game of the very sort we take them to be. Furthermore, this negates the nature
of the player of games who plays for any reason beyond that of the pure love of
play. That includes those who want to spend time with family or friends, or play
recreational sports to stay in shape, or even play a quick game of rock-paper-scissors
to settle a dispute. Surely these are still games, even when the results issue in some
value outside that of play, be it emotional, physical, decisive, or otherwise.
In addition to these criteria of definition Caillois seeks to provide a taxonomy
of games. Here his account’s overly broad nature shows itself. Caillois understands
games as falling along a metric in one of four categories. These four categories
are games of competition, chance, simulation, and vertigo. He gives as respective
examples: “football, billiards, or chess (competition), roulette or a lottery (chance),
pirate, Nero, or Hamlet (simulation), or one produces in oneself, by a rapid whirling
or falling movement, a state of dizziness and disorder (vertigo).”13
12 [77, p. 6]
13 [77, p. 12]
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Within these categories games fall along a continuum between what Caillois
calls paidia and ludus. As he writes:
At one extreme an almost indivisible principle, common to diversion,
turbulence, free improvisation, and carefree gaiety is dominant. It man-
ifests a kind of uncontrolled fantasy that can be designated by the term
paidia. At the opposite extreme, this frolicsome and impulsive exuber-
ance is almost entirely absorbed or disciplined by a complementary, and
in some respects inverse, tendency to its anarchic and capricious na-
ture: there is a growing tendency to bind it with arbitrary, imperative,
and purposely tedious conventions, to oppose it still more by ceaselessly
practicing the most embarrassing chicanery upon it, in order to make
it more uncertain of attaining its desired effect. This latter principle is
completely impractical, even though it requires an ever greater amount
of effort, patience, skill, or ingenuity. I call this second component ludus.
We can see that by Caillois’ own lights his definition includes things that are
not games, though they may be a form of play. At its most extreme, however, his
definition of games includes freewheeling non-rule-governed play as well as including
theatrical plays, such as those of Shakespeare. These are not games, but more free
form kinds of play. We could of course call them games, but then we lose the
distinction among the various forms of play.
Summing up, Caillois provides a definition that more closely captures games
than Huizinga’s broader notion of play. It still seems to stretch its borders too
broadly and encompass as games things better understood simply as play. Further-
more his definition is caught between providing a definition of games and a definition
of play, and that of games being a rigorously pure notion of game-playing, one un-
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troubled by any outside concerns or bad game design. This might be an ideal goal
for game design and engagement with games, but it is too stringent to capture the
less ideal situations in which game-playing sometimes occurs.
2.2.4 Brian Sutton-Smith
Brian Sutton-Smith and Elliot Avedon’s broad ranging study of the different
kinds of things we call games provides us an adequate definition, though they voice
concern over it being too narrow. It may also be too broad.
A game is an exercise of voluntary control systems, in which there is a
contest between powers, confined by rules in order to produce a disequi-
librial outcome.14
Read one way, games must always be competitive, either against another
present player or against the game system itself. This definition hews much closer to
the obedience of rules than prior definitions have, and as a consequence it struggles
to make sense of games of make-believe, or open-ended games without a definite end
state. The example the authors give is of Ring-Around-the-Rosie, which they claim
seems more like a coordinated dance than a game, noting “Whether we call them
games within the present definition, depends it seems, on whether we decide that
there is, in fact, an opposition between the power of the players and an alternative
chaos.”15
This is right as far as it goes, but again, seems to indicate how the precision
of the definitional criterion fades at the edges. Perhaps that is appropriate, as our
14 [79, p. 405]
15 [79, p. 405-406]
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behavior of labeling and treating things as games may itself be vague. “Perhaps
what we have here is a form of activity that in later childhood differentiates, on the
one hand, into songs, drama, and dance, and on the other, into games—hence the
difficulty of classification.”16
If activities like these are indeed not games, and the authors’ definition in-
cludes them, then it is too broad. If they are games, and the definitions does not
include them, then it is too narrow. But two other problems present themselves
for this definition. The first is that it would seem to exclude certain games from
being classified as such based on contingent accident. The second is that it makes
insufficient reference to the attitude that a player adopts when playing a game.
In the first case, games are defined as requiring an end state that is different
from the beginning state. It is easy to see how this happens in a game like Chess.
Pieces start on the board in one configuration and that is never the way they are
arranged at games end.17 But of course it is always possible, after a long night of
poker, that by some chance all the players end up with the same amount of money
that they started with. Rules are sometimes introduced to prevent exactly this kind
of situation from arising, like increasing the ante, but still it remains a possibility.
It would be odd if poker counted as a game except in cases like these.
The second problem is that Sutton-Smith and Avedon’s definition is about
understanding games as structures, with insufficient focus on the players who par-
ticipate in them. There is something lost from Huizinga and Caillois here about
16 [79, p. 406]
17Barring, perhaps, an odd occurrence of an immediate draw. Granting that such an event is
possible, this demonstrates further complications for Sutton-Smith’s view.
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the state of mind or the attitude of players that separates the activity of playing,
and game-playing, from other forms of activity like work. The approach of Sutton-
Smith and Avedon to games as structures is illuminating, and must be understood
as situated among their analyses of games as recreation, games used by the military,
business and industrial games, games in education, diagnostic games, and games in
politics and economics. Like those before them, they have take an anthropologi-
cal and sociological approach to the phenomena that are games, investigating even
the difference between the form of play and a bum leg or wild animals hunted for
sport. Their project is expansive and careful, and they come close to capturing the
extension of games as play-activities.
But it must be said, games are not going to be activities distinguished from
other activities merely by the formal criteria they possess. It is not just that games
have rules or goals or boundaries; it is also that games are related to play in some
important way, and this requires that we make sense of the attitude of the player
in engaging this peculiar activity that makes it a game and not some other kind of
behavior.
2.2.5 Greg Costikyan
As this project is presently concerned with understanding the relationship
between videogames and games, I want to briefly look at two accounts of games
from videogame designers, if only to show how much an analysis is in order.
The first comes from Greg Costikyan who defines games as follows:
A game is a form of art in which participants, termed players, make de-
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cisions in order to manage resources through game tokens in the pursuit
of a goal.18
This definition is problematic on several counts, though Costikyan is less inter-
ested in providing a correct definition than in giving game designers better ways to
think about games. Perhaps most problematic is his unexamined assumption that
games are art. Obviously if he is right, then our project can end here. Videogames
are games, games are forms of art, thus not only can videogames be artworks, but
all of them are artworks. But we cannot take this claim seriously, as his assertion
that games are artworks is mere stipulation. He wants them compared favorably
with paintings and books, but he never defends their art status as such.
Perhaps more importantly, he highlights something about videogames that has
only been hinted at so far. He discusses Will Wright’s SimCity, and notes that his
own definition does not categorize it as a game. Rather, he recognizes that it is
a toy. But he claims that it is such a good toy, because it provides for so many
goal-oriented activities, that it should count as a game. This cannot be the case,
however, as a ball is also an excellent facilitator of games, but is not itself a game.
What Costikyan’s proposal does, however, is demonstrate a way of expanding the
notion of videogames, namely that not all videogames are games, a notion that will




Chris Crawford is another venerable videogame designer, and like Costikyan
he offers a definition that is focused more on producing good videogames than under-
standing the phenomena of games as a whole. He does not provide a single definition,
but proposes four qualities that he claims are essential to games: representation,
interaction, conflict, and safety.19
I won’t provide a complete analysis of each of these features, but point out
a few ways in which they are helpful and ways in which they are less so. Craw-
ford talks about games as systems of interaction, and of ways that interacting with
such systems can generate meaning. This is promising for an account of the mean-
ingfulness of engaging with videogames and ways in which they may bear artistic
meaning.
He understands games as being always a kind of simulation and it is on this
model that he sees games as having safety, always being more safe than the system
that they model. But this assumes that all games model something. This is clearly
the case with some videogames, with them always being safe, and a videogame about
war being more safe than participating in actual war. This is also true of tabletop
war games, that they are also more safe than participating in the real thing. But
sports do not always model anything at all, they are not simulations. In this sense
they only represent themselves. Football is dangerous, people are often injured,
including the long term cognitive effects from repeated concussions. One could argue
19 [81]
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that football simulates war or battle, but that requires an account of representation
with vastly more latitude than the way in which we understand tabletop war games
to model and represent wars and battles. One could perhaps argue that boxing
simulates fighting, in that boxers wear safety equipment like gloves. While this
might be the case, not all sport fighting exhibits this level of abstraction. Consider
MMA fighting which allows for much more violent interaction, and hence often ends
more bloodily.
Even more violent is the 600-year-old sport of Calcio storico, an Italian sport
that mixes something like football or rugby with relatively free-form fighting. There
are rules, and goals, and not everything is permitted. The game “allows tactics such
as head-butting, punching, elbowing, and choking but sucker punches and kicks to
the head are banned.”20 These games are not safe, and it is unclear what they are
safer versions of. Even more dangerous is bullfighting, a decidedly unsafe contest.
Matadors are injured and sometimes killed in the event, yet they are restricted by
the game to follow rules that prevent them from doing safer things, like wearing
certain protective gear or wielding more effective weaponry.
What we have seen are several definitions of varying adequacy. Some are more
focused on the nature of play as a whole, and thus miss the particular features of
games. Others are focused specifically on videogames and thus miss the broader
features of games. What we need is a definition that recognizes games’ place in the
world of play while also being suitable for analyzing videogames as possibly games.
Only then can we replace Wittgenstein’s skepticism with a working definition and
20 [82]
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proceed with our analysis of whether videogames can be artworks.
2.2.7 Jesper Juul
Jesper Juul is a game studies theorist who has developed what he calls the
Classic Game Model. He presents it as follows:
The Classic Game Model
1. a rule-based formal system;
2. with variable and quantifiable outcomes;
3. where different outcomes are assigned different values;
4. where the player exerts effort in order to influence the outcome;
5. the player feels emotionally attached to the outcome;
6. and the consequences of the activity are optional and negotiable.21
This account captures several features of game-playing that we want to make
sense of, in particular our behavior concerning games. But the actual conditions
of what separate games from other activities is left under-specified. “Rule-based
formal system” is too broad of a category to pick out only games, and even if it did,
it tells us little about the relationship between the rules and other formal elements
of a game, such as the goals a game might have.
21 [83, p. 6-7]
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Importantly, it ties game-playing to having the right kind of attitude, but
again, the criteria are too sketchy to clearly demarcate games. Many things re-
quire effort to influence the outcome and assign values differently according to those
outcomes, not least of which is our emotional attachment to these outcomes. Juul
seems to place a lot of weight on the criterion of the consequences being optional
and negotiable, but again, this kind of situation can arise in non-game activities,
like bets.
What Juul has done is provide another case for the importance of tying the
right kind of game-playing attitude to the right kind of formal structure of things
like rules. What is needed is an account that is careful about what these features
are and how they are related.
2.3 Bernard Suits
Bernard Suits gives the most philosophically robust definition of the activity
of game-playing, which sets itself apart from other definitions in its rigor and ana-
lytic precision. He limits his analysis to the kind of play-activity we call games, and
while he appreciates the prima facie understanding of game-playing as a subset of
play, he is careful to keep them conceptually distinct. In many philosophical circles
this may seem like a Herculean task, but Suits undertakes it nonetheless, and, pace
Wittgenstein, succeeds quite remarkably. Suits meets Wittgenstein’s challenge, tak-
ing seriously his admonition to “look and see” what makes something a game.22 As
to whether he is successful, Thomas Hurka notes, “Suits has nothing like Wittgen-
22 [37, Sec. 66]
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stein’s philosophical reputation, but on this topic he’s the real philosopher.”23
Suits defines game-playing as follows:
To play a game is to attempt to achieve a specific state of affairs [pre-
lusory goal], using only means permitted by rules [lusory means], where
the rules prohibit use of more efficient in favour of less efficient means
[constitutive rules], and where the rules are accepted just because they
make possible such activity [lusory attitude].24
He also offers a briefer, more “portable” version: “playing a game is the vol-
untary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles.”
We will now elaborate on the details of Suits’ definition.25
2.3.1 Prelusory Goal
A game must have a prelusory goal. This is the goal or end-state that a
player aims at. Essentially a prelusory goal is one that is in principle achievable
independently of the playing of the game. In the simple example of a footrace, the
prelusory goal is the crossing of the finish line. Clearly this state of affairs, that of
crossing a finish line, can be done independently of actually playing the game. In
the case of a foot race, there are many ways in which one could accomplish this task,
most of them not sanctioned by the rules of the game. One could start the race
right at the finish line, instead of at the starting line, requiring only a simple hop
instead of a mad dash. One could tie up all the other runners so they could not run,
or threaten them with a gun, coercing them into staying in place. Or one could get
23 [75, p. xv]
24 [43, pp. 43] square brackets his.
25Suits account presented here is developed from his earlier [84] and [85].
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on a motorcycle, making short work of the race and beating the other runners by
a large margin. All of these are ways in which one could accomplish this prelusory
goal without playing per se. But this demonstrates how the prelusory goal can be
accomplished independently of the rest of the game.
2.3.1.1 Lusory Goal, or Winning
Obviously none of the ways described above of achieving the prelusory goal are
sufficient for winning. To do that, one must meet other conditions; in the plainest
language, one must follow the rules. These examples of aberrant ways of achieving
the prelusory goal are given to highlight how this goal is a separable element from
the game itself. Achieving the prelusory goal without also following all the rules
does not result in a win.
To win is to achieve a different goal, what could be called the lusory goal of
achieving the prelusory while obeying all the rules. This is the only way to win the
game. Obeying the rules without achieving the prelusory goal would be a case of
playing the game,26 but not a case of winning. On the other hand, achieving the
prelusory goal without having obeyed the rules is not even having played at all.
This is how Suits’ account gives analysis of the popular adage that “cheaters never
win.” For on his analysis, they weren’t even playing.
It is in this way that rules are not separable from the ends, where the end,
given the right attitude, is playing the game and trying to win. Because the activity
of playing is constituted in part by the rules, the only way to engage in the activity
26With the addition of the lusory attitude, explained below.
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of playing that game is to obey the rules. Thus there is no sense in which one can
win, or even play, a game while also disobeying its rules. To attempt to do so would
be, at best, to participate in a different activity.
2.3.1.2 Game Institutions
There is an immediate objection that presents itself, and that is that some
games don’t have goals that seem like they can be achieved outside of the game
itself. Chess, for example, has the prelusory goal of checkmating the opponent,
which requires the pieces be arranged in a certain relation on the board. This
results in the king not being able to move because all of the squares he could be
moved to are threatened with capture by other pieces, but he cannot remain where
he is because the square he currently occupies is threatened as well. Thus the king
is checkmated and the opponent wins. However, outside of the game of chess the
pieces have no such power. It is not intrinsic to a knight-piece that it moves in an
L-shape or that a bishop-piece moves diagonally. No, they are just pieces, and it
is only within the game, which is to say by the rules of the game, that they are
granted such powers. Thus chess appears to be a counterexample to the notion of
a prelusory goal, as it does not seem that checkmate is separable from the game of
chess itself.
Suits anticipates this objection and argues that it is resolved by consideration
of what he calls the “institution” of a game. Sticking with our ordinary understand-
ing of the rules of a game, there is a difference between a proper playing of a game
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and an interaction with the institution of the game which requires only the obser-
vation of some of the rules. Chess again proves an apt example, as there is a long
history of teaching chess by presenting learning players with chess board situations
in media res. This is when they are presented with some particular arrangement of
the board, and either given a demonstration of the ways pieces can move and inter-
act, or challenged with a limited scenario, like being told to mate in two moves, etc.
These types of situations are engagements with the institution of chess, following
some of the rules, namely the rules about the way the pieces can move, so that one
can learn more about the game. Importantly, in these cases, one could also achieve
checkmate. One could arrange the pieces such that, given the rules about the way
the pieces move, one’s opponent’s king cannot move, thus resulting in checkmating
him. One could even simply arrange the board in appropriate configurations from
the outset, demonstrating or experimenting with different scenarios in which the
king is mated.
What these situations are not, however, are proper playings of chess. All of the
examples given above can be realized without players starting with their pieces lined
up correctly on their respective two back rows. Instead they can simply arrange the
pieces as they like, ignoring rules about starting positions, so they can engage in
particular elements of a game, for whatever reason. In any case like this, achieving
checkmate, the prelusory goal, is insufficient for winning. It is logically possible that
one could achieve the state of affairs of checkmate any number of times without it
also being the case that one has ever won a game of chess. The same thing happens
with practicing set plays in soccer and scoring goals, or even practicing breasting
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a tape. All prelusory goals can be accomplished independently of having played a
proper game.
Thus, according to Suits, we have a reasonable way to distinguish between
proper playings of a game and mere involvement in the institution of a game. Proper
playings require that all the elements of a game be in place, observed, and respected,
while this strict requirement is relaxed to some degree when engaging only with the
institution of a game. That the prelusory goal of a game is achievable even when it
is only the institution of a game that is being engaged with shows that the prelusory
goal is indeed separable from actual playings of the game. This preserves it as a
separable achievable state of affairs, even when some of the game’s rules may be
required to make sense of the goal, as with chess. The difference is that it is not
the case that all of the rules, those things that in part determine the identity of a
game, be followed, yet the goal is still achievable.
2.3.2 Lusory Means and Constitutive Rules
The prelusory goal is that which is aimed at, but winning a game requires
more, namely that a player achieve the prelusory goal while following the rules. The
rules, as we commonly think of them, are actually two parts: the lusory means and
the constitutive rules. The lusory means are the ways in which a player is allowed to
go about attempting to achieve the prelusory goal, and these means are restricted
by the constitutive rules.
The rules are constitutive in that they are what make the game what it is,
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what identifies a game as distinct from other games. While different games may
share the same prelusory goal, for instance, foot races of varying lengths or single
versus relay races, it is the constitutive rules that determine the lusory means and
distinguish games from each other.
The constitutive rules determine the lusory means by restricting the use of
efficient means in favor of less efficient means. This is largely what separates games
from work and other technical activities. A technical activity is one for which we
desire the end and the means are merely what we do to bring about the end. If it
turns out that more efficient means are available, we have no reason not to use those
means. When we dig a ditch, we are interested in having the ditch, not the activity
of digging the ditch. This is why we use shovels or backhoes, when available, to dig
ditches, not spoons or hands.
Games, on the other hand, have arbitrarily restricted ends and means, selected
not for what we hope to accomplish in the end, but for the sake of the activity they
make possible. In the game of basketball, it is almost certainly the case that no
players care about the ball going through the hoop per se, otherwise they would
simply get a ladder, climb up next to the hoop, and move the ball back and forth
through the hoop as often as they could. No, what basketball players care about
is playing basketball. This of course involves them aiming to make as many bas-
kets as possible, but it only becomes the interesting activity that they care about
when there are restrictions on how one can move (dribbling), when one can perform
actions (only for a limited amount of time), and opposition to achieving the goal
(a team of five opponents who are trying to stop you from scoring goals). None
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of these requirements are efficient in making baskets, in fact they are designed to
intentionally be inefficient. What makes the game of basketball what it is, and why
it has persisted, it that this arbitrarily inefficient behavior is enjoyable for its own
sake.
It is only when all of these things are in place that we have the game of
basketball. And it is only because the constitutive rules prohibit efficient means in
favor of less efficient means that the activity can count as a game and not a technical
activity.
2.3.2.1 Efficiency
One concern about this notion of inefficiency is that it does not seem in the
spirit of the game to play inefficiently. It is not the case that basketball players,
with a mind to increase the gameness of the basketball they are playing, start closing
their eyes when making shots, or alternating hands on each dribble, or whatever.
No, they aim to win and they play as hard as they can to make that happen. Some
basketball players devote much of their time when they are not playing basketball to
developing skills and abilities that increase their effectiveness at winning basketball
games. How can these different attitudes towards efficiency be reconciled?
The answer is that the inefficiency of games only arises at the level of the rules.
Once the rules are established and agreed upon players can, will, and usually should,
strive to win by the most efficient means possible within the constraints of the rules.
So while the rules restrict players to moving with the ball only while dribbling, a
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player acting under that restriction is free to dribble as well as he or she can. This
is the relationship between all game rules and efficiency. Where the rules restrict
the means allowed, thus creating a kind of inefficiency as it relates to achieving the
prelusory goal, within those restrictions a player can pursue a different goal, the
lusory goal of winning, which means achieving the prelusory goal while following
the rules, as efficiently as possible.
The requirement of inefficient means is prone to another misunderstanding.
The inefficiency requirement does not make it so that choosing an inefficient or
inconvenient task for its own sake is sufficient for that activity to be a game. Suits
gives an example of this with the case of Smith, who chooses to take the long way
home, despite it being less convenient and less scenic.27 Smith really does choose
the long way home simply because he wants to make a game out of it. It seems
inefficient on the face of it, and also meets the other requirements of being a game.
There is a goal, reaching home and the rules, which involve taking the long way
home, seem to have selected inefficient over more efficient means. Smith adopts
these rules simply because they make the activity possible, thus the activity seems
to satisfy the criteria of being a game. Yet it also seems that merely taking the
long way home, even when doing so without a reason, is not a game, but just a
time-wasting endeavor, even if it’s one that the walker does with the intention of
playing a game.
Thus there seems to be a counterexample to Suits’ account, an activity that
meets his definition but intuitively seems incorrect. The solution resides in being
27 [43, ch. 5]
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clear about what it means to be efficient. Efficiency is, “the least expenditure of
a limited resource necessary to achieve a given goal.”28 The key is in efficiency
depending on a limited resource. In taking the longer way home, Smith has not
done something inefficient with respect to any limited resource. While we all have
only a limited amount of time, perhaps, in life, the supposed long-walk game is not
in any way sensitive to time nor does it limit it as a resource. Suits correctly points
this out, as for this activity to be a game as he has defined it, time as a resource,
or some other resource, would have to be limited with respect to the game.
The game-making alteration he proposes is that, “Smith wants to get home
before dark, that the sun has begun to set, and that the distance to his house is
such that taking the longer way risks, to some extent, the outcome.”29 With these
added restrictions the activity of taking the longer way home does indeed become
a game. In his solution however, Suits argues for too much and threatens to makes
the common mistake of conflating classification with evaluation. He returns to an
earlier comment made about the aim of the gamewright, which is to make a game
whose rules are neither too lax nor too restrictive. As Suits puts it:
The gamewright must avoid two extremes. If he draws his lines too
loosely the game will be dull because winning will be too easy. As
looseness is increased to the point of utter laxity the game simply falls
apart, since there are then no rules proscribing available means. . . . On
the other hand, rules are lines that can be drawn too tightly, so that the
game becomes too difficult. And if a line is drawn very tightly indeed
the game is squeezed out of existence.30
28 [43, p. 57]
29 [43, p. 59]
30 [43, p. 32]
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Suits is right to draw the connection between the laxity and restrictiveness of
rules and a game’s quality. However, he does not make explicit the psychology of
the player and seems to aim instead for an Aristotelian virtue-as-a-mean-between-
two-vices approach. Games are only good insofar as they appeal to the psychology
of the player. This is why tic-tac-toe is a perfectly good game for a child, but it is
not good for those who have solved it. Similarly, pole-vaulting is all well and good
for those who can do it, but for me, I suspect, it would be a rather interminable
exercise in failure. So while it is true that where the lines are drawn matter for
a game’s quality, it is also the case that different people find different placement
of lines fun, which is why different people like different games and we have not all
gravitated to some median perfect game.
One could respond that Suits’ analysis is still true, and that for any particular
player having neither too lax nor too tight a set of rules is what makes it good.
But this is just another way of stating the proposition that people like games to
be difficult enough so as to provide some challenge, yet not so difficult that success
becomes too difficult or even impossible.
Where Suits’ account potentially gets into trouble is in making the relation of
the evaluative and constitutive consequences of the restrictiveness of the rules too
close. A more perspicuous way of making his point would be to say that because his
definition requires that games have rules and that players who play the game must
engage with those rules because of the activity they make possible, it must be the
case that there are indeed rules, which avoids the extreme case of laxity, and that
the rules describe an activity that the player can in principle engage in with some
141
hope of success, which avoids the extreme case of restrictiveness.
All of this is to say that Suits makes his case too strongly in the Smith example.
Once the resource of time is made limited by trying to get home before dark, Smith
needn’t even take the long way home to make it a game. It may turn out to be a
better game, since the long way home makes it interestingly challenging for Smith,
whereas the short way home might be too easy. But both cases would now equally
be games. While it is good to see how the constitutive elements of a classificatory
definition are involved in the evaluation of the thing defined, we must be careful not
to make the relationship between the two closer than it should be.
2.3.3 Lusory Attitude
The final component of Suits’ definition of a game is not a formal one, like
goals, rules, and means. It is instead the attitude that players take while playing
a game that completes the account of game-playing as an activity distinct from
other activities. This attitude is that players accept the rules, means, and goals of
a game because they make that activity possible. To play chess as a game is to
play it, roughly, because one likes playing chess. One need no special relationship
to the formations that determine checkmate; in fact, it would be odd if one did.
What one wants is the kind of activity that these particular rules, restricting one’s
actions to these particular means, in pursuit of that particular end, make possible.
In other words, one plays a game for its own sake or because one likes that activity
or wants to do it, but these are rough formulations. Suits builds no explicit reasons
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for why someone plays a game into the lusory attitude other than to say that it
is the attitude in which player accept the rules because they make that activity
possible. To do otherwise, to take a different attitude toward the activity, turns the
activity into a different one.
The lusory attitude does a lot of explanatory work in distinguishing among
the kinds of games that different people like. It is not usually the case that when we
describe someone as a “gamer” that we mean that they love any and all games. It
is instead the case that different people participate in different games for different
reasons. But in the end, whatever those reasons are, players adopt the rules because
they make some particular activity possible in contrast to other possible activities.
This is why a player can care about playing this game rather than that game, instead
of liking all games merely because they are games. Games are non-identical with
each other in virtue of the activities they make possible, and player’s preferences for
these different activities varies as well.
2.3.4 Games as Objects
Suits’ account itself does not include a definition of games. Rather, it gives
a definition of game-playing, and a very promising one at that. The definition can
be altered to be one of games as objects, rather than game-playing as an activity,
if we are to apply it to objects rather than what we do with objects. This is easily
enough done, and preserves a distinction between different ways of creating games.
This is the difference between designed games and ad hoc games. The former are
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games that have been designed to be so and the latter are games that are created on
the fly without premeditation. I suspect the difference between the two is not hard
and fast, but a definition of games as objects must make sense of the different kinds.
On the one extreme we might imagine a game created by a gamewright, labored
and thought over, playtested and refined, with much care given to the quality of
the rules and the kind of activity such elements create. On the other extreme we
can imagine a player or set of players following a spontaneous whim with whatever
materials they have on hand, and cobbling together whatever rules seem to make
sense at the time, perhaps adjusting them as they are discovered to be ill-suited
to the activity or as their whims change. Both are games, but each has a distinct
creative history.
The adjustment I propose is one perhaps understood as a change similar to
the tense of a term than any true alteration of the criterion. Game-playing as an
activity requires the lusory attitude in someone who is otherwise engaging with the
rules to count as a player. To change the definition from that of an activity to
that of an object requires only that the lusory attitude requirement be turned into
a prescription. The game as an object contains inter alia a prescription to engage
with it with the lusory attitude. This frees it from necessitating any actual correct
response—namely game-playing—for the activity to exist. The game itself is then
an abstract collection of rules, ends, means, and prescriptions. It makes a demand
on us, no doubt a highly defeasible one, to play it, but exists whether or not anyone
is presently engaging with it properly, or indeed, ever will engage with it properly.31
31This raises an interesting question related to the debate on whether musical works are things
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Contrary to Wittgenstein it seems we are able to define games. If this is so,
this has larger implications than merely understanding the nature of videogames
or the relationship between games and artworks. Weitz based his anti-definitional
stance about art on Wittgenstein’s indefinability thesis about games.32 While Man-
delbaum’s work did much to rehabilitate the legitimacy of the project of defining art,
it has not been accepted as conclusive.33 That Suits has provided such a promising
account of games is a profound challenge to Wittgenstein’s claim. This threatens
to undermine the soundness of Weitz’ entire project, as it is built on the family
resemblance notion of art, already challenged as inadequate by Mandelbaum, now
can be seen as simply incorrect in light of Suits. More broadly, if Suits’ account,
or something near it, is defensible, then it threatens to undermine Wittgenstein’s
entire linguistic project of understanding language as a game-like set of indefinable
rules. While it is largely the case that linguistics, both philosophical and scientific,
has moved on from Wittgenstein, perhaps Suits’ account can put what remains of
his ghost to rest as well. That the importance of Suits’ work has gone largely un-
recognized for the past four decades is a shameful oversight of philosophical history.
One hope for this project is to aid in the rehabilitation of Suits’.
that are created or abstracta that exist eternally. For more on these positions see, respectively, [86]
and [87]. I am sympathetic to musical creationism, and thus likely also to ludic creationism, but
there is not space here to explore and defend such a position.
32 [36]
33See [39] and for an example of contemporary anti-definitional sympathies, see [41] and [88].
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2.3.5 Open Games
The most paradigmatic of games are those that Suits classifies as closed games,
those with an achievable state of affairs that is also an end state, commonly called
“winning.” However, there are other games in which the prelusory goal is not a
state of affairs that ends a game, but is rather a state that players aim at achieving
and maintaining. Suits gives the example of two players who appear to be engaged
in a game of ping-pong, but after quite some time of hitting the ball back and forth
it becomes apparent that neither is trying to win. Rather the players are merely
trying to keep the ball in play, with the aim of hitting it back and forth to each
other successfully without breaking the streak of returns.
These are called open games, and they can be properly accounted games by
Suits’ account. When doing so, however, one must be careful to make sense of both
the goal that is aimed at and the inefficiency in achieving that goal. Suit’s ping-pong
example seems fitting, as it still clearly meets the other criteria of games; it requires
only a slight adjustment of the prelusory goal from one that terminates play to one
that perpetuates it. Suits puts it thus: “I would define an open game generically as
a system of reciprocally enabling moves whose purpose is the continued operation
of the system.”34
The Suitsian account of open games also seems well suited to make sense
of two-player dramatic interactions. In particular, his account makes sense of the
struggles that often ensue when playing a standard game of make-believe like Cops
34 [43, p. 146]
146
& Robbers. One child yells “Bang!” and a second child yells “You missed me!”
An argument then ensues: “No I didn’t, you’re dead!” and “No I’m not, I had a
bulletproof vest on under my shirt!” and so on. Suits’ explanation is that this kind
of tension arises when there is a misunderstanding over whether Cops & Robbers is
a closed game or an open game. What is the goal that the players are trying to
achieve? Is the goal of the players playing the cops to apprehend the robbers, and
the robbers’ goal to escape with the loot? Or is the goal that they are all trying to
achieve the reciprocation of adequate dramatic moves that allow the perpetuation
of the activity? Such a confusion is at play here, one that being clear about what
was going on would resolve.
There are likely fuzzy borders between open games and forms of play that
are not games at all, being close enough not to easily distinguish them from each
other. What matters is that there seems a large swath of things we call games of
make-believe that are certainly forms of play but that do not meet Suits criteria
for being a game, even when open games are properly understood. This is not
to disparage Suits’ account; on the contrary, his definition provides the tools to
distinguish between the more rigorously rule-following forms of play and those that
are more free-form and thus less game-like.
2.3.6 Walton’s Games of Make-believe
With this account of open games being applied to so-called games of make-
believe, there is a concern that it endorses a view in another debate that we should
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want to resist. Kendall Walton has defended an analysis of representational art
as being relevantly analogous to games of make-believe. According to this account
“representational works of art generally are props in games of make-believe,”35 in
just the same way as are dolls, toy trucks, hobby horses, etc. They are all similar
in that they prescribe imaginings in games of make-believe that generate certain
fictional truths. The details of Walton’s account need not concern us here, other
than to say that given the identification he proposes between the kind of imagi-
native engagement we have with toys and the kind we have with representational
artworks, we must be careful of drawing another conclusion from their similarity:
that representational works of art, or proper engagement with them, are actual
games.
While Suits’ account of open games seems to makes sense of paradigm “games
of make-believe” like Cops & Robbers, what it does not seem to do, however, is make
sense of games of make-believe in a more general sense, in particular those of the
solitary person flight-of-fancy variety. It also struggles to distinguish games from
playing with toys. This difficulty arises when we reflect on Kendall Walton’s account
of fiction, and his argument that our interaction with representational objects, or
fictions, are all forms of games of make-belief.
For the single player of House, to take Suits’ example, it does seem that in
some sense what the player is aiming for is appropriate responses. But, again, he
only describes as problematic deviation from the game when another joins in and
does something inappropriate, something outside of what House should be. Imagine,
35 [89, p. 51]
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for example, that I am playing House with my nephew. He wants to cook me a meal
and he tells me so. This is an appropriate “move” in the “game” of House. And
clearly there are more and less appropriate ways for me to respond. I could tell
him that his cooking smells good and that I am hungry and looking forward to the
meal. I can even play appropriately by responding in a conflicting way: I could
tell him that I already ate and that I don’t need to be fed. I could also respond
inappropriately. I could grab the toy food off the toy stove and pretend that it
is a spaceship now, making spaceship sound effects. This is inappropriate for the
game House, and if that is what my nephew wants to play, he will respond with
frustration.
What is less clear, however, is how to make sense of my nephew’s flight of
fancy as a game, involving a scenario like this: he is playing House one minute,
flipping burgers on the stove, and then picks up the burger and pretends it is a
plane and goes cruising around the room with it. In other words, for many games
of make-believe, it is less clear how a single “player” can make a wrong move. If
the goal of such activity is to follow a given person’s imaginative whims, then it is
not rule-bound in the same way as games are. Certainly one could play a game of
make-believe that was a game by Suits’ account, but what Suits’ account misses,
and Walton’s does not, is the large space of possible games of make-believe that fail
to be games proper.
Walton’s account makes sense of these bouts of imagination, as the act of
make-believe imagination that we partake in is for whatever reasons we might have
while his account of fiction is specifically aimed at illuminating the role of make-
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believe props. In the case of the plastic hamburger, it makes a fairly good prop for a
make-believe hamburger, a not so great, but still adequate, prop for a flying saucer
UFO, and a still worse prop for an airplane, though perhaps as a hand-sized plastic
object it is still better than nothing at all.
Returning to Suits’, it is unclear what kind of game activity is going on here.
It does not seem that on the flight-of-fancy example my nephew is concerned with
providing good dramatic moves while obeying the constraints of playing House, and
engaging with that activity for the sake of the activity it makes possible. Rather,
he simply likes the imaginative activity of playing House. When other people play
House well with him they become additional good props with which to play. But
the aptness of the prop, be it an object or a person, is not for the sake of responding
well, but to engage in the make-believe.
One can shoehorn Walton’s account of make-believe into Suits’ account of
open-ended dramatic games, but it seems to provide for less central cases. While
it is perfectly plausible that some games of make-believe are Suitsian games—and
improv is a good candidate—in many cases what is aimed for is not the reciprocation
of good dramatic moves, but indulgence in whatever goods imagination affords us.
This is why there is even a sense in which good props, whether human or otherwise,
a good because they respond well, but that it is not the activity of responding well
that the player seeks, but the goods of imagination.
This is exemplified in one of Walton’s cases of make-believe, involving Fred,
a shoe salesman, who daydreams about being rich and famous.36 This is where
36 [89, p. 13]
150
Walton distinguishes among many different kinds of make-believe, not all of them
suitable for Suitsian games of make-believe. One example of such deviation is a
kind of imagination that need not involve rule following at all. This is spontaneous
imagining, which is different from deliberate imagining.
We sometimes decide on what to imagine, as Fred did; we form inten-
tions to imagine this or that and carry them out. Imagining is sometimes
deliberate. But not always. Often we just find ourselves imagining cer-
tain things. Our fantasizing minds stray, seemingly at random, without
conscious direction. Thoughts pop into our head unbidden. Imagining
seems, in some cases, more something that happens to us than something
that we do.37
This differs starkly from Suits’ example of Porphyro Sneak. Sneak is a master
impersonator, the perfect spy. He masquerades as different people to serve the
espionage needs of whoever can hire his services. But Sneak does not impersonate
so as to deceive, he rather finds situations in which he is called upon to deceive so
that he can impersonate. As Suits puts it, he has reversed the typical ends and
means of the activity of impersonation.
It may very well be the case that Sneak engages in what are called games
of make-believe for the sake of the activity that such games provide. But as Suits
portrays the character, he really is interested in the activity for its own sake, and in
a radical way. He truly cares for the dramatic interaction and seeks to perpetuate
it above everything else. It might be noted that Sneak sometimes does this on his
own, acting out two parts so as to have a good dramatic partner. But I would
37 [89, p. 13-14]
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hasten to add that while he sometimes plays Suitsian games of make-believe alone,
he always makes room for at least two roles. This differs from the non-Suitsian-game
style of make-believe that Walton often has in mind when he talks about a single
person engaging in a game of make-believe. As we can see, the Suitsian paradigm
of make-believe does fit into his definition of games, but it is an extreme, or at least
marginal, form of make-believe.
The applicability of the notion of rule to games of make-believe can also be
called into question. It’s difficult to say what it means to violate a rule in the kind
of open dramatic game that Suits describes. What could a rule even be? “Play
along” seems like something in the neighborhood, but it is difficult to know how
one could legislate such a rule; even self-legislation seems difficult. Even if I really
am concerned about following the rules, knowing when I’ve followed and when I’ve
broken them may be a task too difficult to accomplish. This is because the rules of
make-believe are difficult to specify to any great degree, and thus results in them
being difficult to understand. This may result merely in these types of games being
poor for being under-described, rather than failing to be games outright, but by
Suits’ own lights, these constitutional and evaluative elements are related, and if
the rules are sufficiently under-described then a game of make-believe ceases to be
a game. That we still call it a game is no reliable indication of its being a game,
especially if we can see why we would call such things games even if they are not.
What we call games of make-believe certainly involve a form of play, and without a
more apt description we seem to have settled on calling any form of more organized
play a “game”.
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This is not to ignore Caillois’ point about the analogy between rules and
make-believe. Where some games, he argues, are played for real, such as chess,
other games, like House, involve make-believe. He sees these not as totally separate
forms of play, but as importantly parallel. He compares someone who breaks the
rules of a rule-based game to one who breaks the illusion in a game of make-believe.
[T]he one who breaks up a game, the one who denounces the absurdity
of the rules, now becomes the one who breaks the spell, who brutally
refuses to acquiesce in the proposed illusion, who reminds the boy that
he is not really a detective, pirate, horse, or submarine, or reminds the
little girl that she is not rocking a real baby or serving a real meal to
real ladies on her miniature dishes.38
Caillois is right, as far as the similarity goes, but one must also recognize a
difference between the precision and clarity of the rules of games he thinks we play
for real and games of make-believe. In the case, say, of chess, there are myriad and
specific rules about how to setup the board, turn order, how each piece kind moves,
and how to win. This is to be contrasted with the make-believe decree to simply
play as if something were the case: in House this would be to play whatever role
you have taken on. Both can be broken or disobeyed, but the sharpness of the line
that is crossed differs remarkably between the two cases. Consider Caillois’ nice
example of two children pretending to be adults playing chess, they are “playing
at “playing chess””.39 Consider now how different it would be to break the rules
of playing at “playing chess” as opposed to breaking the rules of an actual game
of chess. Whatever the similarities between rule-based games and games of make-
38 [77, p. 8-9]
39 [77, p. 9]
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believe, there is a marked difference in the nature of the rules of play in these two
cases.
From the perspective of a robust account of games like Suits’, then Walton’s
account of fiction at best employs a metaphoric sense of games. He is not interested
in the game status of our imaginative pursuits, nor is he arguing that our engagement
with works of art is importantly like a game of the standard sort. What interests
Walton instead is the similarity between the kind of imagining that takes place when
we play House and what we do when we stand in front of A Sunday Afternoon on
the Island of La Grande Jatte and attempt to appreciate it.
What Suits has done is give an account of when games of make-believe are in
fact games, but his account also provides the resources making sense of the majority
of cases when games of make-believe are not games. We can see this in the case of
Walton’s analysis of spontaneous imaginings. The aim of the activity, the purpose, or
the sake for which it is done, is not because of the activity that following the rules of
the game makes possible. It is because of whatever psychological or cognitive reasons
one has for ever engaging in the imaginative activity of make-believe. For instance,
it feels good, or is fun, or interesting, or a form of escapism, or whatever. And we
are willing to follow those kinds of imaginative adventures wherever they lead us,
even into logically impossible spaces, and even into dramatically inappropriate, but
otherwise imaginatively rewarding, directions.
Suits does an impressive job of fitting some games of make-believe into his
account. But while he has made sense of when games of make-believe are games, he
does not make the argument that all of the things that we call games of make-believe
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are games. And it is on this count that Walton’s account differs. His account does
not necessitate that all the things he calls games of make-believe are Suitsian games,
though some are, and even more strongly, most of what fits his account of fiction
are not games in Suits’ sense. Waltonian games of make-believe then are not games
in the relevant sense, nor does it seem that Suits’ account can cover most of them.
What this means is that Suits’ analysis, while useful, is limited. This is important if
we are interested in preserving the intuition that artworks are fundamentally distinct
from games.
2.3.7 Toys
Some of the reason for the difference between so-called games of make-believe
and Suitsian games is that much of what gets categorized as games of make-believe
are actually not games at all, but play of another sort, sometimes with toys. That
we call them games may be a mere linguistic convenience of similarity, being prefer-
able to “activity of play”, though oftentimes the activity is simply referred to as
“playing.” In these cases, and in some of the cases Suits considers, objects, and
even other players, serve as props. “Props are generators of fictional truths, things
which, by virtue of their nature or existence, make propositions fictional.”40
Walton’s talk about games of make-believe begins on an even more fundamen-
tal point:
In order to understand paintings, plays, films, and novels, we must look
first at dolls, hobbyhorses, toy trucks, and teddy bears. The activities
40 [89, p. 37]
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in which representational works of art are embedded and which give
them their point are best seen as continuous with children’s games of
make-believe.41
Walton begins his account not by considering games, but toys. This is impor-
tant because it demonstrates not only that Walton’s account is aimed at something
distinct from Suitsian open dramatic games, but that there are large amounts of
play that exist under the title of ‘game’ but do not fit within a conceptual analysis
of game. Suits’ account of open games may be correct, but it would be wrong to try
to apply it to all the kinds of play there are, including much of what we call games
of make-believe.
A great deal of our enjoyment in play comes from playing with toys, and toys
are props for make-believe, they make things true in the fictional world that we are
playing in. When I play with a toy horse, it matters that it has a horse’s head, and
it matters that the horse’s head is brown rather then green. The features of the toy,
the adequacy of the prop to the play, is something that, for whatever psychological
reasons, we find rewarding. It is in this way that videogames often fail to be games
but serve as excellent toys.
Recall Costikyan’s reference to SimCity as an excellent toy. What makes it
such an excellent toy is not merely, by Costikyan’s lights, that it provides us with
such excellent means with which to play different games. As mentioned above, a
ball can do that, but a ball is not the most excellent prop for make-believe. No,
part of what makes a videogame like SimCity such an excellent toy is that it is both
41 [89, p. 11]
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highly particular, meaning that it creates concrete and specific fictions with which
to engage imaginatively, and that it responds well to our interactions with it, so
that when we engage with it fictionally it responds in turn. Another example of this
are the torches in the recent Far Cry: Primal. They are excellent props for make-
believe. When you light them on fire the fire is animated and lights up the world
around you in the night. But they are an even better prop because as they burn
the flame moves down the torch, leaving behind charred wood, eventually burning
the wood entirely and extinguishing. This serves as a diagetic visual indicator that
the torch is being used up, but the videogame need not have included it. It is
there because, again for whatever reasons we find it so, a more fictionally responsive
imaginative prop is more satisfying.
What makes some videogames toys rather than games, then, is that they only
serve as props for make-believe without also providing the explicit rule structure
needed to be a game. One can certainly play games with them, as one can with a
ball, but this only shows their aptness as toys that can serve as an apparatus for a
game, not that they are games themselves.
2.3.8 Videogames as Games
By Suits’ account it seems clear that some videogames are games, though as
we have seen, some of them are toys, which are not games. So we have arrived at
another partial claim. In attempting to understand how some videogames might
be artworks, we need to understand what videogames are. And we have seen that
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some of them are games, according to Suits’ definition of games, but that some
videogames are not games, being better understood as toys. Videogames can be
other things too, including interactive narratives, educational tools, simulations,
political commentary, and advertisements.42
2.4 The Incompatibility of Games and Artworks
Games and artworks are incompatible things.43 This means that if something
is a game, then it cannot also be an artwork and vice versa. Artworks and games
are ontologically distinct kinds, though this should not be confused with the claim
that the things that make up an artwork or a game could not be used to make up
the other. What this means is that for any physical or structural object that is
a constitutive part of a game or an artwork, be it physical pieces or a computer
program or notes on a page or a set of rules, while they could, with the right
adjustment, be part of either an artwork or a game, they do not wholly constitute
the work that they are a part of. Games and artworks also both have as part of
their constitutive parts prescriptions for how to appropriately engage and appreciate
them. It is this fully constituted work of constitutive parts, creative intentions,
prescriptions and all, that is the target of my argument, not solely the parts that
make them up. The position I am defending is that the ontologically complex
42For several examples of these types of uses by videogames, see [90].
43This conclusion is quite different from Roger Ebert’s famous, or perhaps infamous, assertion
that videogames are not, and never can be, art ( [27]). He argues that there is something about
videogames, and not games, (though he is not terribly clear on this distinction) that makes them
unable to be artworks. I would add that he gets his analysis of both videogames and artworks
wrong, and thus, that although the conclusions of our arguments may have some extensional
overlap, the reasons for them are quite different.
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things that are games and artworks cannot be identical with each other, despite
the possibility that the constitutive parts that make them up could potentially be
constitutive parts of either a game or an artwork.
Duchamp’s Fountain is a clear example of how creative intentions can alter
prescriptions for how we are to engage with an object to the point of changing it
from one kind of object to another. Just as a urinal is not merely a physical object
with a particular shape, but that physical thing along with its intended function,
i.e. the prescriptions, norms, and conventions that guide our proper interactions
with it, so are artworks not merely their physical substrate, but also a collection
of prescriptions, norms, and conventions. Thus Duchamp’s Fountain is no longer a
urinal, but an artwork partly constituted by the physical object that used to partly
constitute a urinal. The functions, conventions, prescriptions, and proscriptions
governing the object when it was a urinal have been altered, otherwise the various
attempts over the years to urinate into it would not be as newsworthy or interesting
as they are; nor has its art status spread to other urinals through mere physical
resemblance. It is important that the object used to be a urinal, but it is also
important that it no longer is one.44
Chess is a game and, arguably, the videogame This War of Mine is an artwork.
At the very least, it is a work of a kind that requires a kind of engagement and
appreciation that requires more than merely engaging with it as a game.45 In This
44Joseph Margolis argues that artworks are embodied in the physical objects that partly consti-
tute them as “tokens-of-a-type”, but are not identical to them, see [91].
45The incompatibility argument presented here neither makes nor depends on the distinction
between artworks and works simpliciter made in [92]. All that is required here is only that if
something is an artwork, it cannot also be a game, and vice versa. While the argument presented
here, I believe, goes through even when it incorporates Lamarque’s theory, there is not the space
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War of Mine, one is tasked with managing a group of survivors in an urban war
zone. It presents the audience with morally difficult choices, such as whether to allow
other survivors to camp in your base and risk running out of supplies or allowing a
betrayer into your midst, or whether to raid the stores of nearby, equally victimized,
survivors, turning your own survival actions into predation. It is a work meant to
impress upon those who engage with it the desperate and vicious effect that war
has on those it impacts beyond direct combat. To “play” it “to win”, to accumulate
the most points, or merely survive, without consideration of the morally ambiguous
aspect of the work would be to largely miss the point of the work and thus to engage
with it improperly. On the other hand, chess is an abstract game with a minimal
veneer of make-believe about war that extends only to calling pieces by names like
“knight” and “queen”. To not play it like this but to instead reflect during the game
on what it says about the nature of war and the state of man which wages it would
be to do something wrong, or at least, something unnecessary to proper engagement
with it.
It also does not follow from the incompatibility of artworks and games that
one can tell just from looking at an object if it is the material basis of a game or
an artwork. Extending William Kennick’s warehouse test for artworks to games as
well, one cannot go into a warehouse of unmarked items and correctly identify all
the works of art, nor, I argue, could one properly identify all the games46 This is
perhaps even more so the case with games than art, as many games exist only as
to demonstrate that here.
46This is contrary to Kennick’s original claim, which is that even without a definition of art,
most people could properly identify most objects of art, see [93].
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abstract sets of rules and thus would be harder to find in a warehouse than many
primarily concrete artworks. Barring the problem of identifying abstracta, if one
were to come across a chess set, how would one know if it belonged to the game of
chess rather than an artwork that had appropriated a chess set? Clearly one could
not, and one must always know more about an object than just its physical parts
to properly identify it as an artwork or a game. All of this is to caution against
becoming distracted from the actual target of the argument, thinking that it applies
to the mere constituent objects that we often take to be a game or an artwork, and
that they could never be constituents of the other.
The incompatibility of games and artworks bears on the debate over the art
status of videogames. Grant Tavinor defends a positive answer in his The Art of
Videogames.47 Dom Lopes’ A Philosophy of Computer Art suggests that videogames
can be art in largely the same way as other interactive computer works.48 Aaron
Smuts argues that by every definition of art, videogames count as art.49 Al Baker
argues for a narrower account, that all videogames are representational art.50 These
authors and many others, both inside and outside of philosophy, argue for various
conclusions, some that videogames can be artworks, some that they cannot.
They do not, however, address a more basic concern, that of whether games
themselves can be artworks. It is an open question whether all, or even any,
videogames are games, but most authors take it for granted that they are. It may






avoid the problem of this incompatibility. The incompatibility between games and
artworks, however, is important for the way we think about them, and about both
in relation to videogames. If the incompatibility argument is successful, it means
we must think differently and carefully about the way we create, appreciate, un-
derstand, and criticize both artworks and games, giving each its due and proper
understanding as what it is and not as something it is not.
In this section I argue that games, at least of a Suitsian type, cannot be art-
works, that something’s being a game is incompatible with its being an artwork. I
am silent on the issue of whether videogames are in fact games, but I will argue
that insofar as someone takes something to be a game, it cannot be an artwork, be
it a videogame or otherwise. The question, then, is what is it about games and art-
works that makes them incompatible? I emphasize three points of incompatibility,
arising from the respective criteria of games and artworks: games and art cannot
share the same constitutive goals, artworks cannot have the arbitrary inefficiency
that is required of games, and the required attitude that we take towards artworks
undermines the required attitude that we must take towards games.
2.4.1 Games
Recall Bernard Suits’ definition of game-playing:
To play a game is to attempt to achieve a specific state of affairs [pre-
lusory goal], using only means permitted by rules [lusory means], where
the rules prohibit use of more efficient in favour of less efficient means
[constitutive rules], and where the rules are accepted just because they
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make possible such activity [lusory attitude].51
Recall that Suits’ definition is not a definition of games proper, but of the
activity of game-playing. Yet this can be easily modified to distinguish games as
objects from game-playing as an activity. This requires an amendment to the lusory
attitude condition, including with it a prescription that players engage the set of
rules with the lusory attitude.
This modified account correctly captures, I believe, the extension of games,
while giving a reason for why people call similar things games in a metaphorical
sense. There is not the space to defend Suits’ account at length, but a brief review
will be helpful.
I want to briefly highlight the elements of games that will be shown to con-
tribute to their incompatibility with artworks.
2.4.2 Prelusory Goals
The first is the prelusory goal. Remember that this is the goal that a player
aims to achieve is a specific achievable state of affairs. It is the kind of goal that
can be specified apart from the game itself, independent of the rules as a whole.
2.4.3 Inefficient Means
The lusory means are determined by the constitutive rules, where the rules
select inefficient over efficient means for achieving the prelusory goal. Suits makes
51 [43, pp. 43] square brackets his.
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special note of this inefficiency condition for it is the selection of inefficient means
that makes an activity a game rather than a technical activity.
Think of any game at random. Now identify its prelusory goal: breasting
a tape, felling an opponent, or whatever. I think you will agree that the
simplest, easiest, and most direct approach to achieving such a goal is
always ruled out in favour of a more complex, more difficult, and more
indirect approach.”52
Technical activities are those we want to complete more or less as efficiently as
possible. To borrow Suits’ example, much of what makes golf a game rather than a
technical activity is that instead of trying to achieve the goal of putting a ball in a
hole in the ground by walking up to it and placing it inside, we instead start several
hundred yards away and (try to) hit it with a club.
2.4.4 Lusory Attitude
The final condition that makes something a game is the prescription that
players engage it with the lusory attitude, which is that they accept the constitutive
rules and the inefficient lusory means they specify for achieving the prelusory goal,
solely because they make such an activity possible, that activity being to try to
accomplish the goal through such restricted means. This distinguishes game playing
from aberrant cases, like someone being coerced by gunpoint into playing what would
otherwise be a game, because their motivation is not one of playing. It also shows
how something that is not a game can be treated as if it were a game. An example
of this might be the game “Traffic”, where someone obeys all the rules of traffic,
52 [43, p. 40]
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not because they are laws aimed at balancing safety and convenience, but because
they enjoy the activity of trying to reach some destination within what they treat
as arbitrary restrictions. Thus one could play “Traffic”, which can be treated as
a game, without turning the prescriptions of traffic into a game, since there is no
prescription for them to be engaged in such a manner.
2.4.5 Art
The incompatibility argument depends on what I take to be an uncontroversial
and generally accepted condition for being an artwork. Whatever an artwork is,
whatever its meaning, and whatever the intentions of the artist, artworks are meant
to be appreciated. Proper engagement with an artwork requires recognizing the
object for what it is and attending to all of its relevant features. This includes
obvious things like the physical object that partly constitutes the artwork, but
features of its context of creation as well, like the identity of the artist, when it
was created, the history of the medium it was created in, and the intentions of the
artist.53 This is just to say that there are right and wrong ways of engaging with
artworks, and the right ways include paying attention to the relevant features of the
work, whatever those turn out to be. This is not a bold claim, and, unsurprisingly,
it finds general agreement in the literature.
53By requiring attention to intention I don’t mean anything as strong as the thesis that an artist’s
intentions fully determine the nature of a work or its meaning, only that the nature of the work
and its meaning depends, at least in some part, on the fact that artworks are intentionally created
objects. These considerations are part of what make for proper evaluations of artworks. There are
many accounts of art that support this general claim, though the stance defended here does not
require the endorsement of any particular view. The role of intentions is, however, ineliminable as
it relates to framing an object not just as a work of art, but as the kind of work of art that it is.
For extended discussion on this topic, see [96], [97]2006, [98], [97].
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Support for this condition of appreciation comes from otherwise quite different
positions across the theoretical space of the philosophy of art. One example is the
kind of regard expressed in historical accounts of art, including Jerrold Levinson’s
“proper ways of regarding”54 and Robert Stecker’s “the set of functions standard
or correctly recognized”.55 Both highlight that established modes of appreciation
matter for something to be properly intended as art. Ways of appreciation of this
kind allow any kind of object to be art, but not that any kind of intended function
can also be an appropriate art function, or way of treating an object, it the object
is to be an artwork.
Peter Lamarque also gets at this notion of appropriate appreciation in his
account of the difference between a work (not necessarily an artwork) and an object
that is, in Danto’s locution, a “mere real thing”.56 The claim is that works have
essential properties that not only make it a work, but make it that work. Lamarque
gives special attention to two such kinds of conditions that are essential to both
ways of being a work: Conditions of Production and Conditions of Reception. In
short, he argues that it is important both how a work is made and how an audience
receives it.
This is in keeping as well, with David Davies’ pragmatic constraint, that what-
ever our theory of art, it must respect actual practice, the way people both make
and engage with art. This notion is also consonant with Sherri Irvin’s account of





determine whether a particular feature is relevant to the work’s interpretation, to
establish in what genre the work belongs, and, in some cases, to determine whether
it, qua artwork, has a particular feature or not.”57
Support can similarly be found in Christy Mag Uidhir’s claim that if art has
a purpose it is “manner specific”, when it has a purpose which is “essentially con-
stituted both by an action (or state of affairs) and a manner, such that the purpose
is to perform that action (or bring about that state of affairs) in that particular
manner. Failure to do so constitutes failure to satisfy/fulfill the purpose, that is,
a manner specific purpose is satisfied only if the state of affairs is brought about
in the prescribed manner,” and that “the prescribed manner is constitutive of the
purpose.” 58 A similar perspective is expressed in Malcolm Budd’s claim that the
proper understanding of a work is nondetachable from proper experience of a work,
as he notes of reliable testimony about the gracefulness of a work, “The reliable
informer, as he perceives the work, will not just perceive the work as being graceful
but will perceive the gracefulness as it is realized in the work.”59
The condition of arthood that I am here defending is minimal: that an artwork
is meant to be appreciated, and that appreciating an artwork includes attending
to all of its relevant features.60 I cite these otherwise quite different positions on
the nature of art to demonstrate how widespread and ecumenical the notion is
57 [99, pp. 315-316]
58 [100, p. 194-195]
59 [101, p. 391] Emphasis his.
60The use of “relevant” here is to exclude obvious non-relevant features, like, say, the color of
the backs of canvases for the evaluation of paintings or their weight or the smell of their frames.
Obviously, any feature could be made relevant, but this is just in keeping with the theory, as
things like the medium of the work and in particular the artist’s intentions, among other thing,
can determine which and whether features like these are relevant.
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of appreciation of art for its relevant features. While much of the philosophical
debate surrounding artworks centers on exactly how this notion of the centrality
of appreciation is manifested in different cases, the notion itself is not usually in
question.
2.4.6 An Object That Is Both an Artwork and a Game
Before we can consider if games are incompatible with artworks, we must
consider what it would mean for an object to be both a game and an artwork.
There are two straightforward ways that we can consider a game that is also an
artwork. One is that an artist creates, transforms, or appropriates a game in a way
that is sufficient to make it an artwork, and does so in a way that preserves its status
as a game. The other way is that an artist creates, transforms, or appropriates an
artwork in such a way as to also give it the necessary and sufficient conditions for
being a game. I take it that either scenario results in the same kind of object being
created.
2.4.7 Art Appreciation
Beyond these two ways of the same artifact being a game and an artwork, a
confusion can arise by conflating the activity of art appreciation with the object
of appreciation that is the artwork itself. This confusion can happen because the
activities that are game-playing and art appreciation share many similarities, such
as having prescriptions, ends, and, if the artist makes his or her artwork in a certain
168
way, both activities can seem to require arbitrary inefficiencies in achieving those
ends.
Even if art appreciation could also be a game, this would not result in the art-
work being a game. The activity of appreciating an artwork is not the same thing
as the artwork itself. As the argument here is concerned with the incompatibility
between games and artworks, even if it were possible for the activity of art appreci-
ation to be a game, that would not then show that artworks were compatible with
games.
It cannot be the case, however, that art appreciation could be a game, nor can
it be a case of the activity of game-playing, because art appreciation is a technical
activity and technical activities cannot be games. Recall that this is so because tech-
nical activities are activities that aim to accomplish their goals in an efficient manner,
something that games don’t do. This inefficiency is the characteristic feature that
distinguishes game-playing from all other kinds of activities. Games prescribe that
their goal, the prelusory goal, be gotten at by inefficient means. This means that, by
Suit’s definition, games are not a technical activity. Art appreciation, then, being a
technical activity, cannot be a game.
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2.4.8 Appropriation and Repurposing
It is perhaps unnecessary to state that the Mona Lisa is not a game.61 But
showing that most artworks are not games is not a very difficult, or even interesting,
claim. The argument here makes the stronger claim that no artworks are games and
vice versa.
Why couldn’t someone make a work out of a game, like a Readymade made
from a chess set, or, a more difficult case, why couldn’t someone create a game that
is also an artwork, or to put it otherwise, if someone did make an artwork out of a
game, why would that entail that the object in question was no longer a game?
In the case of Readymades, there are several examples of artworks made from
objects that ceased to have their non-artwork functions once they were selected or
appropriated as art. Duchamp’s Fountain is perhaps the most obvious case, already
explained above. A different situation would arise if someone were to take a chess
set, chess being uncontroversially a game, and put it in a gallery. Doing so changes
the function of the object that is the chess set, and it is no longer meant to be
engaged with as it was before as certain new actions are prescribed and prior ones
prohibited.
The chess set example does not address the issue at hand, however, as a chess
61Perhaps pace Walton’s account of fiction and games of make-believe (see [89]). Space does not
allow me to address this concern in full here, but in short my response is that if we read Walton’s
use of “game” literally, his account does not correctly capture the notion of games, and if we read
it analogically or metaphorically, then no conflict arises. I would suggest that Waltonian games
are of a different sort than Suitsian games, one concerned with certain practices of make-believe
and the other with rules and objectives, so no conflict arises between the two, nor does something
being a member of one kind of game have any bearing on its being a member of the other kind.
For a fuller analysis, see §2.3.6
170
set itself is not a game. The game that is chess is a set of rules, means, and ends that
we are to engage in certain ways, namely with the lusory attitude. The interesting
case, then, is not of appropriating the paraphernalia of a game, but someone creating
a set of prescriptions that seem to satisfy the conditions for being a game and an
artwork. Is there an incompatibility in cases like this?62
2.4.9 Artworks as Games, Games as Artworks
The case we are interested in is whether a game itself can be an artwork. To
judge this case we must consider carefully the conditions that make something a
game and add to them the conditions that make something an artwork and see if
they are compatible. This includes the different attitudes required for games and
artworks. It is in consideration of these conditions, I maintain, that we can see how
games are incompatible with artworks.
Assume for reductio ad absurdum that there is an artwork that is also a game:
Artwork-Game X. By hypothesis it will have all the properties of a game and all the
properties of an artwork. The arising impossibility of such an object will demon-
strate the incompatibility between games and artworks.
62This is also distinct from playings of games being parts of artworks, as can be the case in
performance works. A playing of chess in a museum does not make chess art, nor did Diego
Leclery’s playing of Civilization at the 2014 Whitney Biennial turn the game you and I can play
at home into an artwork.
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2.4.9.1 The Prelusory Goal of Artworks
Since Artwork-Game X is a game, it must have a prelusory goal.63 The goal
that all artworks have that is as close to the lusory goal of winning a game as one
might hope, is to appreciate the artwork by paying attention to its relevant features.
To get the prelusory goal of any game we separate the goal from the means that are
required to achieve it, isolating the final stage of appreciation of the work. Since
Artwork-Game X is an artwork, its goal must be the appreciation of the artwork by
attending to the features of the work. And as Artwork-Game X is also a game, this
goal must be an achievable state of affairs separable from the means that dictate
how to achieve it. Therefore, the prelusory goal of Artwork-Game X is appreciating
it.
2.4.9.2 The Constitutive Rules and Lusory Means of Artworks
For Artwork-Game X there must be a difference between the efficient means
of achieving the prelusory goal and the inefficient lusory means that the constitutive
rules dictate. At first glance this seems straightforward enough; the creator of X
can make whatever rules he or she desires to make the lusory means of the artwork-
game X in such a way that they are inefficient for achieving the prelusory goal.
For instance, the artist could obscure elucidating elements of the work, or prescribe
63A concern arises here with talk about the plausibility of an artwork having a goal. It is not the
most comfortable fit to say that just because something involves a prescription to engage with it in
a certain fashion means that it has a goal. For the sake of argument I grant that artworks can have
goals only to make the most charitable case in favor of the compatibility between artworks and
games. If it turns out that artworks do not have goals, then we get the incompatibility argument
for free, so to speak, and no further argument is needed.
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outlandish and time-wasting tasks to be performed while also prescribing difficult-
to-achieve goals.
2.4.9.3 The Lusory Attitude of Artworks
Artwork-Game X is both an artwork and a game, and thus requires for proper
engagement with it both the lusory attitude and the artistic attitude.
An overly strong reading of the lusory attitude would make these attitudes
immediately incompatible. Recall the particular language of the lusory attitude,
which says that “anyone who plays a game accepts the rules of the game just because
such acceptance makes possible such activity.”64 If we read the ‘just’ in an exclusive
way, meaning that it is the only reason one can have for playing a game, then the
addition of any other reason would mean that person was not actually playing a
game.
This is radical autotelism, the position that games must be played always
and only for their own sake, and that any other reason that a person might have for
playing a game invalidates the person’s otherwise legitimate playing of it. While this
would indeed make games and artworks incompatible, this is too strong a reading of
the lusory attitude and one we ought to reject for this would rule out many cases of
game-playing that we would want to preserve as legitimate. For example, it would
rule out that any professional athletes are actually playing games if they are also
motivated by fame or fortune.
The exclusion of professional athletes as genuine players might seem acceptable
64 [43, p. 156] emphasis his.
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if one is particularly keen on preserving the pure nature of amateur play. And there
is something to be said for those who play purely for the love of the game, and
this is a distinction that we ought to preserve. However, radical autotelism would
also rule out more commonplace instances of game-playing that even the defender
of amateur play should hesitate to discard. Suits gives the following examples of
playing games for other reasons:
to decide an issue (‘Let’s play a hand of poker to see who goes into town
for more beer’), to achieve the greatest good for the greatest number
(‘You know how I hate bridge, but since you need a fourth I’ll play
this once’), to gain approval (‘Percy joined the football team because
Gwendolyn fancies football players’).65
We should still want to say that these players are in fact playing these games,
even if these purposes are “more important to them than the games themselves.”66
They can still be legitimate players of these games, even if, were their extra-lusory
motivations removed, that would also remove their desire to play the game.
While the lusory attitude is not always exclusive of other reasons to play a
game, it must always be a sufficient attitude to allow engagement with it to count
as the playing of a game. As Suits explains,
I am not committed to the position that playing a game for some fur-
ther purpose somehow falsifies the proposition that a game is really be-
ing played. Nor, although extra-lusory purposes can be accomplished
by playing games, is it necessary either to have or to accomplish such
purposes in order to be playing a game; that is, such purposes are no
65 [43, p. 154-156]
66 [43, p. 155]
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part of the definition of game playing.67
This means that while one may be motivated to play a game for other reasons,
like those listed above, were they to lose those extra-lusory motivations but maintain
the lusory attitude, that attitude would be enough, along with the other conditions
for gamehood, for their activity to be one of game-playing. Thus there is a way for
the lusory attitude to be compatible with other reasons for playing a game. It does
exclude, however, anyone who is either not motivated by the lusory attitude, or who
has an attitude that prevents one from taking the lusory attitude.
2.4.10 The Incompatibility of Artworks and Games
Artwork-Game X is what is supposed to be the case when we have something
that is both an artwork and a game, with all the required features. We have supposed
up to this point that this is a coherent possibility. If we look carefully at these
conditions, however, we will see that some of them are in fact incompatible, and
that no one object can be both a game and an artwork.68
67 [43, p. 156]
68I take a similar approach in my argument from Christy Mag Uidhir (see [100]) and Jerrold
Levinson’s (see [102]) arguments for the incompatibility of pornography and art in that I think
there are incompatible features between games and art, in particular in how we are to appreciate
them. Where others have argued those particular arguments fail, however, my argument differs
in selecting different features on which to peg the incompatibility. In their arguments, each calls
for a certain kind of regard, either too permissive or not permissive enough to accommodate the
other. A somewhat similar incompatibility happens between games and artworks, though not one
that obviously transfers to an incompatibility between artworks and things other than games.
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2.4.11 No Separable Goal for Artworks
The first incompatibility is between artworks and prelusory goals. It is a
hallmark feature of games that the rules arbitrarily require inefficient means for
achieving the prelusory goal. Their inefficiency is relative to the prelusory goal, a
goal that without the imposition of the constitutive rules could be accomplished
by any number of other means, either more or less efficiently. The lusory means of
supposed Artwork-Game X cannot exhibit these features. The goal of an artwork is
to understand it, and doing this requires that we take into account all the relevant
features of the work. The relevant features of the work include any feature of the
work that bears on the correct appreciation of it. As the lusory means that the
artist selects can have a bearing on the correct appreciation of a work, they count
as relevant features. This means that to reach the goal of understanding a work,
an audience member must take into consideration the lusory means that the artist
chooses. But this means that the prelusory goal is not separable from the lusory
means in the way that is required of games.
The lusory means used to achieve the supposed prelusory goal are in fact part
of the prelusory goal. The prelusory goal of Artwork-Game X, namely trying to
understand the work for what it is, requires consideration of the lusory means in
that understanding. The prelusory goal, the state of affairs that is meant to be
separable from the lusory means, must include them. This creates a dilemma. The
first horn is accepting that the lusory means are part of the prelusory goal, and
thus the prelusory goal cannot be separated from them, preserving Artwork-Game
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X’s art status but undermining its game status. The second horn is to deny that
the lusory means are part of the prelusory goal, allowing them to be separable, thus
preserving the game status of Artwork-Game X, but undermining its artwork status.
2.4.12 No Inefficient Means for Artworks
Related to the nature of supposed prelusory goals of artworks, whatever means
are proposed as lusory means for an artwork must fail to be inefficient. Because the
goal of an artwork is to understand it, and that understanding must take into account
the lusory means used to reach that goal as part of the work, such means cannot
be an inefficient way of reaching it. In fact, they are the only means for reaching
that understanding, making them not only exclusive of other possible means, but
also the maximally efficient means available.69 While the prelusory goal of a game
could be gotten at in any number of ways, the particular nature of each artwork
means there is only one way of reaching the goal of understanding it, and that is
through appreciating that artwork and not something else. It is true that there
may be many ways of appreciating the artwork, but the important thing is that all
of them are ways of appreciating that artwork and they demand that all relevant
features be considered. No matter how seemingly obstructionist the rules the artist
creates, obeying them is still the only way of achieving the proper appreciation of
the work.
69This connection between form and content is argued for in [103] and [104]. See also [105], [106],
and [107].
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2.4.13 The Incompatibility of Lusory and Artistic Attitudes
Finally, a third consideration shows the incompatibility between games and
art: a conflict between the lusory and artistic attitudes. Recall that the lusory
attitude is essential to game-playing while the artistic attitude is essential to the
proper engagement with an artwork. It may seem at first glance that the attitudes
are compatible, that one could engage with the object as a game while holding the
further aim of appreciating it as art.
There are problems with this approach, however. Bear in mind that Artwork-
Game X is both a game and an artwork all the time, it does not change status from
one to the other at different times. Thus, while it may be possible to use a game,
and even playings of it as a game, as component parts of an artwork, the claim being
considered here is of an identity between an artwork and a game. This means that
the proposed object must always be appreciated as a game and always appreciated as
an artwork. So while there may be artworks that use games as part of them, and thus
allow for different attitudes at different times, the proposed Artwork-Game X cannot
take this approach; it must require both attitudes simultaneously. Simultaneity is
required because for something to be either an artwork or a game is for it to be
appropriate to treat it as such whenever one engages with it. Thus more has been
shown than just the psychological impossibility of treating something as both an
artwork and a game (if there is indeed such an impossibility); the incompatibility
is, rather, a metaphysical one. The prescriptions that make up games and artworks
prevent the same thing from being both a game and an artwork, even if, were the
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prescriptions different, the same constitutive parts could make up either a game or
an artwork.
The constant of attitudinal engagement means that while playing a game may
serve further purposes, like fitness, fortune, or fame, the reasons for playing the
game must always be reasons for playing it as a game. The distinguishing feature
of game-playing, as of play in general, is that while it need not always be done for
its own sake, it can always be done solely for its own sake. This fact makes games
a paradigm case of autotelic activity.
With Artwork-Game X, however, the lusory attitude is no longer a sufficient
attitude for the proper engagement with it qua Artwork-Game X. Since it is also
an artwork, it requires the artistic attitude. It would be inappropriate to engage
with Artwork-Game X simply because one wanted to engage in the striving that
the lusory means made possible, irrespective of the goal being aimed at; rather
one must also engage with it because one cares about achieving the goal, which is
understanding the work. These attitudes do not overlap, thus it cannot be that one
is sufficient when both are necessary.70
Thus there are at least three ways that games are incompatible with artworks.
There can be no separable prelusory goal for artworks, the supposed lusory means
of an artwork cannot exhibit the necessary inefficiency, and the artistic and lusory
attitudes are incompatible.
70Though artworks have associated prescriptions, they hold limited power over us. While there is
the prescription that we are to appreciate the artwork for the work that it is, this prescription only
holds sway over our appreciative practices, not our lives in general. This makes it a conditional,
and not categorical, prescription. If we are going to properly engage with this artwork, then we
must appreciate it for the work that it is. But it is not the case that at any time there is a
prescription to properly engage with all artworks.
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2.4.14 Game-works
One should be careful about what the incompatibility argument does not show.
It does not show that videogames cannot be artworks, or that other things that seem
like games cannot be artworks, or that things that seem at first glance to be artworks
can’t be games. It only shows that whenever a thing is a game it cannot also be an
artwork and vice versa. It does not mean that the things that make up a game and
make up an artwork could not, with the right adjustments, be made into the other.
In particular, there is little reason, other than perhaps the history and label that
includes ‘game’, to assume that all videogames are games.
Videogames can be many things, including educational tools, simulations, toys,
and interactive narrative experiences, none of which require that it also be a game.
Thus, insofar as any videogame fails to be a game in the Suitsian sense outlined
above, it is immune to the incompatibility argument and is at least a potential
candidate for art status. Strictly speaking, the incompatibility argument allows
for all videogames to be artworks, so long as none of them are games. This also
holds for any other non-videogame things that might be called games, but are in
fact properly intentioned to be artworks. This includes the things we call “board
games”, “role-playing games”, “card games”, and so on.
So we see that the incompatibility does not rule out the possibility of what can
be called game-works. A game-work is simply a work that has features that we might
consider rules, means, and goals similar to a game’s but is meant for appreciation
beyond or differently from what the lusory attitude prescribes. The notion of a
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game-work can include videogames, boardgames, party games, role-playing games,
or anything that resembles a game in having the apparent rules, means, and goals
structure of a Suitsian game. The difference between a Suitsian game and a game-
work is that game-works do not prescribe the lusory attitude, indeed cannot lest
they be games, as the proper appreciation of a game-work extends beyond merely
undertaking them for the striving activity they provide.
Game-works, then, are not incompatible with being artworks, even though
they share many qualities with games. This is because they are not games, despite
evident similarities. An apparent tension can arise when a game-work asks of its
audience that they adopt, as part of the work, something like the lusory attitude,
that the audience, at least temporarily, treat or consider the object as if it were a
game before requiring it to undertake some further appreciative task. Taking such
a stance is insufficient, however, for making the object a game. A game requires
that we actually take the lusory attitude towards it, not that we act only as if we
had that attitude. This is similar to how assumed attitudes can fail in the other
direction to make things artworks, as it is insufficient to make something an artwork
merely that one considers the object as if it were an artwork.
I suspect many videogames will turn out under investigation to be game-works
rather than games, meant to be appreciated for more than just the striving activity
they provide, even when such striving is part of the proper consideration of the work.
This is at least the kind of videogame that is often referenced in discussions about
the art status of videogames, that some particular work has a compelling narrative,
or the gameplay in some other one makes a moral point, or some further one is an
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aesthetic triumph. All of these are characteristics that a work can be appreciated
for, but they are not features that make a Suitsian game what it is.
2.4.15 Conclusion
The possibility of an object being both a game and an artwork has been
considered and rejected. The categories are incompatible for at least three reasons,
artworks being unable to have separable prelusory goals and inefficient lusory means,
and the lusory attitude’s sufficiency being undermined by the necessity of the artistic
attitude. This incompatibility does not mean that a game, like most anything, could
not be a constitutive element of an artwork, but a game cannot be identical with an
artwork. This is important in how we critically analyze both games and artworks,
especially for works that have been proposed as both games and artworks. If my
argument that they are incompatible things is correct, then these theories must be
altered to accommodate this incompatibility and the appreciative methods these
theories endorse changed in kind. Definitions and accounts of videogames must also
take this fact into consideration, and analyses must be modified accordingly. Also
important is that this frees appreciation of games from the burden of having to
satisfy criteria of art as well. Games are excellent things, as Suits is perhaps overly
enthusiastic in defending,71 and as such they should be created, engaged with, and
judged on their own merits, for what they are, and not as something they are not.
71Suits believes that games are the highest value and the best way to spend one’s time, see [?].
I am inclined to agree with him that they are more valuable than they are often given credit for,
but I also agree with Thomas Hurka’s criticism that there are other important values as well, e.g.
beauty, morality, relationships, that do not reduce to games in the way Suits might think they do.
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2.5 Play
2.5.1 A Definition of Play
Defining play is, in part, a defense of a Suitsian account of games. Most radi-
cally, Suits argues that play and game-playing are logically independent. This means
that one can play without thereby playing a game, and perhaps more shocking, one
can play a game without thereby playing. The former is less controversial, and we
can start there. Suits gives the example of young Johnny playing with his food.
We may be very well inclined to understand his behavior as playing, but, as Suits
points out, “it surely would be straining usage to conclude that Johnny is engaged
in playing a game with his mashed potatoes.”72
Suits makes a less persuasive argument in the other direction, in defense of
the idea that just because one is playing a game this does not mean that they are
thereby playing. Consider the case of professional athletes. “When professional
athletes are performing in assigned games for wages, although they are certainly
playing games, we are not at all inclined to conclude from that fact that they are
without qualification playing. For we think of professional athletes as working when
they play their games and as playing when they go home from work to romp with
their children.”73
This may seem more or less correct, and it follows claims made by Caillois
about professionals not being engaged in play. I myself am inclined to agree with
72 [43, p. 221]
73 [43, p. 221]
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the idea that in many cases professional athletes are not playing when they are
fulfilling their professional duties. But Suits, by his own lights, gets the analysis of
professional game-playing wrong. Seeing how that goes wrong can help us see how
it is helpful to understand games as objects rather than as activities.
Recall that Suits’ definition is one of the activity of game-playing, not of
games as objects. If this is so, then as he has defined it, whenever an athlete is
playing a game, they are indeed playing, for to be engaged in the activity of game-
playing is to be engage with the formal system of the game with lusory attitude.
Thus if a professional athlete is indeed playing a game, then they are in a state
of play. Perhaps he is speaking loosely, however, and means only that sometimes
professional athletes engage with the formal elements of a game, but do not have
the lusory attitude, yet we still call their behavior playing the game. This certainly
seems to happen, but then we must distinguish between game-playing as an activity,
with the requisite lusory attitude, and game-playing as being engaged, even to some
degree improperly, with the game as an object.
It is not obvious to me what is the best terminological choice to distinguish
between these senses. Use of the term “institution” seems most natural, but that
term is already used to describe the system of rules that one can engage with without
needing to be involved in a full playing of the game. The example given of this
kind of behavior is the person who is practicing chess by setting up the board in
certain ways so as to improve his or her ability. Perhaps, then, we can use the term
“institution” to also mean when someone engages with a game without also taking
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on the lusory attitude.74
In this stipulated sense, a person can play a game in the sense of engaging
with the institution of the game without it being the case that they are engaging in
a case of playing the game. Of course, we then have the awkwardness of different
senses of play, with play1 being a kind of institutional engagement, and play2 being
the fully proper engagement with a game.
Despite these linguistic hurdles, it seems that we can understand professional
athletes as not playing the game they seem to be playing. The point is that the
example is more complicated than Suits presents it, and does not make as strong
as case as he thinks there is that we can separate play from game-playing. It seems
there is no case in which someone is genuinely involved in game-playing when they
are not also playing, though there are cases when one is participating in a game
institution, something that we call playing, without actually playing.
Though Suit’s example is not as successful as he intends, it is also not as crucial
to his argument as he may have assumed. The relevant aspect of his argument is
the distinction between autotelic activities as a whole and the particular autotelic
activity of play.
Autotelic behaviors, like play, are simply the kinds of things that we under-
stand to be good in and of themselves. They are worth doing without the need for
further justification. This distinguishes them from instrumental behaviors which
have some further purpose. Classic examples of autotelic behavior include aesthetic
74If anything, this kind of usage is hinted at, if not explicitly sanctioned, by Suits’ account of
cheats, triflers, and spoilsports. See [43, ch. 4]
185
and religious contemplation, as well as games. But Suits resists the conflation of
all autotelic activities with play, arguing that there is something more to play than
just autotelicity.
Play is not something that can be understood through its own intrinsic nature,
argues Suits, but only through its relation to what one should otherwise be doing.
Play is understood as the expending of resources, be it time, energy, or whatever,
that roughly speaking ought to be spent elsewhere on something instrumentally
valuable.
x is playing if and only if x has made a temporary reallocation to autotelic
activities of resources primarily committed to instrumental purposes.75
Perhaps the most common resource spent playing is time. Time is a resource
that is limited for us all and, as historical contingency would have it, we primarily
spend that time in instrumental pursuits, the sustaining of our bodies and minds,
and the betterment of our situation. To play is to, so to speak, waste that time
doing something good for its own sake but not good for any instrumental purpose.
At first pass this might seem to accommodate aesthetic appreciation as play.
Suits, however, aims to show that this is not the case, and that what are commonly
taken to be autotelic activities are indeed done for some instrumental purpose, in-
cluding the paradigm cases of aesthetic and religious contemplation. These things
of course could be play, as could any activity made suitably autotelic, but his argu-
ment is that once these activities are made so, we would reject them as not what
we ordinarily consider them to consist of.
75 [43, p. 225]
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I believe it is possible to think away the usefulness of aesthetic and
religious pursuits if we really put our minds to it. And, I suggest, that
if we are successful in that attempt, we will be much less inclined—and
perhaps not inclined at all—to deny that such pursuits ought ever to be
called play.76
The case of religious contemplation, something seemingly good for its own
sake, translates easily to the case of aesthetic contemplation. The key point, in
either case, is whether one expects to accomplish anything from their activity. In
the case of play, it is supposed to go, play is not the kind of thing that accomplishes
anything. It really is just a waste of time that is enjoyable on its own. For it to
accomplish anything, or rather, be done with the aim of accomplishing anything,
would be for it to be instrumental, hence failing to be autotelic, and thus not play.
But what might something like religious contemplation of God accomplish?
Suits offers several possibilities. It may be that one contemplates God to seek his
assistance on some matter. Or perhaps to save oneself and get to Heaven. One
could contemplate God to increase one’s standing in God’s eyes, or to seem good to
those who observe one in contemplation. The possibilities grow ever more subtle.
Perhaps one contemplates God to become a better person. Finally, perhaps through
one’s contemplation of God they expect to become better at contemplating God.
All of these are activities instrumental enough to disqualify the contemplation as
play. Only if they truly did have no further purpose would they count as play.
We can see the parallel with aesthetic contemplation. If one is seeking to im-
press those around them, or understand a work of art, then one has an instrumental
76 [43, p. 232]
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aim. Even if one is only seeking to improve one’s aesthetic sensibilities through
practice, this will not count. It is a fine line to walk, but one may argue that if one
engages in aesthetic appreciation for some reward, then one’s behavior is instrumen-
tal as well. It is difficult to tease out the exact difference, if there is one, between the
reasons one plays and the reasons one engages in aesthetic contemplation. But it
does seem that a difference exists, in that play can seem in its nature a kind of use-
less act, whereas that same description of wasting time seems less apt with aesthetic
contemplation; it seems less plausible to think that one contemplates the aesthetic
for no reason at all in the way one plays for no reason at all. If such a difference is
there, if aesthetic enjoyment can be undertaken for no reason, no self-betterment,
no improvement of aptitude, then it is play, but it seems a rather rare kind.
2.5.2 Is Art a Form of Play?
This gets at what appears to be a problem for the incompatibility argument:
that several accounts of aesthetic appreciation make this out to be a form of play.
Suits’ account of play, however, deflates much of what might otherwise be a po-
tentially devastating counterexample in the various accounts of art that represent
art making or art experiencing as a form of play. We find accounts of this sort in
Kant, Schiller, and Gadamer. They assert that artistic or aesthetic contemplation
is free in a way that makes it a kind of play. If they are right, and if we also cannot
separate games from play, then the argument for their incompatibility is wrong, and
not only can games be art, but perhaps all games are art, and perhaps all art is a
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game.
I think, however, that this objection can be laid to rest in at least two ways.
First, even if art is play, if we are careful about the definitions then they are not
games. I take this point as self-evident from the above discussion on definitions
of games and artworks. Secondly, if we follow Suit’s account of play, it appears
that accounts that have understand art as play have done so in an inaccurate or
metaphorical way. I will briefly review how this is the case in light of Suits’ account
of play. A brief look at three dominant historical accounts of art as play should
suffice to make this point clear. Bear in mind when considering these that if we
accept something like Suits’ account of play then for an account that links a notion
of play to art to challenge the incompatibility argument it must be that the notion
avoids being merely figurative and it must also not be the case that the notion of
play turns out to be instrumental rather than autotelic.
2.5.2.1 Kant
Kant’s Analytic of the Beautiful famously invokes the “free play of the imag-
ination”. It is this notion’s connection to beauty, and thus to judgments of the
aesthetic, and thus to art, that suggests a challenge to the incompatibility of art
and games. We can see immediately a possible way out, in that, according to our
contemporary understanding of art it is independent of beauty in starker fashion
than in Kant’s day. That said, Kant himself did not see art and beauty as nec-
essarily connected, pointing out the obvious cases of beautiful non-art objects like
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flowers. That he conceived of the independence working in the other direction, that
there could be artworks that are not beautiful, is less clear. That we understand
this now, however, is at least one way in which his challenge can be avoided.
Kant gets closest to autotelicity in his account of aesthetic judgment, which
includes the notion of purposiveness without purpose.77 As Paul Guyer understands
it this “means that a beautiful object satisfies our subjective purpose in cognition
without serving any other, more concrete purpose.” This certainly appears to be
a case of autotelicity, but though related to his notion of play, it is not quite the
same. The notion of free play of the imagination is meant to capture the unrestrained
activity of understanding and imagination, free of the constraints of concepts.
It is of note that Kant connects “free” to “play”, suggesting a figurative use,
that the cognition operates, not in play, but as if it were at play, meaning acting
freely of other concerns. Kant’s notion of play in making aesthetic judgments is play,
at least in the sense of being different from the normal purposes of the imagination
and understanding. This is made clear by Gadamer scholar Joel C. Weinsheimer
(Gadamer will be discussed in §2.5.2.3)
The taste for beauty registers the pleasure involved when the cognitive
faculties themselves play. If knowing is the work of the imagination and
understanding, then aesthetic judgment (in which nothing is known of
the object) is their play. The cognitive faculties dally and linger with
the object without coming to the point of making a determination about
it.78
This appears to meet Suits’ criterion of the reallocation of a resource from
77 [35, p. 105]
78 [108, p. 81]
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its primary instrumental use to an autotelic one. What does restrict Kant’s notion
of play from being a counterexample is that it may not be, in fact, as autotelic as
it appears. The role of the free play is not for its own sake, at least not always,
but to serve in making aesthetic judgment. Aesthetic judgment, made in the way
Kant describes, is meant to be of universal validity; since our cognitive faculties
work similarly to others we can expect similar aesthetic judgments by others. Here
is what Kant says about whtat the “free play of the cognitive faculties” effectively
aims at:
the general aim of the understanding [is] to find unity in all of our ex-
perience, [and] we respond to this fulfillment of the underlying aim of
cognition with pleasure, and a pleasure that is noticeable and enduring
because the satisfaction of our general cognitive aim in these circum-
stances seems contingent and not taken for granted by us.79
One reading of this is thus that Kantian aesthetic judgments are always at
least partially instrumental, which is to say not autotelic, and thus again not play.
The goal of having aesthetic judgments, and thus the goal of playing, is to satisfy the
general cognitive aim of universal validity. Differing from judgment of painfulness
and agreeableness, when I make an aesthetic judgment I expect others to make it
as well. If this is part of the reason for engaging in this sort of behavior, then it
has a purpose beyond itself, and thus fails to be autotelic. Kant’s connecting the
aesthetic to other purposes, namely cognitive ones, is perhaps not surprising, since
Kant famously relates morality to rationality. The important point is that there are
reasons for this kind of play, undermining their status as true play.
79 [109, p. xxvi]
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Thus we see that Kant’s notion of play is arguably instrumental and figurative.
For Kant, play seems more about a lack of restriction, which is a way of allocating
resources, but he sees this more as the culmination of cognition, not an autotelic
form of play. His notion of play is not the one under which our definition of games
arguably falls, and thus is not a challenge to its inconsistency with art.
2.5.2.2 Schiller
Schiller’s On the Aesthetic Education of Man follows Kant in seeing the aes-
thetic as intimately connected to a sense of play.80 Also similar to Kant, Schiller
seems to understand play as a kind of freedom, often referring to it as an unrestricted
movement of thought.
Interestingly, it is not that Schiller conceives of play in its original sense in a
way very different from Suits. He writes of play in animals in Nature as playing when
they expend energy they have above and beyond their material needs. Similarly to
Suits’ notion of play as only being relative to a resource primarily put to instrumental
ends, Schiller writes, “Undeniably there is freedom in these movements, but not
freedom from need in general, simply from a definite external need.”81
When he speaks of aesthetic play, however, he envisions a more instrumental
role than for play in general. This is largely because Schiller believes that moral
and political idealism is the highest state for man, but that man cannot reach this
state without either first passing through, or learning from, the aesthetic state.
80 [110]
81 [110, p. 133]
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It is through this state that man learns more about his own Nature and the way
to perfection. When applying the notion of play to the aesthetic, instead of it
being actually about the temporal reallocation of resources usually reserved for
instrumental ends, it is about the fully absorbing and freely associative exercise of
aesthetic sensibility.
Sometimes he describes play as a leap from the free sequence of images, mean-
ing unrestricted contemplation of material, meaning non-ideal, shape, to that of
free form, meaning unrestricted contemplation of ideal shape, calling this aesthetic
play.82 Again this kind of play is only figuratively like the freedom of play in its
ordinary sense, instead of being completely autotelic it is restricted within the do-
main of the consideration of pursuit of Beauty, but unrestricted by any further
considerations.
Further distancing his notion of play from a literal one, Schiller sees his notion
of aesthetic play not as an independent notion, but as the equilibrium between life
and shape, an attempt to balance the material and the ideal. Here he seems to
understand play only as a cognitive freedom analogous to the way play is a freedom
from mundane activities.
In the end, Schiller’s notion of play, like Kant’s notion, which it echoes, is
both figurative and instrumental, two ways in which it is not the kind of play we are
concerned with, and thus not a counterexample to the incompatibility argument.
82 [110, p. 134]
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2.5.2.3 Gadamer
Gadamer doesn’t follow Kant the way that Schiller does, partly refuting him
in places in the act of interpreting him. And while Gadamer’s use of ‘play’ is as
irrelevant to our concerns as Kant’s and Schiller’s, his introduction of the idea of
games in relation to art is not. In fact, by focusing on the relation between games
and art rather than play and art, Gadamer provides a much greater challenge to
the incompatibility argument than Kant or Schiller do.
Gadamer uses play and games as a way to understand artworks, in a way
that may be close enough that an identity can be posited. To begin, he thinks
that play is the way of being of the work of art. Here an identity is already being
suggested, if not outright claimed. To complete this claim he must say what play
is. He rejects the Kantian/Schiller notion of play as “free play” as a mere lack of
restriction. Analogous between play and art, and similar to the Kant/Schiller view,
is the total absorption of play.
As he continues, however, he further distinguishes his view from the Kant/Schiller
notion of play. He understands play not as “free play” as happens in games, with
restrictions taken on because they make that activity possible. In the same way that
games are limited, yet allow for play within those limits, and in fact are what they
are because of those limits, so, for Gadamer, are artworks limiting in the proper ways
of understanding them, while allowing space for active and multiple understanding
to take place.
Ultimately though, Gadamer steers away from the compatibility of games and
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art, using games only as a way of understanding some aspects of art. He also uses
play, and the playing of games, centrally as a way of understanding plays. And that
is how he understands artworks, not as games that are played,83 but as plays, or
stageable dramas. Artworks are like play and games in the ways listed above, but
they differ in that they are repeatable in ways that play and games are not, but
plays are. One cannot, for example, repeat the 2012 Olympic Games. If one were to
attempt to do so, they would cease being games, with all their unpredictability and
particular rule-following and attendant attitudes, and would become some other
kind of thing, like scripted events, in which things that once happened are now
repeatable and in which parts can be played by other people. It is this distinction
that Gadamer sees as the greatest difference, that games and play are one-off events,
while artworks, like plays, are repeatable ones. As Weinsheimer comments, “No one
doubts that when a football game, Olympic Game, or card game is turned into a
play, a work of art, the game is transformed utterly. In becoming repeatable and
permanent, it is simply not a game anymore.”84
So it is that in the end Gadamer uses the notions of play and game not to make
an identity claim, but as a fruitful metaphor through which to understand the nature
of several aspects of artworks. I have not examined whether Gadamer’s comparison
of plays and artworks is one of metaphor or identity, as it is not germane to the
present discussion. In either case, the apparent challenge to the incompatibility of
games and artworks has dissolved.
83Crucially he doesn’t believe that games are ever played, but “all playing is a being-played.”(
[111, p. 95])
84 [108, p. 108]
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As we can see, each of these claims about art being play or games is plau-
sibly understood as having a merely figurative sense of play or turning out to be
instrumental and thus not autotelic. Games and play are used as metaphors for un-
derstanding art and its features, but which are distinct from each other. However,
even if this were not the case and the notions of play in these different accounts of
art were genuine and robust, the connection between play and games would pose no
threat to the incompatibility between games and artworks.
2.6 Conclusion
Part 2 opened with an attempt to understand videogames. The examination
began at an obvious starting place, the assumption that videogames are games.
This then demanded an account of what games are. This led to an examination of
several definitions and accounts of games, ultimately leading to the definition given
by Suits. And on Suits’ definition it is the case that at least some videogames are
games. This gave us a partial analysis of videogames. We now know what games
are and that some videogames are games.
Given a set of videogames for which we could provide a proper analysis,
videogames that are games, we could then ask whether they could be artworks.
As it turns out, there is an incompatibility between artworks and games, arising
from the constitutive intentional features of each, preventing one from coherently
intending an object to be both a videogame and a game. This conclusion showed
some possibility of being incorrect in light of challenging views from Kant, Schiller,
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and Gadamer, but as we saw their theories use the notion of play and games in either
a figurative sense through which to understand the nature of beauty and artworks,
or as a different notion altogether, and end up not being applicable to the notion of
game in use in the incompatibility argument.
If it turns out that is a proper subset—that while some videogames are games
there turn out to be videogames that are not games, or at least that there could
be videogames that are not games—then the incompatibility argument does not
provide a universal negative answer the art question for videogames. We would
then have to show that some videogames are not games, something already hinted
at above, and show how they are still videogames. This will require us to once again
try to understand videogames, and indeed define them, but in a way that does not
have their status as games as a necessary feature. Whatever these other ways of
being a videogame turn out to be, we can consider whether these other types of
videogames can be artworks. This will be the aim of Part 3.
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Chapter 3: Videogames
In Part 2 we saw that with working definitions of art and games all that can
be shown is that some videogames are games, and that those that are cannot be
artworks. This yields a universally negative answer to the prospect of videogames
being artworks if videogames must of necessity be games. So whereas Part One
ends on a positive note with a defensible definition of art, Part Two ends on a
more pessimistic note, that despite that progress made on defining art and games
in the past half century, it appears at first glance that they are incompatible. Such
a conclusion suggests a negative answer to the art question of videogames, and a
universal one at that.
There are, however, reasons to reject the assumption that all videogames are
games. This part of the project aims to convince the reader of this, leaving open
the possibility that some videogames are not games, yet are still videogames, and
thus, potential candidates for art status. This part goes even further, and defends
particular cases of videogames as art works, a status that they are at least eligible
for in virtue of their not being games.
If it can be shown that some videogames that are not games are also art-
works, or at least might be artworks, then we can give a qualified answer to whether
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videogames can be artworks. It depends, perhaps not surprisingly, on features of
the particular videogame in question.
3.1 Videogames Are Not (Always) Games
There are reasons, both philosophical and critical, to reject the notion that
all videogames are games. This is a happy finding for a descriptivist project, as
the current project takes itself to be. In fact, we find that a good amount of
contemporary reporting and criticism of videogames is concerned with videogames
that appear not be games, yet seem to be within the category of ‘videogame’: What
are they and how should we talk about them? The industry has even taken to
calling them non-games, which in combination with the nearly ubiquitous practice
of colloquially shortening ‘videogames’ to ‘games’, leads to odd claims about “non-
game games”. The early remarks I will make about preferring ‘videogame’ to ‘video
game’ go some way to resolving this linguistic conundrum. The case being made
that not all videogames are games will settle it entirely.
What is needed is a definition that correctly limns the boundaries of the cate-
gory of things that are videogames. To do this it must accurately capture what we
take to be uncontroversial cases of videogames, without including things that are
clearly not videogames, and give a compelling analysis of borderlines cases, those
things whose inclusion as videogames is unclear. A successful account must carefully
observe the actual practice of engaging with and appreciating videogames in order
to make sense of both the intuitive scope of what videogames are as well as what
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account of them survives critical analysis. Perhaps surprisingly, given the comments
above about videogames not being necessarily games, the account I propose defines
a videogame as either a game played on a computer, or an object intended to be
a videogame, which historically means being concerned with the scheme of being a
game played on a computer while sometimes going beyond it. This proposal works
in a similar way to the intentional-historical definition that says artworks are such
by being related to prior artworks by being intended to relate to prior artworks ei-
ther intrinsically or relationally. I will show that this definition correctly categorizes
straightforward cases of videogames as well as making sense of the kinds of things
that have evolved in that tradition, including non-ludic videogames—that is, those
which are not games—some of which are videogames that are also artworks.
3.2 Ludology vs. Narratology
A brief word is needed about the debate on whether videogames are properly
categorized, and thus appreciated, as games or as narratives. Games studies scholars
have split on this debate, and there are several methodological considerations at play.
My hope is to dispense with this dichotomy entirely. This clearly hinges on how we
define videogames, and thus further motivates the need for an account of them.
Ludology is the study of games, sometimes characterized more specifically as
the study of game mechanics, which are roughly the structure of the rules of games
and how players are intended to interact with them. Narratology, on the other hand,
is the practice of interpreting games as narratives or texts, using interpretive tools
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from literary and film criticism. Both approaches have met with the criticism that
each ignores something important that the other captures.
Gonzalo Frasca has helpfully clarified, and possible deflated, this debate, ar-
guing that while radical positions on either side are obviously at odds with each
other, there is no need to ignore the tools from either approach. I agree with this
consideration, but I would hasten to add that the debate itself is murky. Frasca is
careful to say that he defines ludology as the “study of games, particularly computer
games,” but not as “the study of game structure (or gameplay) as opposed to the
study of games as narratives or games as a visual medium.”1 This stance has al-
ready assumed that videogames are games of the sort that are properly investigated
as part of a study of games in general, whether emphasis is placed on mechanics or
narrative. Surely a clearer definition would be helpful here.2
3.3 ‘Videogame’
I employ the locution ‘videogame’ over ‘video game’. This is because the
latter option would seem to make it analytic that videogames are both games and
video, two notions that we should be suspicious of. In the first case, there are
reasons to reject the idea that all videogames are games, as videogames can be toys,
storytelling devices, educational tools, art, or other things that are not obviously or
easily categorized as games.3
1 [112, p. 93]
2I also adopt the commonly used Latinate ludic, from the term for sport and play, to cate-
gorize ludic videogames as those that meet the formal conditions of being a game and non-ludic
videogames for those that are not strictly games.
3This is also why I avoid the colloquial shorthand ‘game’ to describe videogame and ‘gamer’
to describe an appreciator of videogames. Use of the ubiquitous ‘game’ and ‘player’ may be
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The term ‘video’ is also a misnomer, for two reasons. First, not all videogames
use what is technically video technology, some employing vector or other kinds of
visual technology.4 More importantly, however, it is not the case that all videogames
have visual components, e.g. videogames for the visually impaired. One might insist
on a terminological distinction here, reserving the term ‘videogame’ for those with
a visual component and using ‘computer game’ as a broader catch-all. Interesting
debates can be had on the different names we have for videogames and closely related
media, but if we are interested in the dominant cultural phenomenon videogames
have become, we should try to capture the broadest practice. In this spirit I mean
to include under the title ‘videogame’ everything usually included under ‘computer
games’, ‘electronic games’, and related terms, noting that some of these terms have
been used with more vagueness and ambiguity than others.5
unavoidable, especially when speaking with the vulgar, and I have no desire to be a terminological
referee, so long as what is really meant by these terms is kept clear. What this means is that
there is not a univocal meaning behind terms like ‘game’ and ‘play’, but rather various meanings,
necessitating clarifications like game1 and game2, and play1 and play2. Even if the term ‘video
game’ does not necessitate anything analytically untoward, calling videogames “games” has proven
a temptation to some to assume without question that they are games, and to pursue a misguided
defense of videogames as universally games, despite the theoretical contortions efforts like these
have faced. The terminological choices are valuable if only to offer some small resistance to the
practice of referring to videogames with the abbreviated ‘games’, which can lead to odd locutions
about whether games are really games.
4Video is an analog raster scan technology, distinct from vector displays and contemporary
digital displays. For more on this from one of the early videogame developers and the inventor of
the Magnavox Odyssey, one of the first home consoles, see [113].
5As will hopefully become clear from my definition, I actually find the categories ‘videogame’
and ‘computer game’ to be identical, differing from those who use the term ‘computer game’ to
mean ‘PC game’. The category ‘electronic game’ presents harder borderline cases. It is not obvious
how to differentiate the electronic version of Battleship from, say, hand-held Tiger Electronic games.
Intuitions vary, though I would argue that consideration of computerized interactivity can help
decide even some of these difficult cases.
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3.4 Videogames
A concern with extensional adequacy requires at least a sketch of the extension
to be captured. Consider these cases of videogames, both popular and obscure.
3.4.1 OXO
One of the first videogames was 1952’s OXO (or Naughts and Crosses), de-
veloped for the EDSAC mainframe by Alexander Douglas at Cambridge. It uses
a dot-matrix cathode-display to visually render a game of tic-tac-toe. OXO took
a previously existing game and utilized the computing power available to make a
playable version against the primitive artificial intelligence.6 Players made their
moves by rotary-dialing in the number corresponding to the square they wanted
and then the computer would respond.
OXO has all the hallmarks of a videogame: it is straightforwardly a game,
being simply a computerized version of an originally non-computerized game, it
uses a digital visual display,7 and it is run on a computer.
6Primitive only in the sense of its inability to perfectly mimic human error, a way in which, to
some degree I suppose all artificial intelligences remain primitive to some degree. Douglas’ OXO
was programmed to play the game perfectly, thus always resulting in either a draw or a loss for the
player, depending on their skill. This makes it not a very good game, but that is partly the result
of tic-tac-toe itself being not a very good game, in the sense that it is reasonably easily solved.
7Technically the display used is not a video display, being dot matrix display and not raster.
This is more evidence that we should not be so strictly beholden to the ‘video’ nature of videogames.
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3.4.2 Super Mario Bros.
Released in 1985, a creation of the now legendary Shigeru Miyamoto for the
Nintendo Entertainment System, Super Mario Bros. gave us Mario, who has become
the de facto mascot of the videogame world. It is a 2-D platformer, requiring players
to navigate the avatar of Mario to the right, jumping onto and over obstacles,
destroying blocks and enemies, aquiring powerups and extra lives, while making
their way to the castle destinations at the end of each level, all as subquests on
the way to finding and defeating Bowser, the boss. The controls are simple but
responsive, using the NES controllers directional pad to move, A-button to jump,
and B-button to run and shoot fireballs when suitably powered up.
Super Mario Bros. is perhaps the paradigm case of a videogame, capturing
for many a nostalgia associated with the fun of playing videogames and the power-
ful branding of Nintendo. It was the centerpiece of Nintendo’s conscious effort to
resuscitate the videogame industry after the Atari-fueled crash of 1983. It went on
to become a colossal success and the Mario franchise continues today.
3.4.3 That Dragon, Cancer
That Dragon, Cancer is a videogame released in early 2016. It is an interactive
narrative that follows a family’s ordeal with their young son’s terminal brain cancer.
It is told through a series of connected vignettes that are point-and-click style. The
user navigates the space by selecting nodes and is given a small set of options of
things to observe or interact with, mostly consisting of ways of listening to audio
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recordings, voice mails, and voice overs.
While it is an interactive narrative, it is not so in the sense that one can impact
the narrative events, but rather one can, to some degree, control the way and the
pace in which one passes through the narrative. Some elements can be lingered
over, or returned to, or skipped, but there is no sense in which one controls the
outcome. There are a handful of “mini-game” like portions, but they are not meant
to be won, but “played” through with an understanding of videogame vernacular.
In this way, That Dragon, Cancer uses the videogame medium to tell a story in an
interactive way that leverages common videogame tropes by presenting the work as
a videogame and, in some ways, subverts them.
3.4.4 Mountain
David OReilly’s work Mountain is a videogame with a highly restricted el-
ement of interaction. It largely consists of looking at a stylized representation of
a mountain while little happens. Very occasionally, quotidian objects of enormous
scale, including barrels, biplanes, and bowling pins, will appear in the atmosphere
and collide with the mountain, over time creating a motley agglomeration.
OReilly describes Mountain as a “Mountain Simulator, Relax em’ up, Art
Horror etc,”8 terms clearly satirical of videogame categorizations.9 His work serves
as a commentary on the nature of videogames, seeming to promise the experience of
a videogame, but then minimizing many of its key characteristics. First there is the
8 [114]
9To be particularly on the nose, these would be the common categories of simulations, shoot
’em ups, and horror games.
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conceit of “playing” as a mountain. Not an anthropomorphized mountain that can
run and jump, but a stand-alone mountain floating in space, immobile and solitary.
While Mountain does have some interactive elements, the interactions that it does
have flout the kind and degree of interactive response we expect in a videogame. In
its brief opening stage you are asked to illustrate various concepts, like “happiness”
and “security”. There is no evident connection between what you draw and any
later effect. After the initial stage you are introduced to the main portion of the
work, where you view the mountain. You can use the mouse to rotate the view
and zoom in and out. Pressing the ‘Z’ - ‘,’ and ‘A’ - ‘L’ keys plays various musical
notes, an effect also disconnected from the mountain you are viewing. The lack of





Mountain is an example of how videogames can stretch their traditional bound-
aries and expectations, and how they are categorized as videogames in part by their
creator’s intent. Whatever our account of videogames, it should make sense of works
like these and capture the kind of phenomena that an account of videogames should
make sense of, giving a clear explanation of why different candidates are and are
not members. This does not mean that there may not be borderline cases, but even
in those cases, an account of videogames should make sense of why there is not a
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clear-cut answer. The extension of videogames ranges back farther in time than
many realize, to the middle of the twentieth century, and includes works created for
many difference platforms, including desktop PCs, home consoles, arcade consoles,
mobile phones, and hand-held consoles. Any acceptable definition of videogames
must at least cover this uncontroversial extension.
3.5 Intentional-Historical Formalism
What is needed is a definition that can make sense of the extension of videogames,
the landscape of which is roughly represented by the examples above. This would
be a straightforward task if there were some intrinsic property that essentially char-
acterized them, something possessed by every videogame and by nothing else. Such
an explicitly intrinsic feature is not forthcoming. Things appear more promising if
we extend the criteria to include relational features. While there is not a necessary
intrinsic feature that all videogames share, there are sufficient intrinsic features that
some videogames have, and if we provide the right account of relational proper-
ties additionally required we can construct a definition that captures all and only
videogames.
Before offering a strict definition, I offer the following looser characterization
of videogames:
To be a videogame is to be an object intended by its creator or discoverer
for membership in the videogame tradition or, in other words, in the
category ‘videogames’.10
10I take it as uncontroversial that creators of works have such categorial, though importantly
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To flesh out this definition it needs to be said what it means to be intended
for membership in a given tradition. The full account adapts Levinson’s intentional-
historical definition of art.11 Levinson’s account, as we saw in Part 1, is as follows:
My idea is roughly this: a work of art is a thing intended for regard-as-
a-work-of-art, regard in any of the ways works of art existing prior to it
have been correctly regarded. 12
Levinson’s proposal is that what is art now is determined in part by what
has been art in the past, and that new art has the status it does by either shar-
ing in the specific kinds of regard that are appropriate for earlier artworks or by
being consciously intended to relate in the right way to the prior body of works
that make up the history of art. Thus something can be art by being intended
for regard in the specific way that some artworks have been properly regarded in
the past, such as “with close attention to form”, “with emotional openness”, or
“with awareness of symbolism”.13 Something can also be a work of art through a
relational intention, “intending for regard in whatever ways any past artworks have
been correctly regarded, having no particular ones in mind.”14 This second method
allows for something to be an artwork simply by intending it to be regarded as other
artworks have been regarded, even if one cannot say, or even does not know, what
those specific ways of regarding are, as well as, importantly, making sense of how
not semantic, determination over their work. Support for the view that a creator’s categorial
intentions are of aesthetic and artistic importance can be found in [115], [99], [116, p. 190], [64], [61],
and [117, p. 396-397]. This rough account is inspired by Anna Ribeiro’s account of poetry: “To be
a poem is to be a verbal object intended by its writer or discoverer for membership in the poetic
tradition or, in other words, in the category ‘poetry’.”( [118, p. 190])
11Ribeiro defends this view in [118] and Levinson in his [64], [61], [62], and [60]
12 [64, p. 6]
13 [61, p. 39]
14 [64, p. 11]
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revolutionary art expands the ways in which we can regard artworks. One need only
intend that a new work be included in the practice of artwork-regarding for their
intention to be sufficient to make it an artwork. In other words, there are three
ways for something to be an artwork: being intended in whatever way that specific
artworks have been properly regarded, or artworks as a whole, or by being intended
in the way that artworks have been properly regarded.
The definition I offer of videogames adds a formalist condition to the intentional-
historical definition that describes the characteristic nature of videogames. This
follows Ribeiro’s definition of poetry, which augments the strictly intentional and
historical nature of Levinson’s definition with a specific proposal about what the
essential intrinsic property of poetry is. Poems, she proposes, all share a similar
aim, which is a concern with repetition. To make a poem, then, is not necessarily to
instantiate repetition, but rather, for a creator “to intend that it be made with a con-
cern for those [repetition].”15 This takes Levinson’s template and adds something
derived from looking hard at a particular practice. The poetry-making intrinsic
property that she proposes, more specifically, is “the use of repetition devices”.16
For something to be a poem, however, it need not slavishly obey the tradition of rep-
etition devices, though it depends on this property in both self-conscious and näıve
cases. Rather, Ribeiro notes, there are three ways that a creator (or discoverer) can
engage with the tradition of repetition devices:
Concern with repetition can be shown by following the tradition (say,
composing in traditional forms), transforming the tradition (using repe-
15 [118]
16 [118, p. 190]
209
tition but altering forms or creating new ones, and so forth), or rejecting
that tradition (avoiding traditional forms, avoiding certain types of repe-
tition techniques—say, metrical patterns of any sort—or, most radically,
avoiding repetition altogether). Alternatively, in cases of verbal art cre-
ated outside and without awareness of any poetic tradition (“näıve”
poetry), a poem will be a verbal object made with the use of repetition
schemes; in such cases only intrinsic intentions involving recurrence are
needed for a poem to obtain.17
This allows an object to be a member of the category ‘poetry’ even when
its hallmark intrinsic feature, repetition, is absent. This leads to her proposed
definition:
A poem is either (1) a verbal object relationally or intrinsically in-
tended to belong in the poetic tradition, by following, transforming,
or rejecting the repetition techniques that have characterized that tra-
dition (nonnäıve poetry-making), or (2) a verbal art object intrinsically
intended to involve use of repetition schemes (näıve poetry-making).18
This fits the intentional-historical template and provides a criterion that all
works of that sort must meet, a concern for a certain scheme, which works demon-
strate by either following, transforming, or rejecting.19
17 [118, p. 193]
18 [118, p. 193]
19There is an important distinction between rejection and mere absence. Rejection is self-
conscious and demonstrates a concern for what is rejected whereas the mere absence of something
does not indicate such a concern.
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3.6 Defining Videogames
We can thus borrow from Ribeiro, following Levinson, in proposing an intentional-
historical formalist definition of videogames.20 Such a definition provides for the
näıve form of videogame making, if an appropriate intrinsic property can be given.
It also allows for self-conscious videogame creation that follows, transforms, or self-
consciously rejects the traditional schema central to the practice of videogames. I
propose that the notion to which appropriate concern is central is that of being a
game played on a computer. Thus we get the following definition:
Videogame df: A videogame is either (1) an artifact relationally or
intrinsically intended to belong in the videogame tradition, by following,
transforming, or rejecting the criteria of being a game that is played on
a computer that have characterized that tradition (nonnäıve videogame-
making), or (2) an object that is intrinsically a game intended to be
played on a computer (näıve videogame-making).
This definition takes into account the history of videogames, the intentions of
the creator(s), and the characteristic feature of videogames, namely being a game
that is played on a computer. This definition also captures the different ways that
concern can be shown for the relevant scheme, from näıvely intrinsic to self-conscious
rejection. To fully flesh out this definition there needs to be an analysis of the terms
playing, computer, and what it means to be played on a computer.21
20 [119] also follows Ribeiro’s template in providing an intentional-historical formalist definition
of screenplays.
21We can also bracket a concern with the ontology of videogames as relevant to defining them
as these are distinct issues. See [120] in response to [121].
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3.6.1 Playing
This definition takes playing to be part of the intrinsic nature of videogames.
This claim must be made carefully, as many different meanings attach to the word
‘play’. The notion I am after is game-playing, what might be a subset of the general
notion of play. I follow Bernard Suits’ definition of game-playing, which he gives as:
“playing a game is the voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles.”22 He
also gives a longer, more explicit definition:
To play a game is to attempt to achieve a specific state of affairs [prelu-
sory goals], using only means permitted by rules [lusory means], where
the rules prohibit use of more efficient in favour of less efficient means
[constitutive rules], and where the rules are accepted just because thy
make possible such activity [lusory attitude].23
There are four elements to Suit’s definition, though the lusory attitude partic-
ularly demands an extended look. The first three parts capture an intuitive notion
of what a game is. The prelusory goal is simply the end state aimed at, usually what
it means to win a game, e.g. crossing a finish line first, amassing the most points,
etc. The lusory means are the actions that are permitted in the game, which follow
from the constitutive rules, which include proscriptions against more efficient ways
of achieving the winning end state, e.g. you can’t start right at the finish line, you
can’t steal money from the bank in Monopoly, etc.
The lusory attitude is that attitude a player takes toward the goals and rules of
a game that make it playing rather than some other means-ends activity, like work
22 [43, p. 43]
23 [43, p. 43], square brackets his.
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or technical production. The (game-)playing attitude is when we follow the rules not
because they are in our best interest, e.g. most efficient, not illegal nor immoral, etc.,
but rather because they make the activity of playing that game possible, because
we want to engage in the activity of striving for that goal with these restrictions.
In other words it is the attitude of playing a game for the sake of the activity the
game makes possible.24
Given this account of play, and a definition of games like Suits’, we have the
beginnings of a sufficient, though not necessary, condition for something to be a
videogame, namely the criterion that it is a game that is meant to be played with,
playing here meaning the autotelic lusory attitude Suits describes.
3.6.2 Computers
The definition characterizes videogames as not merely meant to be played,
but played specifically on computers. By a computer I mean an artifact designed
to perform the function of computation, the automatic manipulation of strings of
digits that follows an algorithm or program, which is a list of formal instructions.
This rough account is broad enough to include what we normally recognize as the
machines we call computers that were developed largely in the 20th century and are
nearly ubiquitous today. This includes computers of different types, both special-
purpose and universal, meaning those that can only perform one or a set of algo-
rithms, and those that can, at least in principle, perform any algorithm.
24This is distinct from certain accounts of intrinsically valuable (“for its own sake”) aesthetic
appreciation, for example [122]. On Suits’ account it is not the appreciation of the game for its
own sake that makes playing what it is, but the voluntary engagement with the rules for their own
sake, simply “because they make the activity possible”.
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What this definition excludes are potential non-machine computers, namely
human brains. I do not argue here that humans or human brains are not computers
or cannot function as computers. Clearly humans compute.25 However, humans are
not the sort of computers that we normally think of when we think about running
programs, especially not videogames.
This account of computers differs from other accounts that have been offered
in debates concerned with the art status of computer works. Dominic Lopes de-
fines computers as follows: “a computer is any item that’s designed to run a com-
putational process,” and “a computational process is any pattern of actions that
instantiates formal rules and controls a transition from input conditions to output
conditions.”26 Lopes’ definition is broader than mine, and thus includes more within
its extension, notably brains. Lopes offers his definition in service of his account
of computer art, and aims to make sense of a broad swath of possible computer
artworks. This includes having brains falling within the extension of computers.
I resist a similarly broad inclusion, for several reasons. First, it is not un-
controversial that brains are computers. While people can perform computations,
under a more rigorously precise definition of computer it is less clear that humans
are doing what computers do.27
25Not least of which is because early ‘computers’ were mathematicians whose job was to calculate
the trajectory of missiles.
26 [94, p. 44]
27See ( [123]) for an extended discussion on the difference between computers, calculators, and
computing aids. According to Piccinini, there are at least six empirical questions that any compu-
tationalist theory must address, only two of which can currently be answered. In light of this he
argues that if the claim that brains are computers, or computationalism, “is to remain a substan-
tive, empirical hypothesis about the brain, these questions need to find convincing answers. If they
don’t, it may be time to abandon computationalism in favor of other mechanistic explanations of
cognitive processes.” [123, p. 59-60]. See also, among others, [124], [125], [126], [127], [128], [129].
For discussion on the limits of computers approximating human cognition and behavior, there are
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One might also argue that people are not designed to compute. While humans
can compute (some) things, they are acting as a computer, which is distinct from
being a computer. Similarly, a sufficiently heavy dictionary can act as a paperweight,
without being a paperweight. The difference here lies somewhere in the creative
intent behind the object. And we might reject that there is a creative intent behind
humans, or that if there is one, it is not that they compute.28 It may be that there
is satisfactory way of including biological functions as a class of design, but it is not
obvious that this is adequately similar to the kind of design that creates computing
machines.
Some of this objection is met by Lopes’ broad notion of computation. Clearly
humans count as computers if a computer is anything designed to follow a pattern
of rules between inputs and outputs and it is the case that humans are designed
and designed with the function of computing. Perhaps Lopes’ account can satisfy
the concerns above. A further concern, however, is that this additional set of non-
machine computing things might be unacceptably broad. If it really is the case that
anything that computes is a computer, and any work that depends on a computer is
a computer work, then it seems like it will turn out that many more things will turn
out to be computers than we originally thought and likewise for computer works.
Some of this is by design, as Lopes wants to include non-electronic and non-
digital computers as computers, human brains being one kind of these. He does
this to include in his account of computer art certain works that follows rules that
many works, including the seminal [130].
28Much of this hinges on whether brains turn out to be computers and whether there is a
plausibly mechanistic theistic interpretation available.
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mediate between inputs and outputs, but are not run on normal electronic comput-
ers. His example of this is a thought experiment that modifies an existing computer
artwork. The original work is Wooden Mirror, a work that, using a computer, tilts
several hundred tiles to match the image of what is in front of it. Lopes imagines
another work, titled Wooden Mirror Unplugged that performs the same task, but
does so by a human following instructions to turn knobs that control apertures and
the tiles, thus resulting in the same image, albeit at a much slower pace. Lopes
wants to include Wooden Mirror Unplugged as a work of computer art, and does so
by making his definition sufficiently broad. I suspect, however, that his definition
actually includes far more than what Lopes intended.
It would, of course, be a trivial account if the laws of physics are an algorithm
and physical states serve as inputs and outputs. Thus canvas and paint become
computers and paintings computer works. This move might be resisted by insisting
that rules be prescriptive entities and not descriptive ones, requiring intentional
design, but it is difficult to see how to make this move without making a similar one
against an account of brains as computers.
A less radical way in which the account is too broad is that it would include
only those kinds of rule-following patterns that we normally recognize.29 But if
this is all that is required for a computer work, then many other things that our
intuitions would likely reject as computer works would also count. Things like
Sol LeWitt wall drawings, Yoko Ono instruction pieces, board games, and IKEA
29Lopes wants to extend the notion of algorithm to include all, or nearly all, instruction following,
but computer science is not settled on this matter. See ( [131]) for an interesting discussion on the
difficulties of giving a technical definition of algorithm.
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furniture assembling. All of these are works of some form or another, or at least
artifacts, and all require the computation of rules that mediate between inputs and
outputs. This seems like it meets his conditions for being a computer work that is
run by a human, but none of these seem like they should count as computer works.
Or, if they do, it is unclear that computer works pick out anything interesting about
the world beyond things that have rules and things that do not.
Again, some of this is avoided by his circumscribing the target of his inves-
tigation to those works that are interactive.30 His account of computer art, by
requiring interactivity, excludes works that run on a computer but are static. This
is on purpose, as he does not merely want everything that runs on a computer, even
essentially, to count as a work of computer art. He has in mind here things like
digital photographs. They cannot exist without computers, but they are outside of
the appreciative kind that he is trying to give an account of. But many things run
on computers, in fact depend on computers to run, but do so in a non-interactive
way. This leads me to suspect that what Lopes has actually described in his analysis
is not computer art, but rather something else, like interactive algorithmic art.
Finally, even if Lopes’ account is immune to all of these objections, it simply
does not seem to be the case, at least with videogames, if not computer art, that
videogames are, or can be, run on people or their brains. The actual contingent
historical practice of videogames has its genesis in games run on computing ma-
chines. To give a definition of videogames that aims to capture videogames as an
appreciative kind should follow this practice, however contingent it may be. To use
30I will address his account of interactivity in greater detail in §3.6.3.
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a different definition of computers that would include human brains does not seem
like it captures the descriptivist extension of our appreciative practice of exploiting
certain technologies as we do with videogames.31
The definition of computers I employ does not exclude non-electronic or non-
digital (and non-Turing) computers, though it happens to be the case that videogames
are primarily run on electronic digital computers. Without such a restriction it re-
mains possible for videogames to be run on non-electronic and/or non-digital (and
non-Turing) computers and also for the possibility of the inclusion of some particu-
larly clever electro-mechanical games from the early twentieth century. This extends
the class of computers on which videogames can be run beyond PCs (and to a lesser
extent, Macs) and consoles, and even handheld devices, but not beyond automatic
computing devices.
With computers functionally defined, it is clearer what it means for something
be played on a computer. Thus we can understand the paradigm case of a videogame,
which is a set of rules, means, and goals, with which we are intended to be engaged,
with a certain playful attitude, and which is done on a computer, a device intended
for running the computational process of instantiating the rules and which mediates
the inputs and outputs in a fixed manner.
31At the very least my aim is to bracket discussion of the possibility of videogames being run
on human brains for reasons that are something more convincing than being merely ad hoc). In
the end it may turn out that brains are computers and any definition that relies on a definition of
computers, as my definition of videogames does, must accommodate them. But if they must be
included, they will at least be a radically aberrant form of videogame that need not be taken as a
central case of my analysis.
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3.6.3 Interactivity
The proposed definition of videogames must also make clear what it means to
play on a computer. Playing on a computer is a specific kind of engagement, one
that is interactive and interactive in a particular way. It is not enough to say that a
videogame is played on a computer, or that it is interactive, we must also say that it
is interactive because it is run on a computer. This requires an account of what inter-
activity is, a particularly vexed project. Interactivity is often defined so broadly as
to encompass all forms of engagement, perception, or even mere consideration. Such
a broad account will not do to distinguish the seemingly obvious interactive nature
of things like videogames from the equally obviously non-interactivity of paintings,
novels, sculptures, etc. Lopes provdes an account of computer interactivity that is
applicable for these cases.
Lopes’ account of interaction defines a work’s being interactive as related to,
though different from, interactivity in other spheres, like conversations. Interactiv-
ity, in Lopes’ sense, has two main components, the first being the notion of the
display of a work, and the second being a prescription to partake in the generation
of said display.
A display is “a pattern or structure that results from the artist’s creativity
and that we attend to as we appreciate it.”32 In some cases, as with paintings
and sculpture, the display is the physical component that is sometimes thought
of as the work, while in the case of multiple artworks like symphonies, it is the
32 [94, p. 37]
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sonic properties generated by a performance of the work, and the idea can be still
further abstracted in works like novels where it is the linguistic structure that we
attend to. It should be noted that while the display of a work is a focus of its
aesthetic and artistic appreciation, it does not exhaust all that we appreciate of a
work, even aesthetically.33 It is important not to confuse the display with the work
itself.34 This distinction is clear in the case of multiple artworks. The display of a
symphony is the sonic qualities as they are presented to the audience, as these are
things that are properly subjects of aesthetic and artistic appreciation arising from
the artist’s creativity, roughly prescriptions to play certain instruments in certain
ways following the score composed by the artist. However, the sonic qualities of any
single performance do not make up the work, nor is the work the complete class of
all the performances of it.35
What makes a work interactive is not simply that the display can be altered
or that we can exert control over it. Sculptures can be modified by people other
than the artist with chisels, hammers, or just a good shove. Not all modifications
of works even have to be intentional. Recently a 350-year old painting by Paolo
Porpora was accidentally punctured by a museum-goer. None of these cases, how-
ever, are sufficient to make the modified work an interactive one. This is because
of something that many accounts of interactivity miss; it is not simply that a work
can be modified that makes it interactive, nor is it some particular way of modifying
33Such a claim would amount to aesthetic empiricism. For a recent critique of this position,
see [132, Ch. 2]
34It is also important to note a distinction between displays and display-types, a distinction not
addressed in Lopes’ account but made clear in [133].
35See [132, p. 221] for a notion of the ‘focus of appreciation’.
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works that exploits computers but excludes other media, but it is that it is supposed
to be altered, that the work prescribes that the display be in at least some degree
determined by the audience. An interactive work is one whose display is meant
to be generated in part by input from the audience. This is in contrast to what
are non-pejoratively called passive works, which are those whose displays are not
prescribed to be generated in any part by its audience members. This prescriptive
element resolves concerns about the malleability of works, as many works are mal-
leable in some way, and replaces it with a distinction between those works for which
such changes are prescribed and those for which they are not.
This distinguishes videogames, and other forms of interactive works, from non-
interactive, or passive, works. It’s not that a painting is non-interactive in virtue
of its physical manifestation; after all, you could slice it corner to corner, or paint
over it, or burn it to ash. In the case of the painting, however, you are not supposed
to alter the display, while with videogames you are supposed to alter the display in
prescribed ways.36
The preceding criteria of näıve videogames demonstrate how such works are
made without any explicit intention of including them in the tradition of videogames.
The works that are most likely to fall into this category are the ludic videogames
that are translations of games from other media. Videogame versions of Monopoly
and Chess can be made so that the game can be played on computers, but without
any recognition of the tradition of videogames or any self-conscious intention that
36The prescriptive requirement also shows how one could make an interactive painting: the artist
need only prescribe that the audience member modify the painting in some way. This does not
call for a radical reconceptualizing of painting, it simply divides the class of paintings into the
interactive and the passive.
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they be included in such a tradition.
Equipped with accounts of game playing, computers, and interactivity, we can
now see the notion that something must be concerned with to be a videogame:
being a game that is meant to be played on a computer. Meeting this condition
intrinsically is sufficient for a work to be a videogame, but there are relational ways
of being a videogame too.
3.7 Following, Transforming, and Rejecting
The preceding account of the historically contingent intrinsic (näıve) nature
of videogames sets the groundwork for the relational ways of intending something
to be a videogame. The intentional relationship with the intrinsic property, playing
a game on a computer, can be realized by the creator demonstrating concern for it
by either following that tradition, transforming it, or rejecting it. This provides for
the inclusion of many videogames that are not näıvely intended to be played with
on a computer, indeed might not even intrinsically be a game intended to be played
on a computer, but are intended to be considered as part of that tradition in an
appropriate manner.
3.7.1 Following
Many videogames are games. They are rarely, however, accidentally games
made without any recognition of the history of videogames and with the intention
to be a part of that tradition. This is different from a näıvely created game that just
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happens to be played on a computer, thus unintentionally being a videogame. The
set of videogames that knowingly follows the tradition includes most large studio
releases, along with many others, that are self-consciously made to be played on
computers in the way videogames have been in the now half-century old tradition.
That they are knowingly related to the videogame tradition does not mean
that they must be particularly self-conscious, at least as that relates to any notion
about critiquing the medium or exploring the essential nature of the medium in
anything like the way Clement Greenberg had in mind.37 Examples are likely to
include videogames like the Assassin’s Creed series, the Call of Duty games, or at
least many iterations of them, and many of the recent EA Sports franchises, as
they are self-consciously participating in the videogame tradition. This set also in-
cludes videogames like Candy Crush Saga, and The Chessmaster 2000 and countless
other straightforwardly ludic videogames. Not only do they intentionally follow the
tradition of being concerned with being played on a computer, as they are they
are intentionally made in the tradition of making videogames, intended to be re-
ceived, engaged with, and appreciated in relation to other members of the class of
videogames.
3.7.2 Transforming
There is a large class of videogames that fail to meet the criteria of being games,
but are self-consciously created as members of the videogame tradition while also
being self-conscious transformations of the concern of being played on a computer.
37See, [2].
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A clear example of this transformation of playing on computers are videogame toys.
Will Wright, esteemed creator of the Sim series of videogames, including SimCity
and The Sims, is widely credited with denying that his creations are games, but
rather “software toys.” Wright is underlining the fact that his works lack the fea-
ture of objective-based gameplay and are instead experiences of exploration and
self-guided play; in other words, they are toys. His videogames often do not meet
the formal criteria of being a game in a Suitsian sense, instead they are an inten-
tional transformation of the property of playing on computers. Will Wright in fact
conscientiously transformed the medium from an action game he worked on titled
Raid on Bungeling Bay. He found himself more interested in building and exploring
the map and began to seek ways to make something that could provide players the
same level of fun, which resulted in his first SimCity title.38
Videogames that are transformative recognize what it is to play a game, or
what it has meant to be a videogame up until this point, but have altered the
goals and rules and other properties so that engaging with them is different than
engaging with a game. An even more extreme example of this are videogames that
serve as toyboxes, objects that games can be created with and played with but
are not games themselves. Examples of these include Garry’s Mod and Tabletop
Simulator. They are not games themselves, but they are self-consciously made in
the videogame tradition while still prescribing that they are played with in some
form, even though it is not strictly a game kind of playing.
38 [134, p. 211]
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3.7.3 Rejection
Still more radical departures from the concern with straightforward game-
playing happen when creators reject the notion of playing a game on a computer.
The rejection of this condition should not be confused with absence of a concern
with it. Works that reject the formalist feature of a medium can be the result of
their creators being particularly sensitive to the restrictions and reactions that the
formal features of the medium seem to demand.
David OReilly’s Mountain is a clear example of this. Mountain is explicitly
and self-consciously about limiting interactivity, which is a rejection of the concern
of playing with computers, while still being intended to be regarded as a videogame.
As noted in the above description, it is clearly and self-consciously categorized as a
videogame, yet it also severely limits the kind and amount of interaction it affords
the player.
We can imagine an even more radical case, a videogame in which no interaction
is afforded the user at all, which is to say that nothing they do can alter or generate
the display in a prescribed manner, but is intended to be regarded in a way that
videogames have been properly been regarded in the past.39 The definition I have
offered entails that such an object would indeed be a videogame, that there could
be a videogame that is not interactive. This may seem absurd on its face, but
the Intentional-Historical Formalist definition makes sense of this claim. Because
39This is different than there being simple stop/start conditions on the videogame. Those might
suffice as rules of a game (see [43, Ch. 6]), but they won’t satisfy the criteria of interactivity, which
is designed to excluded analogous stop/start conditions in cases like DVD players by distinguishing
between access conditions and generation conditions.
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the purported videogame is properly engaged in the intentional-historical manner
required, which includes an appropriate concern for the formalist condition of a
videogame, even an object with no interactivity at all might properly count as a
videogame.
3.7.4 Purely Relational Videogames
Intending a work to be in the tradition of videogames and thus indirectly
demonstrating a concern with being played on a computer can also happen where a
videogame creator creates a videogame that they intend to be part of the videogame
tradition without also self-consciously following, transforming, or rejecting the fea-
ture of playing with computers. This can manifest itself in several different ways,
perhaps more common than might be expected. One is with narratively or aes-
thetically dominant videogames that focus on storytelling or experiences over game
objectives, but are nonetheless intended to be regarded as videogames. This in-
cludes videogames like those from Telltale Games, where the videogames are not
objective-based but narratively focused, where the videogame functions as a way
to tell a story, in conjunction with the user, or videogames like Proteus, which is
about having an exploratory and sonic experience, though the creator insists it is a
game.40
In these cases, it is not an explicit concern with being a game played on a
computer that is being followed, transformed, or rejected, but there is the intention
40See [135] for discussion of the complications this work poses. In the end it seems that the
creators intentions that the work is a game be somewhat determinative. I return to this case
below.
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that the works be regarded as part of the tradition of videogames, whatever that
might be. They are meant to be compared and contrasted with other videogames,
they reference and allude to other videogames, and they are part of an intentional
vein of progress, both technological and stylistic, that is the history of videogames.
This purely relational way of making a videogame is what can account for entries
ranging from straightforward games that we would easily recognize as videogames to
works that are radically different or revolutionary with respect to the medium. The
intent to be regarded as a videogame, even without the specific formalist condition
in mind, but just however videogames happen to be properly regarded, is sufficient
for making something a videogame.
The definition I’ve proposed is successful in at least three ways. First, it cap-
tures the contingent practice of making and appreciating videogames, making sense
of the extension of mainstream videogames that are commercially successful and
are the paradigm cases of videogames. It also makes sense of how other videogame
works relate to this practice and extend it in self-conscious intention to make works
as part of that tradition. This makes sense of the relatively recent renaissance of
so-called “indie” videogames, often made by small teams, that push the boundaries
of what it means to be a videogame without abandoning that tradition. Finally,
the definition also makes sense of how it could be that some videogames fail to be
games, and thus could succeed in being potential candidates for art status.
In several of these ways in which a thing can be a videogame, it is not necessary
that it also be a game. This is the key element in this definition, that an intentional-
historical formalist definition, while making sense of the sufficient videogame-making
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condition that is playing a game on a computer, it also makes sense of how non-
ludic activities that are appropriately related to this concern are also videogames.
In short, videogames do not have to be games. This then leaves open the possibility
that there can be (non-game) videogames that are artworks. Before I consider this
possibility in detail, I will briefly consider other recent philosophical definitions of
videogames and show why they are inadequate to answer whether videogames can
be art.
3.8 Other Definitions
This is not the first time a definition of videogames has been offered. The
proposal offered here has several advantages over those prior offerings. In this section
I consider two definitions that have been offered in the literature and contrast them
with the proposal offered above.41
3.8.1 Lopes
Dominic Lopes has recently proposed a definition of videogames. It should
be obvious by now that I am enthusiastic about several aspects of his account of
computer art and its element. He offers a definition of videogames in service of the
consideration of whether videogames are instances of computer art, a new artform
that he explicates and defends.42 The definition suffers by being considered only in
41I do not here address the relatively large literature from Media Studies. Much of it is tangential
to our concerns here, and what bits are definitional are not adequately rigorous. Examples can be
found in [136], [137], [138], [139], [140], [141], [78], [142], amongst many others.
42 [94]
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relation to other computer art via its status as a game. For Lopes,
an item is a video game just in case (1) it’s a game, (2) it’s interactive,
(3) it’s run on a computer, and (4) it’s interactive because it’s run on a
computer.43
This captures several important elements of videogames. It is often true of
central cases that they are games. Furthermore, conditions (2) - (4) are conditions
that are excellent prima facie conditions for a definition of videogames, especially
given the accounts of computers, interactivity, and displays that he gives. His
definition seems to at least serve as a sufficient condition for something to be a
videogame.
While this definition can be criticized, in Lopes’ defense he is not primarily
concerned with defining videogames, but rather constructing a plausible case for
videogames being art. That said, the main flaw in Lopes’ definition is that it makes
it a necessary condition of videogames that they be games.
There are several reasons, as listed above, to reject gamehood as a necessary
condition for videogames. Primarily it is that it is not obvious that by any going
definition of games, all instances of what we commonly take to be videogames would
count as games. Many cases are more properly categorized as toys or simulations:44
SimCity, Minecraft, Farming Simulator 2013, Silent Service, and countless others.
Still more are better categorized as interactive narratives, and not games: Dear
Esther, Hard Rain, Digital - A Love Story.
43 [94, p. 107]
44Importantly, the referent here are videogame simulations, not actual simulations which have
a different aim, usually training.
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Another reason for being skeptical of gamehood as a necessary condition is
that there seems to be, as argued in Part 2, a conceptual incompatibility between
something’s being a game and its being art. It may be the case that something
cannot be both a game and a work of art. This is not a possibility that Lopes
considers. If games and artworks are incompatible, and there is interest in defending
the art status of some videogames, then it cannot be the case that videogames must
be games.
These concerns may not be decisive on their own, but if videogames can be
defined while avoiding these possible objections, that would serve an interest in
defending them as art, and would also provide an inclusive definition that does not
exclude videogames that are not easily categorized as games.45
3.8.2 Tavinor
Another definition from the philosophical literature is put forward by Grant
Tavinor:
X is a videogame if it is an artifact in a visual digital medium, is intended
as an object of entertainment, and is intended to provide such entertain-
ment through the employment of one or both of the following modes of
engagement: rule and objective gameplay or interactive fiction.46
Tavinor’s definition has advantages over Lopes’, notably in that it extends to
artifacts that are not games. However, there are other points which my proposal
45A definition that does not require that videogames are games would also put to rest the ongoing
hand-wringing in the popular media that certain videogames may in fact be non-games in disguise,
e.g. the discussion over Proteus’ game status.
46 [53, p. 26]
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handles better. First, his definition necessitates that a videogame be visual. This
does not capture the actual practice of a growing community of visually impaired
videogamers and their videogames, as well as those interested in exploring other
sense modalities.47 Recall that this is one of the reasons listed above for why we
should avoid making it analytic that videogames have a video, or in a broader sense
visual, component.
Tavinor recognizes this deficit of his definition and clarifies that his is only a
definition of what he calls the “nominal category” of videogames, and not the broader
category of computer games.48 This, however, is to miss out on much of the point
of offering a definition, that of matching our actual practice of engagement with the
kinds of things we call videogames and making that practice as consistent as we
can; this is the descriptivist methodology of ontology. Of course we could stipulate
a definition that covers only artifacts with visual components, but this would ignore
the community of videogame users that engage with works without visuals, making
the definition under discussion less generally applicable. Tavinor’s definition either
incorrectly defines videogames, or, more charitably, needlessly limits the phenomena
under consideration to something that does not match well with actual practice.
Defining videogames as entertainment is a problematic requirement if one
thinks videogames as a medium could ever, or already have, expanded beyond the
realm of entertainment. This definition assumes a compatibility between art and en-
47See, for instance, http://www.audiogames.net/ They have also replaced ‘video’ with ‘audio’,
highlighting the differences. They intend these works to be in the appreciative realm of videogames
by playing on computers as is done with videogames that present the historically prevalent use of
visuals as the main sense modality. This kind of historical intention is addressed in Section 3.5.
48 [53, p. 28]
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tertainment, or else once a videogame became art it would cease to be entertainment
and, ex hypothesi cease to be a videogame. This would be unacceptable by Tavinor’s
own aims in proposing the definition. Thus entertainment must be broad enough
to be compatible with categories like art, but then it is unclear what phenomenon
‘entertainment’ picks out, threatening to become trivially inclusive and insufficiently
discriminating, allowing a host of uncontroversially non-videogame artifacts to be
included under this definition.
Presented with this objection, Tavinor could intend his use of ‘digital visual
medium’ to discriminate between various objects of entertainment, successfully se-
lecting only the things that would, in addition to the other conditions, only pick
out videogames. Problematically, however, there is a great deal of ambiguity as-
sociated with Tavinor’s use of ‘digital visual medium’; in our vernacular it usually
means something having to do with computers, but we should be more specific.
Videogames do depend on having some kind of relationship with computers, and a
good definition of them should make that relationship clear as well as making what
is meant by ‘digital’ explicit.
Tavinor does not give an explicit account of what he means by ‘digital’. In
explanation of it he references the “invention of the computer, including its crucial
visual display elements.”49 Confusingly, however, he then appeals to an example
of an analog computer that used an analog display. He dismisses these concerns as
being outside the realm of the digital, but reassures us that “the basic prototype -
49 [53, p. 26]
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entertainments in a visual digital setting - can already be seen.”50 It is difficult to
know what to make of this account, but it seems that his notion of ‘digital visual
medium’ means something like a visual display generated by a computer. Unfortu-
nately this is neither definitionally precise nor apt to capture only videogames, as
examples of non-videogame interactive art show.51
There is also concern about Tavinor’s endorsement of a cluster account reading
of what seems otherwise a straightforwardly disjunctive definition. This is not the
place to offer a complete criticism of cluster accounts,52 but such accounts raise
questions about in which cases only one of the disjuncts is necessary and in which
cases both are necessary.53
Tavinor’s disjunctive definition, if it is one, does capture much of what makes
something a videogame, though it is still too narrow, there being videogames that
are not captured by Tavinor’s account, and there being a logical space of potential
videogames left outside his account as well. In some cases this results from Tavinor’s
account of fiction, and the limiting of his definition to only games or interactive
fictions.
Tavinor gives an account of fiction that claims to follows Walton’s, but deviates
from it in some ways.54 Tavinor’s account, however, is not precisely Walton’s and
50 [53, p. 26]
51See [94, Ch. 2] for several examples. Tavinor could respond to Lopes’ examples saying that
they are not entertainment, but this leaves his definition wanting an account of entertainment that
is not present in his explanation. Or, less plausibly, Tavinor could argue for the categorization as
videogames of all interactive art that uses a digital display.
52For an extended discussion on cluster accounts, see Part 1.
53Tavinor notes that there are “at least two necessary conditions”, instead of saying that there
are simply two, one being disjunctive. This leaves open the possibility of there being three necessary
conditions, making his offering not a disjunctive definition, but a cluster account. For arguments
against cluster accounts, see [56] and [41].
54See [89].
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it reconstructs it with varying adherence. At times it countenances videogames as
fictions because “they seek to depict situations with an imaginary existence only.”(
[53, p. 60]). This differs from the earlier claim that he intends “a robust meaning
for the term, where fiction is something more than this symbolic activity; it is where
representations are used as props for envisaging a world with an imagined existence
only.”( [53, p. 24]). Perhaps Tavinor intends a weak notion of “world” that would
include any imaginative practice. This is undermined however, by his claim that the
representational symbols of Tetris do not count as fictions. This is an odd claim,
as Tetris blocks are shaped so as to give the impression of them having dimension,
being physical blocks in space, when this is, strictly speaking, false; they are only
shapes of light being displayed on a screen. We are being asked to make-believe that
they are physical blocks that extend into space. That account Tavinor gives is not
Walton’s account of fiction, wherein anything that serves as a prop for make-believe
counts as a fiction.
While Tavinor gives a more restricted account of fiction than Walton does,
even under the broadest interpretation of Walton’s account, there are videogames
that fall outside of it. Consider Super Hexagon, a borderline case of make-believe
in a Waltonian sense. Super Hexagon is a fast-paced rhythm action game where
the user navigates a small triangle out of pulsating, constricting sets of concentric
shapes. It’s possible that no imagination is prescribed at all when engaging Super
Hexagon. We perhaps imagine the player-controlled triangle to be in the foreground,
floating above the background, make-believing a depth of space that is not really
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there. If this is a fiction, it is a fiction of the sparest sort.55 However, it is very
easy to imagine a videogame that does not have even this thin element of fiction
to it, one where the user is engaging only with, for example, shapes displayed on
a screen, neither suggesting nor prescribing any imaginative act of make-believe.
Given Tavinor’s definition, such a videogame could also fail to be game, thus not
satisfying either of Tavinor’s disjuncts.56 Such a case may be rare—in fact it is rare,
if it even exists—but such definitional exceptions have never been a barrier to artists
in the past; indeed, they have been incitement, and a definition of videogames ought
to capture such cases, both actual and possible.
3.9 Entailments and Deviations
The intentional-historical formalist definition that I have defended includes
what are considered mainstream videogames. It can also include works that deviate
significantly from paradigm cases, as long as they do so with the certain intentions.
This happens in some ways that are less severe and more predictable, like the de-
velopment of different interfaces, such as virtual reality headsets and Rock Band
videogame instruments. But it also includes cases that deviate more radically from
what we normally expect from a videogame. One of these is Michael Newman’s
Video Game Sans Video project, in which a physical rocket is moved along an x
55cf. [89, p. 54 ff] on the fictional element present even in abstract art.
56What would such a videogame look like? Imagine an abstract shape and sound videogame, one
that lets you play with different shapes and sounds with an objective to accomplish. Non-objective
videogames aimed primarily at generating a visual and sonic experience like Tale of Tales’ Luxuria
Superbia or Lumines get close to this, one would only need to remove the minimal Waltonian
fictive elements and make them about shapes on the screen, without any fiction about their spatial
arrangement.
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and y axis over a hand-drawn paper background of obstacles that scrolls by. The
interactivity is still handled by a computer, but we have a physical display instead of
an electronic ‘video’ one. Another example is Jason Rohrer’s Minecraft as religion
project. He created a single instance world of Minecraft that existed solely on a
single USB drive. The work prescribes that any player in possession of it may play
until his or her avatar dies, then the player must pass it on to another player, never
to interact with the work again. Of course these prescriptions can be disobeyed, but
to disobey them is to not engage with the work properly. As the work is prescribed,
however, it deviates strongly from the oft-repeatable nature of videogames, while
being obviously intended as a member of that tradition.
3.9.1 The Value of This Definition
The value of videogames as an appreciative kind overlapping with computer art
but not as a subset of it allows us to borrow resources from that appreciative practice
without being held to all the same standards for evaluation. The broadly historical
account I have offered also makes sense of the varied ends to which videogames are
put, while also subjecting them to a related set of evaluative criteria. This aims, and
I believe succeeds, in giving a clear account of the actual borders of the appreciative
practice that has developed as part of the tradition of videogames.
Furthermore, if the definition I have presented is successful it suggests, along
with the success of similar Intentional-Historical Formalist definitions of poems and
screenplays,57 that an Intentional-Historical Formalist definition might be successful
57See, respectively, [118] and [119]
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for all artforms, and possibly all kinds of works. I am optimistic that this is the case,
though I do not defend it here. But given the historically informed template style
of the intentional and historical components along with the contingent functional or
morphological aspect of the formalist condition, it seems likely that a wide-ranging
application of this model might be in store.
If this is so, then the interesting work is not just in the defending of the
Intentional-Historical Formalist account for artworks, works, or artifacts generally,
but the giving of the formalist aspect of the definition. Giving this roughly necessary
condition, one intended for the proper regarding along with demonstrating concern
with whatever the proper aims are, either näıvely or by following, transforming,
or rejecting it, may be sufficient to provide a definition for any particular artifact
kind.58
Past definitions of videogames have failed at capturing the proper class of
artifacts and their nature. I have proposed and defended an Intentional-Historical
Formalist definition of videogames, as has successfully been done in the past for
certain artforms and in a general sense for art. A virtue of this definition is that it
captures the class of what are uncontroversially videogames while also making sense
of seemingly borderline cases and even avant-garde or revolutionary candidates.
It does so while recognizing a contingent intrinsic property, what I have called
playing with computers. It allows for this concern to be a sufficient condition while
58This is distinct from Paul Bloom’s argument that Levinson’s Intentional-Historical account
can be directly applied to all artifacts ( [143]). Levinson rightly rejects this possibility, citing the
idiosyncratic nature of art as a purely intentional-historical concept. This does not settle, however,
whether non-art works and perhaps artifacts in general could be accommodated with the addition
of a formalist component as given above.
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allowing proper concern with regards to that property to qualify something as a
videogame rather than requiring unequivocal exemplification of that property. This
flexibility allows the definition to more adequately categorize videogames than other
definitions, while also being prepared to handle radical and future cases.
3.10 Videogame Art
We come now to the main question: Can videogames be art? With a definition
of videogames in hand, along with the findings of Part One and Two, we have the
resources to finally address the art question for videogames. As is probably evident
by now, on my view it turns out that videogames can be art, though in many, or
even most, cases they are not, and when they are not it is often because they are
games, which I have argued cannot be art.
The Intentional-Historical Formalist definition entails several things about
videogames. One is that it is relatively easy to create a videogame, even if it is
not easy to create a good videogame. This is as we should expect it to be, finding
analogs in other art forms, e.g. it is easy to make a painting, while making a good
one is a more difficult endeavor. This is also the proper outcome of being careful to
keep separate the classificatory and evaluative notions of a definition. Many tradi-
tional theories of art fall into this trap, confusing what makes an artwork good for
what makes it an artwork.
No such confusion has happened here, though I may hazard a proposition that
what makes something an artwork and what makes something a good artwork are
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not wholly unrelated. It is at least prima facie plausible that demonstration of
concern with the sufficient intrinsic property of videogames, namely being played
on a computer, is a central element in what makes a videogame valuable, much as
modernist painting’s concern with being flat objects that represent space was part
of what made those paintings good. Not that a videogame must have that feature,
as we have seen that it can be self-consciously rejected, but the way in which it
concerns itself with that notion, whether it be in an aesthetically interesting way,
or by being just good fun, can bear on its quality.
But aside from what makes a videogame a videogame, can a videogame also
be art? The definition here avoids the seemingly universal negative conclusion of
Part Two, where it is shown that games and art are not compatible, and which
threatened to show that no videogame could ever be an artwork. We see now that a
videogame need not be a game, that the category of videogames as works is broader
than that of games.
That videogames need not be games is no answer in itself to the art question
of videogames. Most things that are not games are also not art, but of course some
things that are not games are art. Even if we can eliminate from art-status consid-
eration all videogames that are games, we must still have a way of distinguishing
among the remaining possible art candidate videogames.
In consideration of which non-ludic videogames might be art we turn back to
consider the findings of Part One, where an Intentional-Historical definition of art
was defended. Recall the definition given there, roughly that something is a work
of art if it is intended for regard in the way that past artworks have been properly
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regarded. The question before us now is whether videogames, or at least non-ludic
videogames, can be so regarded.
We know that ludic videogames cannot be given the kind of regard that is
proper for artworks. This is simply a result from the incompatibility argument in
Part Two. But the incompatibility argument is only about videogames that are
games. Videogames that are not games are still candidates for art status under the
Intentional-Historical definition of art. What we need is, rather than an incompati-
bility argument, a compatibility argument, one showing that something can be both
a videogame and an artwork.
3.10.1 A Compatibility Argument
It might be argued offhand that in absence of an incompatibility argument for
all videogames, as opposed to games, any non-ludic videogame should be considered
a potential candidate for art status until an incompatibility argument presents itself.
This is a tack I am tempted to take, and show how specific cases can be artworks,
letting that be a sufficient counterexample to any possible incompatibility arguments
about videogames.
The first concern is the possibility of some other incompatibility argument
about videogames. Is there some necessary condition of videogames or art that
is incompatible with a necessary condition of the other? For other definitions of
videogames, and art for that matter, there may be, for instance the requirement of
Tavinor’s definition that videogames be objects of entertainment. The notion of so-
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called mass art, and skepticism about its art-status, is something that has occupied
writers about popular media for some time.59
An Intentional-Historical Formalist definition of videogames avoids the prob-
lems of prima facie incompatibilty by making clear that while there is an intrinsic
concern that videogames have, one that can sometimes function as a sufficient in-
trinsic condition, objects can also be videogames because of a historical relation
between what a thing is now and what things were videogames in the past. This
means that objects of a relatively varied sort can end up being videogames under
this definition than might be under other definitions.
It also means that videogames do not rely solely on the possession of a par-
ticular intrinsic property to be videogames. The incompatibility argument shows
that if something is a game then it cannot be art, but it does not show an incom-
patibility with the intentional-historical connections to such a property. Thus when
something is a videogame in virtue of an historical relation to its defining scheme,
that of self-consciously following, transforming, or rejecting the concern with being
played on a computer, or simply intending it to be a member of the tradition of
videogames, it avoids the consequence of the incompatibility argument.
Avoiding the consequence of the incompatibility argument means that there
are then videogames that, if they also have the features required to make them
artworks, can be artworks. This would require that a videogame be seriously, or
non-passingly, intended for regard as artworks in the past have been properly re-
garded. Non-ludic videogames that are so in virtue of the appropriate relational
59See [144] for a sustained consideration, and rejection, of this possible incompatibility.
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intention seem to be candidates for such regard. Nothing stands in the way of these
videogames being regarded, for example, “with close attention to form, with open-
ness to emotional suggestion, with awareness of symbolism”.60 Nor is there anything
that is incompatible with these works being intended to be regarded as particular
individual or groups of artworks in the past have been properly regarded, whatever
those ways were. Nor, finally, is there anything incompatible about someone cre-
ating a non-ludic videogame and also intending that it simply be regarded as an
artwork.
3.11 Art Videogames
It is perhaps enough to settle the debate about videogames and art to have
provided an answer to the art question of videogames that provides for the concep-
tual possibility of art videogames. What would be even more interesting is if an
example could be found of an actual videogame that was also art. Below is a small
selection of possible candidates, their proposed art status, and explanatory consid-
erations. Importantly, the art status of a videogame cannot be discerned from its
intrinsic properties alone. It requires the right kind of art-regarding intentions. We
can speculate, however, as we do with all artworks, about the presence or absence
of such intentions in light of their more apparent properties.
60 [61, p. 39]
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3.11.1 Artwork Videogame Candidates
3.11.1.1 Mountain
David OReilly’s 2014 Mountain is an obvious case for an artwork videogame.
The creator makes it clear that it is a videogame in both its explicit description and
in its apparent properties. Furthermore, OReilly is an artist who decided to work in
the videogame medium for this piece. His usual works are video pieces, and he was
contracted to make a prop work that appeared as a videogame in the movie Her.
With these considerations in mind, it is a relatively straightforward case to make
that Mountain has been intended to be a videogame, doing so by appropriately
concerning itself with the tradition of videogames through self-consciously rejecting
the interactive element of videogames. It is also fairly clear that the work is intended
to be regarded as an artwork, at least in the relational sense, in that, among other
evidence, OReilly presents the work alongside his other less controversially art pieces.
3.11.1.2 Amnesia: Dark Descent
Amnesia is a videogame whose creators understand that making a videogame
brings with it tacit prescriptions for how it should be engaged with. They seek
to alter these prescriptions, but are aware of the limitations of doing so merely
by implicit means within the work itself. In light of this, they offer an explicit
announcement of the different prescription for how to engage with their work. The
following announcement appears when first engaging with the work:
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Amnesia should not be played to win.
Instead, focus on immersing yourself in the game’s world and story.
Two things are clear from this. One, the creators understand what games
are, how people engage with them, and that they do not want people to engage
with Amnesia in this way. Secondly, they replace that mode of engagement with a
different one, one intended to focus on elements that are distinct from the objects
of focus were Amnesia a game.
It is a further question whether a “focus on immersing yourself in the game’s
world and story” is sufficient to qualify the work as an artwork. But Amnesia
serves as an excellent work to consider for two reasons. One, it makes explicit the
creator’s intentions and the bearing that they have on the way one’s interactions
with the work count as proper or not. And two, it demonstrates the pervasive use
of the term ‘game’ in the videogame world, ubiquitous enough that we now have
videogame designers asking their audience not to treat their ‘games’ like games.
3.11.1.3 Journey
Thatgamecompany’s Journey is the most straightforwardly a videogame of the
candidates I will consider. It was developed by Jenova Chen who has developed sev-
eral videogames, including Flow and Flower. Journey is, at one level of abstraction,
a 3-D platformer, but with a muted cooperative multiplayer element. As players
attempt to traverse the landscape they will sometimes encounter other players that
look similar to them. The work does not make it explicit that these are controlled
by other players, also taking part in the same journey; this is only revealed at the
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end, and on a first play through may be a surprise. The journey turns out to be a
metaphor for life and its rhythmic cycle, the player encountering several narrative
elements describing the birth, life, death, and rebirth of the journeyers.
The work is beautiful, breathtaking in parts, and accompanied by a wistful
musical score that accentuates the feeling of reflection on a life passed. In particular
it works in conjunction with the incidental interactions with other players to suggest
the sometimes transient, sometimes profound, ways in which our interactions with
others can affect the path taken in life. Sometimes a fellow traveler is found early
on and you stick together until the end; other times various travelers come in and
out of your journey, staying with you for only a brief time.
What is challenging about this case is that it has many elements suggestive
of a game, in that there is a goal you are trying to reach and there are obstacles to
reaching that goal. The work certainly provides a virtual apparatus on which a game
can be played. The question is whether the work contains within it a prescription
that a game should be played on it. It seems as though this is not the case, and for
the reasons given in the Incompatibility Argument.
In support of the idea that Chen has artistic goals in mind, it should be noted
that he is a graduate of the University of Southern California’s School of Cinematic
Arts’ Interactive Media Program. His earlier work, Flower, examines the tension,
contrast, and conflict of nature and the urban setting. While Chen has clearly
situated Journey as a videogame, he seems to have something other than making
a game as an objective. The work prescribes a kind of total aesthetic appreciation,
and leverages the interactive nature of the medium to this end. It seeks to get the
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player to reflect on the beauty, though passing, of life and how our interactions
with others impact this quality. These are ways of appreciating the aesthetics and
contents of a work in a totalizing way. It seems to me that concerns like these are
thoroughgoing enough and of the right sort to count as art-regarding intentions,
that these are ways that artworks have been properly intended for regard in the
past. If this is the case, then Journey is a work that is both a videogame and an
artwork.
Analyses such as this are likely to hold for host of videogames, ones that
employ common videogame tropes and mechanics, but put them to non-ludic use,
like narrative or emotional exploration. While the final categorization depends in
part on the intentions of the creator, convincing cases can be made that these works
are intended for kinds of regard that are ways artworks have been properly regarded
in the past. Videogames like the previously mentioned That Dragon, Cancer and
Dear Esther, but also classic “videogamey” works that have epic narratives, like the
Final Fantasy and Metal Gear Solid series, are plausible candidates for this kind
of intentional regarding. These latter works are situated on the boundary between
game and non-game, and careful examination would be needed into what exactly the
prescriptions of each work are. But we now have the tools to engage in examinations




Ed Kay and David Kanaga’s Proteus is a more challenging candidate. As
with any videogame, the distinction between whether it is a game or an artwork, or
something else, rests in part on the intentions of the creator. To be a game there
must be the prescription that the work be engaged in with the lusory attitude. To
be an artwork the creator must intend that the work be regarded as an artwork.
However, it is only in the art case that the intention is sufficient. Artworks are
radically historical in ways that games are not; they require an intention, but they
must meet the other criteria as well. Proteus, at least at first glance, seems to meet
the criteria of a game, even if there are what appear to be game-status overriding
art-making aesthetic and expressivist goals. This has led several critics to categorize
Proteus as an anti-game, and there has been much hand-wringing over whether it
even is a game, sometimes expressing concern over whether it is actually an artwork
disguised as a game or videogame.61
The creator, however, insists that it is a game. Whether or not he is sincere, or
has a proper understanding of what a game is, is a matter of debate, but this is a case
where the author’s actual intentions seem to matter. Proteus can be understood as
a game. There is a goal, and there are inefficiencies in place to prevent one from
achieving the goal directly—that is, obstacles, however slight, to be overcome. The
issue is whether the work involves a prescription to treat it as a game or regard it
as a work of art. Our best evidence suggests that it is intended to be played as a
61See [135] and [145].
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game, even if the elements of the work strain against such a description.
3.11.1.5 Clouds
Finally, I present a candidate that is clearly an artwork made from videogames,
but is not itself a videogame. Cory Arcangel’s Clouds plays on a television and is
an 8-bit representation of clouds floating by in the sky. They appear to be like the
clouds that are in the sky in Super Mario Bros. They do not merely appear to be so,
but are in fact clouds from Super Mario Bros.. They are not even copies of clouds
from that work, but are clouds generated by the videogame, but with everything else
stripped away. Arcangel modified an actual Super Mario Bros. cartridge so that it
would only display the clouds and it runs on an original Nintendo Entertainment
System.
The work is not interactive, nor is it intended to be interacted with. It is part
of the collection of the Whitney Museum of American Art. Important to the work
is that it is made out of a videogame, but this does not make it itself a videogame.
Similar things have been done with machinima, where people use videogames as
a kind of puppet and set to create their own dramatic productions. This exploits
videogame technology, but in a way that makes works outside of the tradition of
videogames, though referencing it. Thus Arcangel’s work is essentially related to
videogames, but is not itself a videogame.
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3.12 Conclusion
These examples serve to show two things. The first is the use to which a
thoroughgoing definition of videogames and art can be put in helping to clarify
whether and which videogames can be art. The second is to show that indeed there
can be videogames that can be art. However, the definition of videogames is such
that something need not be a game to be a videogame and this preserves it as
at least a candidate for art status. Of those candidates, some of them also meet
the conditions for art status, namely that they are intended by their creators for
regard as a work of art. And, it turns out, there are actual videogames that appear
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